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AN ANALYTICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
SOVIET UNION AS ADAPTED FOR USE IN SAUDI ARABIA
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
This study is designed to provide an analysis of the 
international communication goals, techniques, and effective­
ness of the United States and the Soviet Union and to create 
a plan to permit the Saudi Arabian government either to de­
velop new techniques or improve existing ones in its inter­
national communication system. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
would be well advised to consider and possibly implement 
changes in its international communications system to keep 
abrest of both social development inside the Kingdom and 
other nations' improvement of their communication systems. 
Evidence of a worldwide interest in social and economic 
change has been evinced for more than a quarter century.
In 1958, the United Nations' General Assembly " . . .  called 
for a program of concrete action to build up press, radio.
broadcasting, film, and television facilities in countries 
in the process of economic and social development. During 
the last twenty years, conferences have been conducted at 
the University of Hawaii's East-West Center to discuss the 
process of development, the strategies for change as used 
in developing countries, and the role of mass communications 
in furthering that change. All countries, in a sense, are 
developing countries. Development is the method by which 
a society gains the ability to improve the quality of life 
for its people. Development cannot come solely from outside 
a nation; it must come from the residents living there, al­
though any developing country can accept assistance from 
other, more affluent nations. Since World War II, the con­
cept that more affluent nations could help those who are
2less fortunate has gained worldwide acceptance.
However, development cannot occur in a well devised, 
coherent manner without some sort of strategy for planned 
change, and two of the most common employ a capital-intensive 
strategy on the one hand, or a labor-intensive strategy on 
the other. This useful distinction is developed more fully 
in Schramm and Lerner's Communications and Change, (1976) 
and is useful in this analysis of change. Though different 
in approach, these two broad theories of development both 
depend heavily upon communications. Before we specify the 
role of communications, we will review briefly these two 
approaches to development and their relevance to Saudi Arabia.
An urban-based, capital-intensive strategy is based 
on the theory that industrialization and its new technology 
will be located in urban areas where there are a sufficient 
number of educated people to provide the labor necessary 
to use the modern technology. Stated differently, these 
industries would use advanced machines, requiring a great 
deal of financial outlay to build and install but would re­
quire very little labor to run them. There was a demand 
for skilled workers, but not a large one. And if the gross 
national product increased by about two or three percent 
per year, the benefits would eventually trickle down to all
3segments of the population.
As a result, many underdeveloped countries— including 
Saudi Arabia— began to employ high tariffs, overhaul their 
financial systems so industries could but machinery and raw 
materials, provide tax exemptions and government subsidies 
and " . . .  concentrated on the construction of roads, utilities, 
buildings, and the like in the large cities and established 
schools and training centers that turned out workers with
4skills needed for the new industry."
However, there is a problem with this type of develop­
ment strategy. Those nations implementing this type of strategy 
and their leaders often do not realize that sustained growth 
cannot occur by using modern technology only in central areas 
and ignoring rural areas or smaller villages. The reason 
the strategy often fails is that for it to succeed, demand
for whatever product the new technology is producing must 
continue to increase. Skilled laborers and planners find 
their incomes rising, while other segments of the population 
find their incomes lowered— and in many cases, discover they 
are worse off than before "progress" began.
In contrast, the aim of a rural-based, labor-intensive 
strategy is to create more jobs and to produce more food.
The labor-intensive strategy depends upon " . . .  integrated 
rural development, agricultural intensification, appropriate 
technology . . . small industry promotion, health develop­
ment and so f o r t h . I n  short, development cannot occur 
if there is not an interrelation between technological ad­
vances and social changes.^ Underdeveloped countries can 
go only a short way with capital-intensive projects. However, 
labor is plentiful; thus labor-intensive projects must play 
a prominent part in an overall development strategy.
Saudi Arabia finds itself in the unusual situation 
of being viewed as a developing nation, but the Kingdom in­
creasingly assumes the characteristics of more developed 
countries. Since its creation in 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia has been a developing country. Since then it has 
emerged from a nation struggling to catch up with the de­
velopments of the Twentieth Century into a major world power, 
capable of utilizing the most advanced forms of technology 
to meet the needs of its people. During the early stages, 
a capital-intensive development strategy was used. In latter
stages, a combination of both capital-intensive and labor- 
intensive strategies have been utilized to bring the Kingdom 
to where it is today. Obviously, the mix of these two types 
of strategies will depend upon a nation's degree of under­
development, the extent of labor surplus, the availability 
of natural resources and other natural endowments, such as 
money. It is important to realize that the role of mass 
communication is greatly enhanced in a labor-intensive strat­
egy because more people with less education in remote regions 
must be reached than in a capital-intensive strategy. Be­
cause Saudi Arabia has developed into a major world power, 
capable of using the most advanced forms of technology to 
meet its people's needs, the next phase of Saudi Arabian 
development probably ought to include the continued use of 
technology to establish a sophisticated communications system 
to interpret the Kingdom's foreign policy, cultural, and 
religious heritage, social traditions, economic development 
and political stability to the rest of the world. However, 
before the need for an effective Saudi Arabian communications 
system can be explained, it is necessary to understand some 
basic facts about the Kingdom.
The Saudi government, which has been in power since 
1932, has directed political, economic, and social choices 
to ensure the country's evolution from an underdeveloped 
nation to a modern one in a careful, measured combination 
of capital-intensive and labor-intensive strategies. In
1964 in his book Mass Media and National Development, Schramm 
defined underdeveloped or developing countries as those
7. . in which the annual per capita income is $300 or less."
The rising power of the oil nations since 1973 and 
their suddenly increased wealth, has given a sudden 
boost to their development efforts. Previously, al­
most all of the "Third World" countries were poor.
Now about 250 million people in oil-exporting coun­
tries . . . have the economic requisites for rapid 
development. Some observers divided the old Third 
World countries into two (rich/poor) by splitting 
off a "Fourth World" of forty countries with about 
900 million people (about one-third of the world's 
population) averaging a per capita income of less 
than $150 per year. The Fourth World is concentrated 
in the Indian subcontinent, sub-Saharan Africa and in 
pockets within Latin America. . . . Oil power has 
set back the pace of development in those resource- 
poor nations, who are now faced with rapidly rising 
energy and food prices and a scarcity of foreign
exchange.8
Political decisions regarding ways of improving a peoples' 
quality of life can be made in a country's capital. But 
they must be carried out on the local level. If a country 
has a poor transportation system, or if most of its people 
seldom travel more than a few miles from their home village, 
as was the case in Saudi Arabia, then, " . . .  mass communica­
tions must be relied on to transmit information and education 
in a two-way flow from the center to the hinterland and vice 
v e r s a . I n  addition, it is important to realize that there 
are often small, but very powerful groups, which may be op­
posed to change of any type. Because of their power, they 
can cause confusion and block any progress. Therefore, their 
viewpoints must be considered during any discussions provided 
through the mass media, and those in power must make the
effort to persuade them of the necessity of such change.
Thus, the role of mass communications is greatly expanded 
in a labor-intensive strategy because more people with less 
education in remote regions must be reached than in a capital- 
intensive strategy. If social values are to be changed, 
the people need to know more about all aspects of their cul­
ture, recreation, leisure and living patterns of people in 
all walks of life if mass communications are to be both in­
formative and persuasive.
In 1958 Saudi Arabia was listed as an underdeveloped 
country with a per capita income of $101 (SR 336)^^ to $300 
(SR 993). Clearly, Saudi Arabia with its per capita income 
of almost $7,000 (SR 23,980)^^ per year in 1975 no longer 
fits that category, although the report included almost all 
the Middle East in its classification of underdeveloped coun­
tries.
Certainly the discovery of oil has played a vital 
role in the Kingdom's development, providing a solid econo­
mic foundation from which the country can operate. Oil power 
has set back the pace of development in other, more resource- 
poor nations, which are now faced with rapidly rising energy 
and food prices and a scarcity of foreign exchange. Another 
factor contributing to Saudi Arabia's advancement is the 
unique blend of government and religion. The Kingdom, with 
its holy cities of Mecca and Medina, is regarded by the world's 
some 700 to 800 million Muslims as the center of the Islamic
faith. Government and religion are even more closely related 
in the Kingdom's use of the Holy Koran as a national consti­
tution. Saudi Arabia's location in the strategically impor­
tant Middle East has made it a country which must be taken 
into consideration by other nations when formulating their 
own foreign policy.
Therefore, considering the magnitude of its responsi­
bilities, its prestigious international standing, and its 
significant role in domestic, Arab, Islamic and world affairs, 
and its careful blend of capital-intensive and labor-intensive 
development strategies, it seems only natural that the Saudi 
Arabian government probably ought to have the most up-to- 
the-minute methods of communications now used in more advanced 
countries.
This conclusion is based on the reality of the vital 
and far reaching influence of information in its wider sense 
and upon the political realities of leading affairs of state. 
As mentioned earlier, a mass communications system can be 
most helpful in carrying out social change, particularly 
if a small but powerful group is opposed to change of any 
type. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the small but powerful 
group consists of religious leaders, which the government 
cannot ignore, simply because of the tradition of the close 
relationship between government and religion which will be 
explained in detail in Chapter Two. However, this group can 
cause confusion and block any progress, and Schramm quoting 
Dr. Harry Oshima at the 1975 East-West conference elaborated.
labor must be re-educated and manpower training 
reoriented. . . . New institutions and organiza­
tions in the rural areas must be established, 
while old values must be modified and new values 
promoted. . . . The key problem of the new strat­
egy is implementation, so that its success may de­
pend very much on the ability of mass media to in­
form, persuade, and educate. Mass communication 
may turn out to be the most important medium of 
education, whether formal or informal . . .13
Purpose of the Study
The ultimate purpose of this study is to suggest im­
provements in Saudi Arabian international outreach efforts. 
Since there is little precedent for this in the Kingdom,
I propose to compare the two superpowers, the United States 
and the Soviet Union, and adapt from their strategies those 
approaches which might serve to benefit the Saudi Arabian 
effort. It is ironic to note that two of the major Allies 
in World War II, the United States and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, are now engaged in a bitter battle for 
world supremacy. However instead of using atomic submarines 
or intercontinental ballistic missiles, the war is waged 
on an entirely different battleground— within the minds of 
those persons throughout the entire world, whom both super­
powers wish to convince of the correctness of their political 
philosophies. Therefore, I have first analyzed both the 
United States' and the Soviet Union's international communi­
cation systems in terms of Western mass communication theories. 
Next, I have examined the techniques, goals and effectiveness
10
of the United States International Communication Service; 
the techniques, goals and effectiveness of the Soviet Union's 
international communication service and the techniques, goals, 
and effectiveness of Saudi Arabia's international outreach 
efforts. The ultimate objective of this study is to deter­
mine which goals and techniques to achieve them will be most 
effective for use by Saudi Arabia. Studying the superpowers 
provided the information about communication techniques, 
and the study of the Kingdom's international outreach efforts 
pinpointed some of the flaws therein.
Obviously, acquiring the data necessary to create 
an entirely new international information dissemination sys­
tem for Saudi Arabia was more difficult in some areas than 
in others. For example, it was relatively easy to determine 
mass communication theories which applied to both the United 
States and the Soviet Union. It was also relatively easy 
to determine the United States' communication goals and al­
though determining the effectiveness of the efforts proved 
to be another problem. It was also possible to study other 
scholars' analyses of Soviet communication techniques, but 
the Russian government's tendency to secrecy made it possible 
to determine only a general goal— to enhance the Soviet Union's 
reputation among people of other nations. And, as with the 
United States, an accurate measurement of Russian propaganda 
techniques is not possible. Therefore, it was necessary 
both to study other scholars' general conclusions concerning
11
the probable specific goals and the success or failure of 
Soviet communication strategies and to observe the physical 
results of these efforts, that is, actual Russian use of 
the mass media. In sharp contrast, information about the 
recently renamed United States International Communications 
Agency is easily available, making U.S. communications strat­
egies more readily adaptable for use in Saudi Arabia. There­
fore, this study, which will be conducted in the tradition 
of action research, is designed to serve both academic and 
practical purposes. The main objective, then, is to create 
a program to provide an integrated, advanced use of inter­
national communications activities so that the Saudi Arabian 
government can derive all possible benefits from it at domes­
tic, Arabic, Islamic, and especially world levels. This 
study will reflect an analysis of theories of both the United 
States and Russia as influenced by the cultural needs and 
social traditions of both superpowers as well as the communi­
cations need and social traditions of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.
Related and Previous Investigations
This study is the first of its kind to focus on a 
Saudi Arabian international communications system. Although 
relatively little has been written about the mass media in 
Saudi Arabia, at least two studies have been completed, but 
only one of these by a Saudi Arabian. The first academic
12
study, conducted by Dr. Abdulrahman S. Shobaili, the former
director general of television, in his masters thesis which
centered on the development of a television broadcasting
system within the Kingdom and emphasized the influence of
the Saudi Arabian government. Dr. Shobaili continued to
develop his research in his doctoral dissertation for the
University of Ohio, emphasizing Saudi Arabian mass media
in a four-part work. Three of the chapters discussed the
developments of the print media, including privately owned
newspapers and the government's radio and television systems.
The fourth section discusses informational activities, the
print media, and the development of radio and television
systems. The section on television was taken from the 1969
14thesis, but it was updated. Although I could not find 
any other record of any thesis or dissertation, there were 
two books which were extremely helpful in providing informa­
tion about the Kingdom's mass media. These are The Area 
Handbook for Saudi Arabia by Norman C. Walpole and King 
Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia, edited by 
Willard Beling.
Douglas A. Boyd, in his dissertation, concentrates 
on the continued development of a Saudi Arabian television 
system, particularly in terms of the effect of American in­
fluence on the system. Boyd's work also examines the under­
lying reasons why the Saudi Arabian government elected to
15establish a government-operated system. However, the
13
discussion of the development of television and governmental 
influence is more helpful in Beling*s collection of articles.
Other references to the mass media, although not 
scholarly or useful as academic references were available 
in articles in the Christian Science Monitor, the New York 
Times, the Washington Post, the London Times, the Wall Street 
Journal. TV Guide, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, 
and Saudi Arabian newspapers and news magazines. Other schol­
arly articles have discussed American influence on the develop­
ment of Saudi Arabian television, and there are numerous 
works on the use of the mass media as a tool for political, 
sociological, and political development, hence the need for 
an interdisciplinary approach. All of these works are in­
formative, important, and useful as an integral part of this 
research. But no matter how much background perspective 
these readings might provide, they do not speak to the main 
research goal of this study— devising an effective inter­
national communications system for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, the main thrust of this research is not intended 
solely to examine the mass media in the role of a domestic 
communications system in the Kingdom. Rather, it is designed 
to concentrate on how the Saudi Arabian government could 
use these media in conjunction with other sources to communi­
cate wisely and effectively at the international level.
14
Organization of the Study
Chapter Two is historical in nature. It traces the 
history of Saudi Arabia and also includes a brief history 
of the Kingdom's cultural, educational, economic, religious, 
and political systems, but only insofar as these factors 
affect the development of a Saudi Arabian international com­
munications system.
Chapter Three briefly analyzes the significant dif­
ferences in the international communications services of 
the two major powers— the United States and the Soviet Union, 
focusing on those particular characteristics, policies, and 
communications procedures which can be adapted to fit Saudi 
Arabian needs.
The decision to focus on the democratic and communist 
superpowers was not made lightly. Early readings showed 
that in the free world, the British, French, and West German 
international communications systems receive less money and 
reach a smaller audience because the United States possesses 
the fortunate combination of freedom of information, guaran­
teed by the First Amendment of the United States' Constitution, 
personnel with the proper training in mass communications 
technology, and sufficient funds and the inclination to finance 
a worldwide operation. Additionally, preliminary research 
revealed that any international outreach attempts made by 
the communist satellite nations are largely controlled by 
and therefore patterned upon the Soviet Union's efforts.
15
Communist China was excluded because most of its international 
outreach is concentrated upon other Asian nations.
Thus the two countries having the most effective inter­
national communications systems, and therefore more worthy 
of a scholarly observation of goals and strategies used to 
achieve those objectives are the United States and the Soviet 
Union. As mentioned earlier, the United States International 
Communications Agency was the easier of the two to study, 
mainly because it makes its goals and strategies to achieve 
them public as required by law. The Soviet Union's inter­
national communications efforts were observed and then analyzed, 
although the task was more difficult.
This study focuses on those particular techniques 
and goals which were adapted and applied to Saudi Arabian 
needs. The next step, undertaken in Chapter Four, was to 
review and evaluate the existing domestic and international 
communications systems in Saudi Arabia, including a brief 
history of the Ministry of Information and the Higher Council 
of Information. The necessity for this is developed early 
in Chapter Four.
Chapter Five summarizes and focuses on why Saudi Arabia 
needs an international communications system and proposes 
a workable plan for its establishment, which could be modi­
fied for use in other Third World countries.
16
Methods of Research
The methods of research used in this study are his­
torical, descriptive, analytical, and a relative newcomer 
to the field of scholarly research endeavors— action research. 
The method of research for Chapter Two is historical, concen­
trating on the background and history of Saudi Arabia as 
these factors pertain to the need for and the requirements 
of an international communications system for the Kingdom.
In Chapter Three, there is first an analysis of Western mass 
communications theories, followed by analyses of the U.S. 
International Communications Agency's worldwide information 
dissemination efforts and the goals to achieve those commu­
nications objectives. Information for the Soviet strategy 
was analyzed by studying the work of other scholars and ex­
amples of Soviet international outreach efforts. Thus in 
this study, information about the Soviet Union was related 
both to historical and current political, sociological, and 
psychological literature concerning communications and systems 
theories. Using the action research perspective developed 
in the United States, the end result was the determination 
of which communications strategies were adaptable for use 
in Saudi Arabia and why. Chapter Four will be an historical 
analysis of the Ministry of Information and a descriptive 
analysis of the Saudi Arabian international and domestic 
communications system and an explanation of the Higher Council
17
of Information and Its role in international outreach efforts. 
Chapter Five will be an analysis of the need for and proposal 
of a plan for an international communications system for 
the Kingdom.
I expected the observations in Chapter Four to show 
numerous gaps in the Kingdom's existing international commu­
nications system, and these gaps will be pinpointed and de­
fined as the first step in establishing Saudi Arabia's need 
for such a system. Once the need for an international commu­
nications system is established, analysis focused on how 
Saudi Arabia could attain its international outreach goals 
through modifying and utilizing selected American and Soviet 
strategies. This plan will reflect Saudi Arabian goals, 
philosophies, specific communications techniques, and the 
technology most appropriate for use on an international level.
Utility of the Study
This study is designed to provide a comparison of 
international communications strategies of the United States 
and the Soviet Union which are adaptable for use in Saudi 
Arabia. An additional by-product was an interpretation of 
the impact of information on Saudi Arabia's foreign policy. 
Stated differently, it was possible to determine how mass 
communications theories could be practically applied to 
translate Saudi Arabia's most positive aspects to the rest
18
of the world. Additionally, this study presents a practical 
design for a sophisticated international communications sys­
tem for Saudi Arabia. The proposed system's policy and goals, 
function and organization, foreign and civil service personnel, 
and proposed international outreach projects are also included. 
Finally, this study can be used as background information 
for and to stimulate communications research in Third World 
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CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF SAUDI ARABIA
It is impossible to understand Saudi Arabia’s need 
for an international communications service without under­
standing something about the Kingdom's background— its inter­
related cultural, educational, economic, religious, and poli­
tical systems— which exert a direct and powerful influence 
upon any plan to devise an international communications ser­
vice. Any idea, designed to improve the Kingdom's position 
in world affairs, cannot be designed independently of these 
factors; however, only a clear understanding of a few basic 
concepts is required.
Understanding Saudi Arabian culture requires a brief 
recitation of the country's history up to the reign of His 
majesty King Abdul Aziz. Rentz traces the beginning of mod­
ern Saudi Arabia:
. . . back to the first century of Islam, or the 
seventh Christian century, when the Prophet Muhammed 
presided in Medina over the original Islamic state.
The Prophet administered the Supreme Law, those di­
vine revelations he had received which were incorpo­
rated into the Koran, the Book of Allah. He was 
also the commander-in-chief of the State's military 
forces whose primary function was the Jihad, "The
21
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endeavor in the path of Allah" often regarded as 
the sixth pillar of Islam. By missionary zeal and 
martial powers the new religion spread rapidly, 
greatly enlarging the number of believers who ac­
cepted the rule of the Prophet over the Umraah, the 
Islamic community.1
After the Prophet's death, the state was governed by 
a series of caliphs who sought to rule according to prece­
dents the prophet had set. But although there was no continued 
Islamic expansion under one political leader, Hitti (1966), 
explains how the religion continued to spread:
. . . ruled an empire, extending from the Atlantic 
to central Asia. From their subsequent capital of 
Baghdad, they spread their translations and rendi­
tions of Greek, Persian, and Indian philosophy, 
science and literature throughout the vast domain.
From Muslim Spain, Sicily, and crusading Syria, some 
of these intellectual treasures passed on to Europe 
to become a vital force in a modern renaissance.^
It was nearly 1,000 years after the Prophet Muhammed
that the House of Sa'ud chose to create the first Islamic
state as a political model, and it was not until 1744 (1164)
that Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammed ibn Sa'ud united
their talents to create an Islamic state. A new era of reli-
2gious reform and territorial expansion began. The spread 
of religious reform slowed somewhat, and it was not until 
1803 (1223) that reformation forces led by Sa'ud ibn Sa'ud 
entered Mecca for the first time. The Holy City was returned 
to Islamic domain in 1805 (1225).
Other secular rules in the Middle East became worried 
about the expansion of Islamic religion and reform. However, 
in 1824 (1244) Turki ibn Sa'ud established Riyadh as the
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capital of the new state— where he lived until his assassi-
4nation only a few short months later.
With the death of Muhammed ibn Sa'ud, the tradition 
of father-to-son succession of government control was estab­
lished. Leadership eventually passed into the hands of his 
son Faisal, and once again, the state's boundaries were ex­
panded. A period of civil strive ensued after Faisal's death.
By 1891 (1311) Abd al-Rahman, youngest of the sons 
of Faisal ibn Turki, was the only one remaining in 
Riyadh, but in that year was forced to capitulate 
and go into exile. With him he took his son 
Abdulaziz, then only a stripling.5
The young man, Abdul Aziz, never forgot his homeland.
His ambition was to return to Najd and reassume leadership
of the province. By the time he was seventeen, he was ready
to take action.
He had had enough of idling. For six years he had 
sat in Kuwait, eating out his heart, listening to 
the hopeless grumbles of the exiles. . . .  He was 
sure of himself and of the people of Najd. If he 
gave them the lead, they would rise and join him 
and throw out the Rashid.®
By January 1902, Abdul Aziz was able to return to
7Riyadh, and thereafter the reformation continued to spread 
unhindered. By 1932 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as it is 
known today, was well established. And, it is also inter­
esting, as well as important, to note that the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia was able to maintain its independence and was 
never included in the 1926 British mandate settlements.
After 1932 the Kingdom was to embark upon a new era.
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and it is also essential to understand this particular period
of history if one is to understand how Saudi Arabia was to
arrive at the position it holds in the world today.
Having grown up during the lean years . . . and 
having wandered with Bedouins in the days of exile,
Abdul Aziz remained throughout his life imbued with 
the democratic spirit. . . .  He held daily sessions 
in his council chambers, receiving callers from the 
lowest as well as the highest degrees. . . .  As 
the Kingdom grew, it became no longer possible for 
Abdul Aziz to know all his subjects firsthand, but 
he never wavered in his concern for the welfare of 
each and every one of them.®
The most important aspect of his reign was that Abdul 
Aziz was always willing to promote change, so long as it 
benefitted the population and so long as it did not contra­
dict Islamic law— a tradition which was to continue under 
later rulers.
Abdul Aziz legitimatized the present government's 
claim to leadership by regaining control of territory which 
had been governed, with only two interventions, by his family 
since the early eighteenth century. Abdul Aziz emphasized 
his belief that the government had both obligations to and 
control over traditional tribal and village governments be­
cause his family represented both a lawful Arab and Islamic 
leadership.
And thus began the real development of a modern nation. 
As a result, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has continued to 
cherish its religious principles and, at the same time, adapt 
the use of modern technology for the increased comfort and
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good of its people.
Abdul Aziz died November 9, 1955, and it was at this 
point that succession to the throne changed. When Sa'ud 
assumed leadership after the death of his father, Abdul Aziz's 
second son, Faisal, was named Crown Prince. From that day 
to this, the line of succession has been from brother to 
brother, a concept which has promoted stability while permit­
ting a special kind of growth. And the House of Sa'ud, fol­
lowing the traditions of Islamic and Arabic democracy, assumed 
the social responsibility of providing for the population's 
needs by increasing government services for the people.
Further political and social development began when 
Faisal was Crown Prince and continued throughout his life­
time. The Kingdom was finally organized in 1932 after thirty 
years of regional wars, but it soon became apparent that 
unification marked the achievement of only one goal— the 
consolidation of sheikdoms into a national entity.
The 1940's marked the beginning of the transition 
from old to new. Government income was raised primarily 
by tax levies on Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca dur­
ing the Hajj, but the oil production promised the potential 
of a new and between way of life. By the 1950s the Kingdom 
was enjoying a new source of income, modest in comparison 
to today's standards, from the commercial production of oil. 
Unfortunately, development projects created a new set of 
problems. There was no executive branch of government to
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supervise decisions regarding which projects should be at­
tempted, which ones should receive top priority, or to over­
see the disbursement of monies required to plan and carry 
out these projects.
The transition from near poverty to economic affluence 
was not easy.
The Saudi nation-building process underwent several 
major stages of revolution. First came the consoli­
dation of the fragmented sheikdoms into a cohesive 
national entity. Then came the creation of a number 
of institutions and systems to implement the objec­
tives and programs of the new nation. Unlike most 
governments of the Third World, and particularly 
in this region, the Saudi bureaucracy evolved in 
absence of a colonial legacy. It grew largely from 
local resources and in response to local needs.®
It became necessary for government to become more centralized 
and for the general population to learn to accept this type 
of government. This stage of development emphasized the 
creation of centralized institutions such as the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 1930, and the Ministry of Finance, 1931.^^ 
Because of its adherence to the tenets of social responsi­
bility, the Saudi Arabian government was determined to invest 
its new financial increases in income from oil to improve 
the general population's quality of life. However, achiev­
ing that objective was complicated by the perceived need 
for vast reform which had to be implemented in a relatively 
short time. The two hurdles were the lack of an efficiently 
organized executive branch of government and the lack of 
training of civil service employees to implement the changes.
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The government had to decide whether to continue its 
social development programs while at the same time trying 
to develop an executive branch of government to supervise 
administrative details or whether to shift its emphasis to 
the development of management concepts and skills which would 
eventually facilitate both development and implementation 
of such projects. The result was a combination of both.
By the 1950's the government agencies were increased in re­
cord numbers; the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of 
the Interior in 1951, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and 
the Ministry of Communications in 1952, the Ministeries of 
Education, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry in 1953, and 
the Ministry of Petroleum in 1954.^^ Much of the credit 
for this development belongs to the late King Faisal. He 
received his education from his grandfather— a noted reli­
gious scholar— and practical governmental experience while 
serving as Viceroy, Minister of the Interior, Minister of 
Finance, President of the Consultative Council, and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. He learned firsthand the problems and 
pitfalls of inaugurating religious and governmental reforms.
He ruled only eleven years— from 1964-1975— but he 
began to direct governmental affairs, through the offices 
listed above, long before he assumed the throne. Faisal's 
influence on the Kingdom's development encompasses more than 
fifty years, and nearly all of Saudi Arabia's modern history. 
His leadership answered the need for Islamic unity because
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leadership is always a critical factor if a nation is to 
grow and change and yet retain its stability.
Stability becomes an even more critical factor if 
one of the goals for improvement is the development of, first, 
a domestic communications system, and later, the development 
of an international communications service. First, it is 
only logical to assume that a communications system could 
never be established without a stable government to maintain 
its continuity. A constant change of government would mean 
a constant change in the perception of the role of communica­
tions. Constant changes in perception would almost certainly 
result in constant changes of policy. Constant policy changes 
would require those in charge of developing a communications 
system to spend more time implementing policy changes and 
less time developing the system. And without a pre-established 
domestic communications system, any plan for creating an inter­
national communications system would be doomed to failure.
. . . [in] a developing nation, two concepts which 
are usually dealt with separately, will be joined 
together. These are the need for vigorous, dynamic 
leadership and the equally critical need for a sys­
tem of belief or values, a 'consensus of sentiment', 
which holds a nation together, giving it a sense 
of form, cohesion, community, and an overreaching 
purpose.12
Faisal was successful because he was able to incorporate 
social change with religion and social, cultural, and histori­
cal traditions. The first example, as will be seen later in 
this chapter, is the establishment of educational institutions
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for girls. The second example would be the establishment 
of the Saudi Arabian television system. In both cases, Faisal 
utilized the power strategy of change. He was able to show 
religious leaders who opposed these changes that they could 
be implemented with little or no damage to religious tradi­
tions. King Faisal was well aware there was little social 
acceptance of the need for these changes; but he was willing 
to have his wife advocate education for girls and spend the 
Kingdom's funds to create the best possible television system. 
He knew in advance that certain religious groups would oppose 
these changes, and in the example of the television system, 
he used the psychological device of explaining to religious 
leaders how television could be used to increase the general
public's knowledge and understanding of religious beliefs 
13and practices.
However, the initiation of government reform and social 
change were not made easily. The increase in the numbers 
of governmental ministries and employees created a number 
of administrative problems;
— The number of agencies and employees were increasing, 
but there seemed to be no increase in the output of work 
being done;
— Existing agencies continued to grow, but not in 
relation to program requirements because the new employees 
were not always qualified to implement the new programs;
— Planning was not always coordinated, even though
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there were agencies designed to handle exactly those prob­
lems ;
— Outdated procedures were still being used, and
— Agency functions were ill-defined and authority 
14overlapped.
Al-Sadhan summed up some of the government's diffi­
culties;
There were many reasons for this situation. Most 
importantly, education of the type required in so­
phisticated societies was introduced very late in 
the country. There has not been enough educated 
and trained personnel available to do all of the 
things which need to be done by a modern government. 
Students have been sent abroad in increasing numbers 
since a small initial group was sent out in 1954.
But with very few exceptions, when they return, they 
are without practical experience in the development 
and operation of systems of the kind r e q u i r e d . 15
As a result, job slots in the executive branch were filled 
by a migration of unskilled and poorly educated portions 
of the general population who were enticed by the avail­
ability of jobs in the capital.
To make matters worse, achievements often fell below 
predictions for a variety of reasons:
— Objectives were unspecifically defined;
— Rational planning was curtailed by the absence of 
stated objectives to achieve goals;
— Budgets were designed only to continue the existence 
of a pre-existing agency and not to fulfill the purpose for 
which the ministry was established, and
— Most importantly, because there was no government
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ministry "responsible for information gathering, reporting 
and control, procedure evaluation and improvement."^®
Fortunately, the government was well aware of the 
problems and more than willing to seek new and innovative 
solutions. Reform of the executive branch became of prime 
importance and suddenly it was linked to the need for social 
and economic reforms.
Without improvement of the executive branch, the goals 
of social reform could not be achieved. Thus by the autumn 
of 1963, the Administrative Reform Program was launched.
A team of management experts from the World Bank were called 
in to evaluate the problems and needs of promoting political, 
social, and economic growth. Team members pointed out the 
need for modernizing the executive branch before other devel­
opments could occur. Also that same year, a management spe­
cialist from the United Nations was called in to evaluate
17administrative problems. As a result, the Institute of 
Public Administration, formed to educate civil service em­
ployees, was established.
However, even this solution was not without its prob­
lems, as a three-man team from the Ford Foundation, assigned 
in the summer of 1963 to analyze the operations of the Kingdom's 
government, soon discovered. There were few civil servants 
the management team could discuss problems with, and those 
who did speak English lacked the authority to solve problems 
or suggest solutions. To make it worse, the Ford team had
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no experience in Saudi Arabian government processes. The
Ford team suggested formation of a special advisory group
to aid in organization and management, planning, budgeting,
18accounting, public works, personnel and training. Despite 
some mistakes along the way, definite improvements resulted, 
and because management development is a continuous process, 
continued improvements were made. This list of governmental 
reforms leading to social changes such as improved educational 
systems, better health care delivery programs, better roads 
and telegraph service are important factors contributing 
to Saudi Arabia's need for an international communications 
service because these types of reforms led to today's climate- 
one which is more likely to accept and understand the need 
for further improbement of the Kingdom's domestic and inter­
national communications systems.
Another important perspective which must be understood
is the close relationship between government and religion.
Thus, as Oswald Spengler defines the Islamic world, it
embraces the whole of the world-cavern, here and 
the beyond, the orthodox and the good angels and 
spirits, and within the community the State only 
formed a smaller unit of the visible side, a unit, 
therefore, of which the operations were governed 
by the major whole.19
Although it cannot be empirically measured by tradi­
tional political science research methods, this Islamic unity, 
based on emotional, religious, and ideological forces, must 
be taken into account in any scholarly discussion of the
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Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The close relationship between 
government and religion is not a transitory phenomenon.
Rather, it is based on the traditions of military victories 
coupled with missionary fervor.
Islamic law includes both religious and secular obli­
gations, and it is sanctioned and enforced by the Saudi Arabian 
government. Law is divided into two parts, the Shariah, 
which is religious, and Regulations, which enforce the com­
mands and implement government projects designed for the 
good of the general public. There are four sources of regu­
lation in the Shariah:
— Most important is the Koran, which Muslims believe 
is God's Word as given to Muhammad, the Prophet, by the Angel 
Gabriel;
— Al-Sunnah, a school of thought, which includes tradi­
tions of the Prophet, that is, the things he said and did 
as well as his approbation or censure of actions in a speci­
fic situation;
— Al-Ijma, a ". . . consensus of learned scholars
on particular problems whose solutions are not directly found
20in either the Koran or the Sunnah," and
— Al-Qiyas, another scholarly consensus of reasoning 
by analogy, which means that principles explained in the 
Koran, Sunnah and Al-Ijma can be applied to any problems
21or situations not dealt with in the first three sources.
The Shariah Courts have full jurisdiction over all
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administration of justice. Because the government issues 
regulations for the good of the people, Saudi Arabia has 
been able to achieve political, social, and economic develop­
ment. At the same time, other regulations were issued con­
trolling business activity, financial enterprises and economic 
development, labor, and welfare programs.
However, none of these reforms could have been success­
ful unless the Saudi people were educated to accept them, 
and a system of education was carefully planned. Public 
schools were established for young boys and young men, and 
attendance through at least the high school level became 
mandatory. But the Kingdom's accomodation of the demands 
of social and economic development, while maintaining its 
unique social, cultural, and political heritage, is best 
illustrated by the development of an educational system for 
women. "Education has traditionally been the initial point
of departure in the movement of any social group to alter
22its status and opportunities." A misconception, popular 
among Westerners, has been the notion that the Islamic reli­
gion forbade the education of women. According to one source,
the Prophet Muhammed called the search for knowledge a re-
23quirement for all Muslims— men and women. Thus the early 
Saudi Arabian prejudice against the education of women was 
the result of pre-established cultural attitudes and not 
the result of religious percepts. The government was well 
aware of what the general public's prejudiced response to
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this new idea in the realm of education would be. The pub­
lic would accept change only if the resulting benefits were 
presented to them in a logical manner.
Government planners determined the best way to pre­
sent the information to the people was to utilize the demon­
stration technique of the persuasive strategy for change. 
Because the government wanted the concept of education for 
girls. ". . . to be introduced in a low-key manner, perhaps
because of its potential for stimulating unwanted conflict,
24an explicit, persuasive strategy . . . "  was not used.
If a persuasive strategy can be developed that is 
not obvious, it indeed may be very effective in 
creating an openness to change or at least a recep­
tivity to information about c h a n g e . ^ 5
It was determined to show Saudi Arabian citizens that educa­
tion for girls would not harm the fabric of society. Estab­
lishment of a modern school for girls, if handled improperly, 
would have generated a strong negative reaction from the 
public. To overcome this expected resistance, an experimental 
project was launched. The government established a home 
and school for orphaned girls in Jiddah. The orphanage orien­
tation was used as a basis for the gradual introduction of 
the methods of modern education for women.
The Bar Al-Hannan— the House of Affection— opened 
in 1956, but a first, even the orphaned girls refused to 
attend. The government recruited several orphaned students, 
and eventually encouraged families also to enroll their
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daughters in the school. A 1957 newspaper article explained
the goals of the new school in relation to preparing young
girls to become better wives and mothers as a result of study­
ing the Islamic religion and receiving additional modern
26education about moral, social, and intellectual subjects.
The school grew steadily as more and more female pupils were 
enrolled and curriculum was expanded for intermediate and 
secondary levels, with the first high school class graduat­
ing during the 1964-65 academic year.
Four years after the founding of Dar Al-Hannan, in 
1960, the government assumed responsibility for in­
troducing a system of public schools for girls through­
out the Kingdom. Despite the fact that the Government 
delegated this sensitive assignment to a conservative
group of religious leaders governed by a respected
Sheikh, there were isolated cases of opposition.
The most famous of these occurred in Buraidah, where 
certain elements of the population claimed that the 
planned establishment of a school for girls would 
produce demoralization and destroy the foundation 
of the family. A public demonstration erupted, and 
Government troops were dispatched to restore order.
At this time, the Amir Faisal was Prime Minister, 
and he was adamantly opposed to eliminating plans 
for the projected school. He insisted that the school 
would open even if no one chose to attend. He selected 
a well-respected, highly educated woman from Jiddah 
to serve as Directress, and the school was opened.
During the first year of its operation, however, 
the daughter of the Directress was the sole student
in attendance.27
And today, there are women's divisions at the University 
of King Sa'ud, formerly the University of Riyadh, King Abdul 
Aziz University in Jiddah, and King Faisal University in 
Damman. In addition a managerial school to produce qualified 
female administrators, directors and managers to assume posi­
tions of authority with the system of segregated institutions—
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That is, women are permitted to assume administrative posi­
tions only in girls schools, women's hospitals, banks and 
colleges, and as social workers providing social services 
only for women— were established.
However, NONE of these advances would have been possi­
ble without the solid economic foundation provided by the 
Kingdom's income from its most abundant natural resource—  
oil.
28The discovery of oil in 1938 with its accompanying
revenues provided ad economic base for contemporary power.
Petroleum wealth and its power are therefore relatively new
to Saudi Arabia, but the government has long been aware of
its potential. When King Abdul Aziz met U.S. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II, the Saudi Arabian
leader said "Whoever controls the untapped oil fields of
29the Middle East will have power to make peace or war."
Saudi Arabia has many unique characteristics which
set the Kingdom apart from other oil-producing nations. In
one of his public addresses, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yemani, Minister
of Petroleum and Natural Resources, explained the basis for
Saudi Arabia's importance in today's oil market.
(i) Since Saudi Arabia is an Arab oil-producing 
country, it is connected with other Arab oil- 
producing countries in a number of specific ways.
Within this context, Saudi Arabia is wholly com­
mitted to the Arab cause and does its best to 
serve that cause with the Palestine question 
central to. that cause. Because this interest is 
within a political framework, it does not include 
such oil-producing countries as Iran, Indonesia or 
Venezuela.
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(ii) Saudi Arabia has the largest surplus oil re­
serves in the world; 27 percent of the world's proven 
oil reserve is located there. This means that its 
prospects for the future extend farther than any 
other country. For example, Iran, which also has 
large oil reserves, has a much shorter outlook due
to the amount of present production relative to its 
reserves. This in turn places the Kingdom in a more 
strategic position in international relations within 
the realm of politics and economics, than the posi­
tions of Algeria and Venezuela.
(iii) Saudi Arabia produces more oil than necessary 
to fulfill its financial obligations resulting in 
currency surplus. The financial power coupled with 
its political power also derived from oil, places 
Saudi Arabia at an advantage over its neighbors and 
other OPEC members.
(iv) Saudi Arabia is an oil-producing country that 
considers itself as politically belonging to the 
group of nations referred to as the 'free world.'
This distinguishes it from neighboring countries 
who fly a revolutionary flag, but who share the 
spirit of Arab nationalism.
(v) Unlike other oil-producing countries, Saudi 
Arabia produces several different types of oil.
These include; light Arab oil, medium Arab oil, 
heavy Arab oil, and a very light oil that is known 
as ^  Barri oil. Other types of oil are now being 
discovered and will soon be produced and exported. 
This gives Saudi Arabia a unique position in the 
economics of oil and will serve to enhance its role 
in pricing.
(vi) Saudi Arabia has not reached the level of de­
velopment that other developing countries have. For 
this reason, its outlook for pricing oil and the 
future of energy differs from other more developed 
nations. During the next generation government of­
ficials have to work continuously to develop the
country, develop the land, establish industries,
and look for new sources of national income that
would substitute oil in the future.
(vii) Saudi Arabia is an Islamic oil-producing 
country. Approximately 70 percent of the world's 
oil reserves are owned by Islamic countries, but 
it should be noted that Islamic power has not ap­
peared in the world petroleum game and, as yet, 
has not been used to influence oil s t r a t e g y . ^ 0
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Saudi Arabia's vast oil reserves are largely responsi­
ble for the Kingdom's economic power and therefore also for 
its international political viewpoint. The financial power 
provides a sound economic foundation for Saudi Arabia's social 
development, and for improving foreign relations with other 
countries.
Henceforth, Saudi Arabia has assumed a leading posi­
tion in Middle Eastern affairs by supporting the 
states confronting Israel and in world affairs by 
influencing the politico-economic conditions of many 
countries through its immense wealth. In effect,
Saudi foreign policy at the regional and international 
levels, represents-the greatest development in the 
Middle East and in the world today.31
Examples of the effectiveness of the use of oil as a bargaining
tool already abound. The Arab-Israeli conflicts and 1973 oil
boycott, Crown Prince Fahd's plan for peace in the Middle
East, proposed in late 1981, and the United States' 1982
sale of sophisticated AWACS bombers to the Kingdom are only
a few.
Because of the booming oil revenues, the Kingdom has 
been able to draft and implement a series of five-year plans 
to use the income in the best possible manner to bring about 
the necessary social changes to improve the quality of life 
for its people.
Saudi Arabia's petroleum wealth assumes still more 
importance in light of its potential use as leverage to en­
courage other nations to assist in a system of disseminating 
international information.
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Only a few Third World countries have been blessed 
by nature with raw materials, such as oil, that can 
be used as a weapon in bargaining with industrial- 
country customers or used indirectly to accumulate 
financail assets which can enhance their bargainingposition.32
Provisions for assistance in providing accurate infor­
mation about Saudi Arabia, through a variety of methods ranging 
from word of mouth to influencing local, state or national
officials to agree to permit establishment of information
33centers, could be included in foreign project contracts.
More will be said about this in Chapter Five. Since most 
nations or industries outside the Kingdom are eager to pro­
vide technology or goods and services to improve the balance 
of trade, it is highly unlikely such contract provisions 
would be refused. And any nation or private industry could 
as always, retain the option of refusing to accept such con­
tract provisions; however, if Saudi Arabia were to adopt 
a policy of refusing contracts with uncooperative nations 
or industries, it is reasonable to assume refusals to assist 
in the task of providing information would become few and 
far between.
As we have seen, the Kingdom's cultural, social, and 
economic development all have had an effect on the develop­
ment and use of domestic and international communications 
systems. According to a United Nations' General Assembly 
report, "information media have an important part to play 
in education and in economic and social progress generally 
and that new techniques of communication offer special
41
opportunities for acceleration of the development process.
The philosophy expressed in the preceding quotation is par­
ticularly applicable to Saudi Arabia because the pace of 
the Kingdom's further development will probably be largely 
dependent upon the development of an effective international 
communications system.
The background information discussed in this chapter 
provides an excellent perspective from which to study the 
international communication system of the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Without such a perspective, it would 
be impossible to determine which of the two superpowers inter­
national communication strategies and techniques, to be dis­
cussed in Chapter Three, are adaptable for use in Saudi Arabia.
CHAPTER TWO
ENDNOTES
^George Rentz, "The Saudi Monarchy," from King Faisal 
and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia. Willard Beling, ed. 
Westview Press. Boulder, Colorado, 1980, p. 15.
^Phillip K. Hitti, A Short History of the Near East.
D. Van Nostrand Co. Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, p. 3.




®H.C. Armstrong, Lord of Arabia: Ibn Saud, An Intimate
Study of a King. Arthur Barker, Ltd. London, England, 1934, 
pp. 48-49.





^Abdulrahman Al-Sadhan, Secretary General of the 
Civil Service Board, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. "The Moderniza­
tion of The Saudi Bureaucracy, from King Faisla and the 
Modernization of Saudi Arabia. Willard Beling, ed., Westview 
Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980, p. 77.
l°Ibid.
l^Ibid., p. 78.
^^Ralph Bribanti, "Saudi Arabia in the Context of 
Political Development," from King Faisal and the Moderniza­
tion of Saudi Arabia. Willard Beling, ed., Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1980, p. 36.
13Gerald Zaltman and Robert Duncan, Strategies for 
Planned Change, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1977, p. 180- 
181.






^^Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West. Alfred 
A. Knopf, New York, 1939, p. 243.
44
^^Geroge M. Barody, "The Practice of Law in Saudi 
Arabia," from King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi 
Arabia.
^Ifbid.
^^Catherine Parssinen, "The Changing Role of Women,” 
from King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia. 
Willard Beling, ed., Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980, 
p. 154.
^^Robin Dunipace, et. al., (eds.) The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. Stacey International, London, England, 1977, p. 462. 
24Zaltman and Dunca, Strategies for Planned Change,
p. 134.
S^Ibid.
^®Abu Mazin, "The Mother is a School if You Prepare 
Her," Abas. No. 2557, Sept. 25, 1957.
^^Parssinen, King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi 
Arabia, p. 159.
^®A1-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development.
Stacey International, London, England, 1978, p. 43.
^^Eirnest Jack, Background of the Middle East, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1952, p. 13.
^^Abdulazia Al-Sowayyegh, "Saudi Oil Policy During 
King Faisal's Era," from King Faisal and the Modernization
45
of Saudi Arabia. Willard Beling, ed., Westview Press, Boulder,
Colorado, 1980, pp. 204-205.
q-r^^Ibid., p. 202.
<30Seymon Brown, Oil and World Power; Background to 
the Oil Crisis. Penguin Books, Baltimore, Maryland, 1974, 
p. 147.
o qA more thorough discussion of how this economic 
strategy can be utilized is provided in Chapter Five.
^^Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development: 
The Role of Information in Developing Countries. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, California, 1964, p. vii.
CHAPTER THREE
AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION "
This chapter is designed to explain both superpowers' 
efforts in the area of international outreach in terms of 
western mass communication theories; a second step will 
be an explanation of the two countries' international commu­
nication goals, the strategies and techniques to achieve 
them; and the third step will be a comparison and contrast 
of the Rusian and American efforts. A literature search 
has shown that no one from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
ever attempted such an analysis. The scholarly works on 
mass communication written by Saudi Arabians focus mainly 
on the use of the mass media within the country itself. This 
effort is entirely different. Not only will it analyze the 
international outreach efforts of both superpowers in terms 
of Western mass communication theories, it will provide the 
basis for Chapter Five, which will include an explanation 
of which techniques— Communist or American— will be most 
effective for use in Saudi Arabia.
46
47
No matter whether one is talking about the United 
States or the Soviet Union, there is a basic truth in the 
types of international information disseminated by both govern­
ments, and that is the fact that there is a discrepant world 
of difference between "official facts and realities."^ Propa­
ganda can be considered a metaphor for the created facts 
provided by governmental organizations, and may therefore 
be considered a function of some of a government's international 
outreach efforts. Contemporary society regards modern govern­
ment records as constructed events. Mankind, no matter where 
he lives, is usually only aware of what happens around him.
Real events which he cannot see for himself must be reported
to him. Suddenly public records become a performance for
2a specific audience and not a matter of reality.
However, it is important to remember the ways of re­
creating the world through information, either reported or 
through government records, are often very subtle. Altheid 
and Johnson, (1980) explain the implications of government 
information, which they call propaganda.
Propaganda as a social scientific concept, has not 
been well understood. . . Propaganda . . . has pro­
found implications for current understanding, bureau­
cracy, formal organization, and mass communication.
. . .  We believe that propaganda, like all social 
phenomena, is not unique to one sphere of social _ 
life, although it has been treated as though it were.
They also point out two specific aspects of organizing propa­
ganda.
What the members of the organization understand to
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be the practical significance of certain informa­
tion for a particular audience and the actual pro­
cedures used in constructing official reports to 
reflect what the audience expects from any legiti­
mate organization, and they discrepancies between 
the official view and what many members know to be 
the truth.4
The most significant aspect of this theory is the 
medium of communication through which this information is 
shared. Even in the United States, where freedom of informa­
tion is so highly touted, people have only those documents 
"being read or shown or interpreted, and we seldom have the 
inside knowledge available to check on them. We must simply 
take someone else's word for it. For example, during the 
1973 oil embargo, in the United States, the general public 
was recognized as the audience to be communicated with and 
there was no need to develop sophisticated communications 
techniques. Long lines at gasoline stations were proof enough 
of the reality. Government pleas for observation met with 
unqualified endorsement, and, in general, the American public 
was willing to do its part to help win the energy war. All 
government pronouncements were intended for public consump­
tion via the mass media.®
Unfortunately, the problem with this is that official 
reports often convey only one reality. There is one defini­
tion of propaganda which can be applied to the information 
supplied to the world by both the United States and the Soviet 
Union.
The deliberate attempt by some individual or group
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to form, control or alter the attitudes of other 
groups by use of the instruments of communications 
with the intention that in any given situation the 
reaction of those so influenced will be those de­
sired by the propagandist.?
It is important to understand why anyone would want to in­
fluence another person or group of people with propaganda, 
because the process involves interaction between a communi­
cator and a target audience.
Modern use of propaganda is a refined, deliberate 
way to influence. "One does not win an argument with scholars
g
with emotional appeals." It was the emergence of public
opinion as a legitimate and essential political fact of life
that pushed propaganda toward the depth it has today.
Until the idea of the public was recognized as a 
relevant audience to be communicated with, there 
was no need to develop sophisticated techniques for 
manipulation; rulers simply did what they and their 
supporters deemed necessary.9
Hans Speier defined public opinion as the peoples expectation 
that the government will explain its decisions to them.^®
This definition probably can be applied to Saudi Arabia.
The government is not concerned that adverse public opinion 
will force them to change official policies; rather, the 
government provides information to ensure that no other in­
formation which might cause the people to challenge its poli­
cies would be released. However, it is different for the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Altheide and Johnson 
have explained that bureaucratic propaganda is often targeted 
to reach "a specific segment of the p o p u l a t i o n . T h u s ,
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both the Russians and the Americans find it necessary to 
pick and choose the specific audience for which specific 
information is geared. In short, targeted audiences receive 
the same information in different ways. Perhaps before a 
more complete analysis of the two superpowers' propaganda 
efforts is made, an explanation of why the Soviet Union and 
the United States are engaged in a propaganda conflict would 
be in order.
It is interesting to note that World War II, the last 
physical conflict for one nation's control of the world, 
ended more than 40 years ago. And during that global con­
flict, the United States and the Soviet Union were allies. 
Ironically, the two former allies are now engaged in a bitter 
struggle for supremacy over the countries in the rest of 
the world. However, there is a major difference. Excluding 
the violent and often underhanded actions of either super­
powers' intelligence agencies, this battle is fought on an 
entirely different area. Although the struggle for physical 
control of certain geographical areas still continues— Cuba 
and the Middle East, for example— this struggle is waged 
mostly in the minds of the general population of the rest 
of the world. Modern atomic technology has made the concept 
of a nuclear war almost, but not quite, ridiculous. Both 
countries have more than enough nuclear power to decimate 
each other's populations more than a hundred times over.
That power alone is self-defeating. What good is territorial
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control if there is no one left alive to carry out either 
political doctrine? Therefore the struggle, although just 
as bitter, is waged on an entirely different area— within 
the minds of men and women. The best way to establish con­
trol and still have enough of the population remaining to 
exert that control over is to convince the general population 
of a given country that a particular political philosophy 
is the only correct one. In the past, the major pawns in 
this struggle have been the United States' Western European 
allies and the Soviet Union's Eastern European satellites. 
However, the scarcity of petroleum as a natural resource, 
and the Middle Eastern countries' control of most of the 
reserves of that valuable asset, have changed the battle 
somewhat. The war for the allies and the satellites still 
continues, but the war for supremacy in the Middle East has 
escalated considerably. Control of Middle Eastern oil is 
a step toward control of the entire world, and none of the 
Arab nations will tolerate such an event. Therefore, it 
is incumbent upon nations such as Saudi Arabia, which al­
ready enjoys an enormous measure of international prestige, 
as explained in Chpater Two, to exert its own influence.
Another example of the propaganda struggles between 
the United States arid the Soviet Union is the situation oc­
curring in Poland during the winter of 1981-81. It serves 
as a perfect example to illustrate the mass communication 
conflict between the two superpowers. The number of Voice
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of America broadcasts to Poland were increased with the inten­
tion of presenting the true facts to the Polish people about 
what was really happening in their own country. The broad­
casts were aired simply to counteract Soviet propaganda efforts. 
American policymakers did not want the Polish people to become
susceptible to Soviet propaganda and misinformation and there-
12fore accept the Russian perspective of events.
The Polish situation is not only a microcosm of commu­
nication battles between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, it is also a perfect microcosm of the communication 
problem in Saudi Arabia. The difference is that both the 
American and Russian communication strategies are enjoying 
a large degree of success on a worldwide basis, while Saudi 
Arabian international communication strategies do not. The 
United States, with its Associated Press and United Press 
International, and the Soviet Union, with its news agency,
Tass, control most of the information disseminated throughout 
the world. The man living in a small village in Nigeria, 
Algeria, or any other Third World country is FORCED to believe 
the information fed to him by one superpower or the other, 
because they are the main source of international news. Local 
news, of course, comes from his own country. The list of 
these kinds of communication battles between the two super­
powers is endless. There are only two results: either the
people do not believe either nation's propaganda, or what 
is more likely, they end up believing information from one
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superpower or the other. There can be no victors in a war 
13such as this.
Communication Constructs
In understanding the communication strategies of the 
United States and the Soviet Union, several works were espe­
cially helpful. The main sources used in the section on 
the United States are L. John Martin's International Propa­
ganda; Its Legal and Diplomatic Control, Leo Bogart's 
Premises for Propaganda; The United States Information 
Agency's Operating Assumptions During the Cold War, and John 
Henderson's The United States Information Agency. For infor­
mation about the Soviet Union, I relied heavily on Lee Ann 
Johns' Soviet Life: Totalitarian Public Relations, Frederick
Baghoorn's Soviet Foreign Propaganda, and David L. Altheide's 
and John M. Johnson's Bureaucratic Propaganda.
I will begin an analysis of the two information systems 
by highlighting a few Western models or constructs which 
serve to provide a basis for consistent comparison between 
the American and Russian communication strategies. These 
tools are most useful in understanding both the United States' 
and the Soviet Union's international communication tactics.
In this section I will show how communication by natural 
sign, the three dimensions of communication, the DeFleur- 
Ball-Rokeachs and the Westley-MacLean theories of communi­
cation are used. I will also explain which communication
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models are most effective for both the United States and 
the Soviet Union in their international outreach efforts.
According to Altheide and Johnson, international out­
reach efforts contain four major components; target, medium,
14purpose, and truth. The target is usually a mass audience.
After World War II social scientists believed that 
technology and urbanization had stripped away the stabilizing 
influence of "family, religion, and f r i e n d s . A s  a result 
the mass audience was really a group of isolated persons, 
"Susceptible to a variety of stimuli that could drive them 
one way and then a n o t h e r . E a r l y  attempts to influence 
a targeted mass audience depended on the mass media as the 
most direct method of manipulating public opinion. And the 
main purpose was to deliberately alter attitudes.
Any international outreach effort will encounter cer­
tain inherent problems. Any communication attempt can be 
considered a system involving the sender, the message, the 
content, the target audience, the medium used to transmit 
the message, the purpose of the message and the circumstances 
under which the receiver gets the message. Each of these 
components of the system affects the most important goal 
of communication— the interpretation of the message. It 
is well known that no two persons, each bringing their own 
personal biases, will interpret the same message in the same 
way. Because of these components and the individual interpre­
tation, it becomes impossible to measure with complete accuracy
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the effectiveness of either nation's international communi­
cations attempts:
. . . beyond the knowledge that some works and some 
does not, remarkably little is known of how propa­
ganda really affects audiences or effects its re­
sults. The very nature of political propaganda, 
its frequent attempt to be all things to all people 
means that for it to be analyzed a scholar would 
first have to master all data on human behavior.1?
However, it is possible to discuss at least one of 
the types of communication used in both superpowers' propaganda 
efforts, and that is communication by natural sign. Almost 
everyone is familiar with the notion of the pecking order 
established among a flock of chickens. These pecks are sim­
plified acts which come to stand for dramatic behavior asso­
ciated with vitory or defeat in battle. On the human level, 
this can be defined as a gesture— that is, if the beginning 
of an action serves to trigger the same response in an in­
dividual that would be triggered if the entire action were 
completed. Stated differently, the individual receiving 
the message has acquired a learned response. However, only 
when two organisms have developed a set of learned responses 
that are coordinated so that a response from one can serve
as a stimulus to the other, can communication by natural
18sign be said to occur.
For humans, it would seem that an example of this 
type of communication could be illustrated by what have been 
popularly called buzzwords, that is, those words which elicit 
a certain emotion form the person hearing them. Hence, the
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Soviet Union's continued use of the words "peace," "American
19aggression," and "American imperialism." The Americans,
on the other hand, employ such Words as "personal freedom,"
20"Democracy," "equality," and "Soviet aggression."
Verbal symbols can be approached in several ways.
The syntactic, which studies the relation of signals, func­
tioning as S3nnbols and their referrents, is concerned with 
structural meaning. Signals are treated as signs which denote 
but do not connote. The pragmatic, which studies how signals, 
functioning either as signs or symbols are related to human 
behavior, is concerned with behavioral meaning. The concern 
is with how signals treated either as signs or symbols, in­
fluence human behaviors. And the semantic, which is the 
study of the relation of signals, functioning as symbols 
and their referrents, is primarily concerned with ssymbolic
meaning. The signals are treated as symbols that have both
21denotative and connotative powers.
The Russian interested in providing his nation with 
the best possible international outreach effort, would, most 
likely, by more interested in the pragmatic and semantic 
dimensions of information theory. Using the pragmatic dimen­
sion would permit him to devise a message which would influence 
the behavior of those receiving the message— perhaps to attend 
a Russian exhibition or a lecture concerning the Communist 
party theories. He would be concerned with the semantic 
dimension if the message's main goal was to create a more
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favorable attitude toward the Soviet Union. American inter­
national outreach efforts would probably also include the 
pragmatic and semantic dimensions, but it would further include 
the use of the syntactic dimension. The syntactic approach 
permits the creation of a message in which symbols are used 
to denote, but not necessarily connote, specific meanings.
This dimension is essential for the United States' technique 
of telling the truth in an unbiased manner whenever possible 
and for the utilization of credibility techniques.
By using some general theories about how communication 
takes place, that is, by explaining how the person hearing 
they symbolic word or seeing the gesture, received the in­
tended message and therefore has the appropriate reaction, 
it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of both super­
powers' international outreach efforts. An excellent explana­
tion of how this event occurs is offered by Melvin L. DeFleur 
and Sandra Ball-Rokeach.
The first general component of this system is a : 
source. It is the function of the source to formu­
late "meaning" into message, that is, to select ap­
propriate, significant symbols "message" with which 
to express the internal responses "meanings" the 
communicator wishes to present to the audience. The 
transformation of meaning to message makes the former 
externally available in the form of significant sym­
bols . 22
This is a good description of exactly what the Russian propa­
ganda writer is trying to do in his international outreach 
efforts. It does not matter what medium he uses— newspapers, 
television, radio, film, or books. He wants to choose exactly
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the right symbols to give exactly the right meaning to the
message he wants to communicate. The Americans also utilize
this theory, but not as frequently as the Soviets.
The second component in this abstract scheme is 
the transmitter. Its function is to encode— to 
transform the message into information. Informa­
tion will be defined as some type of event in the 
physical world which will permit movement over 
space. Electrical impulses traveling along a wire, 
electromagnetic radiations in the air, printed vis­
ual stimuli on paper and agitations of the air mole­
cules are all examples of information. It is these 
events in the physical world that conquer distance 
between distinct individuals.23
Stated differently, both the superpowers' international out­
reach efforts must select the medium or media which will 
most effectively convey their message.
A third component in this system is some form of chan-
24nel. This can be compared to Soviet and American actual
use of the medium or media to convey the message.
Linked with the channel in this system is the re­
ceiver. This component has the function of receiv­
ing the information and decoding it— transforming 
the physical events of the information back into
a message.25
In both the Soviet and American international communication 
efforts the receivers are the people to whom the communication 
is addressed. Whether mediated through the Voice of Moscow 
of the Voice of America broadcasts or other media, the message 
reaches the listeners' ears which hear the message or if 
the printed word is involved, the receiver's eyes which see 
the symbols, and finally, his brain which provides the mean­
ing.
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Once the message "set of symbols" has been per­
ceived, the final component, namely the destina­
tion, responds to these with the denotative and 
connotative internal experiences we are calling 
meaning. Thus the function of the destination 
is to interpret message into meaning.^6
In the case of both the Soviet Union's and the United States'
efforts, the person abroad who is receiving the propaganda
is the destination. It is important to remember that both
superpowers are reaching a variety of destinations with a
variety of messages in a variety of ways.
After these components have functioned, if the 
meaning of the destination is isomorphic with 
the meaning of the source which originated the 
act, then communication can be said to have taken 
place. Thus, communication amounts to achieving 
a parallel in the structure of the internal mean­
ing responses of both a source and a destination.^'
In other words, if the Soviet propagandist uses the words
American imperialism, and the person receiving the message
understands those words to mean that the United States wants
to rule the world, then the Soviet propagandist can be said
to have successfully communicated. However, if the person
receiving the message hears the words and decides inwardly,
"it's nothing more than the same old lies again," then the
Soviet propagandist has NOT communicated effectively. The
same examples applies to the United States. If the Voice
of American newscaster characterizes the people of a Third
World country who disagree with United States' policy as
radicals, and the receiver takes it to mean those people
are extremists who cannot be reasoned with, the American
propaganda effort can be considered successful. If, on the
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other hand, the person receiving the message decides, "These 
people are nationalists, defending what they believe to be 
their country's way of life," then the American effort has 
failed.
It is important to note here that there is one aspect
of this particular communication theory which neither the
Soviet nor the American propagandist has ready access to,
and that is the feedback component.
Another component of the system is the producer 
of content. This component's primary link is 
with the financial backer or sponsor component 
and with the distributor.. . .28
In the Russian system, the producer would be the Ministry
of Russian Foreign Culture and Agitrop which determines party
policy to be included in propagandistic statements, and the
sponsor supplying the funds is the Soviet Presidium. In
the United States, the producer would be the United States
International Communication Agency and the sponsor would
be the U.S. Congress, and the Executive Branch.
Another mass communication theory which might be correct­
ly applied to the two superpowers' propaganda efforts is 
the one constructed by H.H. Westley and M.S. MacLean, Jr.
They begin with the premise that there is a vast difference 
between face-to-face communication and mass communication.
First, face-to-face communication involves 
more sense modalities than mass communication.
Visual cues, paralinguistic cues, olfactory cues, 
and kinesthetic cues are available to the parti­
cipants in face-to-face communication situations.
Second, in face-to-face communication the par­
ticipants have access to immediate feedback from
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the receiver whereas in mass communication the 
feedback is delayed if present at all.29
Their model of mass communication is designed to point out 
these two major theories. It is based on the concept that 
if a person cannot receive information about other persons 
and objects he needs so that he can understand his relation­
ship to his own environment, then he must depend on a gate­
keeper :
[The gatekeeper will] select relevant information 
from the environment and pass it on to him. The 
gatekeeper in this model is the mass media, and 
it functions to select and transmit information 
otherwise unavailable to [the person. . . .] In 
a sense, the function of the mass media is to 
extend selectively people's information environ­
ment . 30
Both the Russians and the Americans utilize this mass communi­
cation theory. They provide information to people in under­
developed countries to play up the virtues of either Marxism- 
Lenninism or of democracy. Unless the other nation has launch­
ed a similar propaganda effort in the same country, the first 
message received is usually the one the receiving person 
believes. However, if the American effort happens to include 
telling both sides of a story— which it frequently does—  
then the reciever has the chance to decide for himself which 
country is telling the truth.
In addition to these two theories of mass communication, 
there are also communication models based on the mechanistic, 
psychological, interactional and pragmatic perspectives which 
help to understand the superpowers' international communication
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efforts. Of the four, only the mechanistic model probably
would not apply to the United States or the Soviet Union.
The mechanistic perspective is based on the assumption that
the focus is based on the channel of communication and that
there is a constant flow of information between the source
31and the receiver. Neither the Russians nor the Americans 
have any way of receiving accurate immediate feedback on 
their propagandistic activities, and thus, the model would 
not apply. But the other three approaches to describing 
communication can certainly be used.
The psychological model assumes that people exist 
in a stimulus field or information environment but there 
are too many for the person to process each stimulus. The 
communicator produces information in the form of signs and 
symbols in an organized manner which easily identifies the 
message as a body of information. As the interpreter re­
ceives the message, they are automatically processed through 
conceptual filters which can be described as ". . . attitudes,
beliefs, motives, drives, images, cognitions, self-concepts,
32precepts, or orientations. . . . "  Once these conceptual 
filters have acted upon the information, the interpreter 
responds by producing additional stimuli, which is called 
a behavioral response.
It is easy to see why this particular perspective 
would be applicable to the Soviet international outreach 
effort. In fact, given the success of the Soviet approach.
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it is fairly safe to assume that exactly this type of think­
ing is often used in constructing propaganda messages, al­
though it probably would not be recognized by this name.
To a lesser extent, the Americans rely upon this model as 
well. Both superpowers have to be aware of those internal 
beliefs and attitudes through which their information must 
be filtered before they can design a message which will have 
any measure of success as a means of mass communication.
The interactional perspective is also employed by 
both the United States and the Soviet Union, although the 
Russians use it more frequently in their strategies of inter­
personal contacts, friendship societies and international 
organizations.
According to this communication model, the communica­
tor is a person who has developed his potential as a human 
with social interaction with other humans.
The communicator in the interactional model is 
thus performing or acting a role. Part of his 
role behavior involves role taking. The commu­
nicator views self from this perspective of other 
as well as the other from the perspective of self.
The communicator, then, can adapt her behaviors 
to the other person by aligning those actions 
with those of the other person.33
The pragmatic perspective of communication is based 
on the behaviors of the persons involved. "Communication 
in the pragmatic perspective begins with the behaviors of 
the persons involved in communication. The most fundamental 
unit of communication, then is the act . . . which are then
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categorized into the various functions performed by commun­
ication."^^ The acts of communication occur in a continuous 
chain of events and thus the very order in which the act 
is repeated becomes significant. These interactions of one 
communication act to another will change over time. In other
words, " . . .  the communications system leaves one phase
35of interaction and enters another. . . ."
Here again, the Soviets make better use of this model 
than does the United States. The Russians have shown their 
ability to take advantage of any event which can be turned 
to their own purposes, and usually, although the mode or 
channel of communication remains the same and occasionally 
even the approach, the signs and symbols are changed to com­
municate on a current basis.
In the next section we will see how the superpowers 
use and fail to use these communication dimensions, theories 
and models by studying first the United States' international 
outreach efforts and then those of the Soviet Union.
U.S. International Outreach Efforts
This section is designed to explain why any nation 
undertakes an international outreach effort and more specif­
ically why the United States government felt compelled to 
launch such a project. It also includes an analysis of the 
United States International Communication Agency, including
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its goals and objectives, the strategies and techniques used 
to achieve them, and the effectiveness of the United States' 
efforts to alter public opinion on a worldwide basis. The 
need for an international outreach effort on the part of 
the United States has never been disputed by either politi­
cal party. For the Americans, it was necessary to discount 
Soviet propaganda which described the American people as 
enemies of all eastern European countries and represented 
the Soviet Union as the only superpower interested in the 
common man and in maintaining world peace. The need for 
international outreach is a commonly agreed upon fact, al­
though the two political parties in the United States often 
disagree on the strategies to be used or the amount of funds 
to be spent. Both parties have made their agreement clear 
since 1964.
Earlier, the idea of peacetime propaganda by the 
United States had not been considered so favorably.
But in 1964 the Democratic position was that,
"The United States Information Agency has been 
transformed into a powerful, effective, and re­
spected weapon of the Free World. The new nations 
of the world have come to know an America that 
is not afraid to tell the truth about itself—  
and so can be believed when it tells the truth 
about Communist imperialism."
That same year, the Republican party declared,
"We will take the cold war offensive on all fronts, 
including, for example, a reinvigorated USIA.
It will broadcast not our weaknesses but our 
strength. It will mount a psychological warfare 
attack on behalf of freedom and against Communist 
doctrine and imperialism."37
By 1967, for the first time in history, more than half of
the people in the world could both read and write. That
66
meant that only four adults out of every ten were still classed 
as illiterate. "In these new circumstances, public opinion 
among the masses, as distinct from attitudes of government,
38has become a preoccupation of world leaders as never before."
However, this attitude did not come easily. It was 
not until World War II that the United States began a major 
international outreach effort. Before then, efforts were 
limited to such things as the 1936 Buenos Aires convention 
in which 21 nations, all friendly to the United States, 
met for the promotion of cultural relations and the creation 
of exchange students and university professors programs.
Then in 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt set up an Inter- 
Departmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Re­
publics, which was later renamed to Committee on Scientific
39and Cultural Co-operation.
The first real attempt at international information 
dissemination began in 1942 with the creation of the Office 
of War Information, headed by Elmer Davis. This initial 
effort served to teach Americans the importance of psychologi­
cal warfare, and it was under the aegis of this agency that 
the Voice of America broadcasts first began. Information 
offices, providing documentary films, book translations, 
radio broadcasts, photo displays, libraries, public speakers 
bureaus, news releases, press photographs, magazine articles,
posters, film strips, and pamphlets were established in western 
40Europe.
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After Harry S. Truman became president, these activi­
ties were decreased to the bare minimum. Truman realized 
the effort was too important to be abandoned entirely, but 
he was not willing to continue to allocate large amounts 
of federal funds to continue the program at its previous 
level. But then, after a 1948 congressional junket, American 
leaders were made aware of the fact that foreign propaganda 
activities were even stronger than the United States’ efforts 
in some of the countries in which the United States was spend­
ing the most money with the Marshall Plan. The result was 
the establishment of the U.S. Information and Education Act, 
which provided increased funding for American international 
outreach efforts. The USIA was formally established and
41Theodore C. Streibert was named to be the first director.
By the time Streibert resigned. President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower was able to write to him, assessing his effective­
ness favorably;
You and your colleagues have developed the United 
States Information Agency into a strong arm of 
our country in our struggle for world freedom.
It has now been firmly established. It presents 
the truth about the United States and our foreign 
policy factually to all the world which is free 
to hear its voice, and many behind the curtain 
who are not free have managed to hear it also.
The pioneering work which you have done has proved 
the validity of our concept in creating the Agency 
three years ago.42
It is necessary to backtrack for a moment, and study 
the first United States international outreach effort estab­
lished during World War II. Veteran newsman Elmer Davis
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assumed leadership of the War Information office, and thanks
to him, American leaders began to believe in the effectiveness
and psychology of propaganda both at home and abroad. Davis
did not hesitate to use international sources such as The
Voice of America or domestic sources, such as local newspapers,
to disseminate the information he wanted to reach the public.
The Office of War Information began to produce news reels
for use in theaters and began to translate books dealing
with the negative aspects of the communist party. He did
not let any propagandistic opportunity pass him by, Davis
utilized pamphlets, films, newsreels, the newspapers, posters,
billboards, or any other communications methods which would
43counteract communist propaganda efforts. Although Truman 
was not willing to supply as large an amount of money, he 
did establish the temporary International Infromation Office 
with the goals of disseminating information about the United 
States to the U.S. Armed Forces and persons working in for­
eign embassies during the war. However, Truman's attitude 
underwent a gradual change, when, as mentioned earlier, it 
was discovered that foreign nations' propaganda efforts were 
even stronger in Marshall Plan countries. Truman began to 
believe the United States should include foreign propaganda 
activities as part of its foreign policy. In April 1950, 
in a national speech, Truman attacked American newspapers, 
telling the editors and publishers that American propaganda 
must be placed around the world in every area where Soviet
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44propaganda was already established.
When Streibert assumed leadership, he said it was 
time for the American International outreach strategy to 
change. The United States could no longer disseminate mere 
propaganda; instead it would concentrate on providing real 
information. The U.S. Information Office began with radio 
broadcasts to democratic Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, 
and it was responsible for the United States' information 
efforts in the Fifties as well as for the activities of the 
Voice of America. Since the Russians did not permit U.S. 
broadcasts from Radio Berlin, the Americans built still more 
powerful radio transmitters, especially after technicians
45in East Berlin began jamming some of the weaker stations.
Also during the Fifties, Eisenhower was also encouraging 
the development of private organizations to provide positive 
information about the United States in the belief that this 
effort might be even more believable since it did not come 
from the government. He endorsed programs such as People 
to People and Radio Free Europe. One of the advantages was 
that these private efforts utilized subtle psychological 
tactics against communist countries and that it did not pre­
tend to be an official voice of the United States such as
46the Voice of America.
There has been one scholarly study of the USIA made
47by Leo Bogart in 1954, but it was not released until 1973. 
Agency personnel told Altheide and Johnson ” . . .  the avowed
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purpose of the USIA [was] to sell America to the world, es­
pecially to those countries most susceptible to communist 
48influence." The problem was that agency eforts were 
thwarted by the democratic process itself . . congres­
sional, approval, funding, selecting men and women for var­
ious jobs, and resolving disputes about the best way to con­
vince them their operatives and legislative overseers they
49were doing a good job." In other words, USIA personnel
had to spend more time creating propaganda to ensure continued
congressional funding than they spent creating propaganda
to sell America to the rest of the world.
Part of the effort . . .  to ensure future funding 
was to maintain the appearance at all times of 
a fairness, probably because some [people] did 
not understand that you cannot fight black shirts 
and brown shirts and red shirts with stuffed 
shirts . . . Idealists who don't believe in hit­
ting below the belt. USIA operators also had 
to convince their audiences overseas they were 
being fair.50
Leo Bogart stated the assessment a little differently.
We have to maintain the appearance at all times 
of fairness. We are news reporters, and a re­
porter does not go out and get just one side of 
the thing. If you are telling a story, you want 
to be telling a comprehensive story, even though 
it's slanted in the sense that you show us in 
a better light.51
Once the effectiveness of the USIA was established 
during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, its impor­
tance was even more valued as the Cold War became even colder.
By 1962 when Edward R. Murrow took over as head of
52the agèncy almost a de facto cabinet status. More than
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anyone else, Murrow was able to maintain close personal con­
tacts with congress and heads of other government agencies. 
Finally, by 1968, the information agency was considered com­
pletely respectable, had achieved independent status and 
could be considered a permanent part of America's international 
outreach effort. In fact, its importance was recognized 
as early as 1966 when the Advisory Commission on Information 
summarized the development of the information program to 
that point.
From its inception, the information program faced 
difficult problems in management and organization, 
policy, and programs, facilities and construction 
personnel and evaluation, and the evolution of 
its role in the government's structure. Compound­
ing these problems have been the difficulty of 
establishing an adequate financial and appropria­
tions base and the domestic political controversies 
concerning its activities which have periodically 
raged in Congress and in the press. A succession 
of six directors in the last 12 years— each with 
a different idea of the mission— did not provide 
continuity and stability to the Agency's direction 
and leadership.
Improvement in the program's operation came 
slowly. Thanks to congressional investigations 
and hearings, public criticism, executive level 
self-examination, and the periodic reports issued 
by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, 
the role of U.S. information became better defined, 
a sense of professionalism in the area of foreign 
communications began to emergy, purposes and ob­
jectives were clarified, confidence in its methods 
grew gradually, and in more recent days there 
are encouraging signs that management and admini­
stration are improving. This has taken some 17 
years of effort, of trial and error, of mixing 
and meeting short-range crises with long-range 
considerations.53
By 1979 the agency's role was so well accepted and its need
so well recognized that President Jimmy Carter was willing
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to broaden its scope of international outreach activities 
and as a result renamed the information disseminating entity 
the United States International Communications Agency.
International events have shaped the main objectives 
of the agency as much as legislative and executive actions 
of the U.S. government. The agency's main concern is, of 
course, the advancement of United States foreign policy in­
terests by informing and persuading other nations of the 
United States' intent and actions. At times, it has also 
acted as a sort of public relations consultant for the presi­
dent and his advisors, and today its role is a sort of compro­
mise; it does more than try to project a positive national 
image of the United States, but it is not a full-fledged 
instrument of psychological warfare.
It is interesting to note that while USICA objectives
are set out in policy statements and official government
documents they are often interpreted in different ways by
field operators.
To succeed at propaganda requires leaving a broad 
residual effect, which means that the propagandist 
must first decide what residual effect he wants 
to leave. Accordingly, neither Congress nor the 
USIA administration has ever clearly set down 
what the function of American propaganda is sup­
posed to be. . .54
There are, however, some clear objectives. Showing mutuality 
of interest is one. The USICA wants its international out­
reach efforts to make the people overseas feel that their 
good fortune and well being are clearly linked to the good
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fortune and well being of the United States. But perhaps
the agency's main objective is to fight communism.
USIA is in business to fight communism. Its prime 
and only objective is a strong, dynamic, anti­
communist program. This firmly held view within 
USIA ranks is supported by the contention that 
Congress, especially appropriations committees, 
believe this to be USIA's most important mission—  
even its sole one.55
Friendship is another important objective. In other words, 
the main task of persuasion is like the Soviet Union's, the 
USICA needs to create a favorable opinion of the United States 
in foreign countries. The underlying reasoning is that there 
will be more confidence in foreign policy if the United States 
is admired and approved of. Listeners are always more recep­
tive to propaganda efforts in a friendly atmosphere. Another 
objective is to strengthen the United States' chief foreign 
policy aims, including the strengthening of democratic unity 
in the free world as well as the institutions of democracy. 
Thus, it becomes important to support governments of American 
allies.
The USICA's Office of Policy does not form or change 
political policy. Its job is to translate government policy 
into "understandable terms, bringing to bear on the problems 
background information from the wire services, foreign broad­
casts, intelligence, and State Department telegrams and in-
57formation policy statements." The office should determing 
the kind of emphasis an event should receive, and the types 
of media to be used to achieve that emphasis.
74
According to Henderson, the USICA has four major goals
to be achieved through six major strategies. The goals are:
— the vital need for supporting and furthering 
the aims of the United States foreign policy;
— the necessity for maintaining and strengthening 
friendly relations between the United States and 
other countries;
— the imperative need for counteracting the inspired 
flood of misrepresentation as to the United States' 
aims and policies abroad, and
— the necessity and the wish to cooperate with 
other nations in attaining world freedom of in­
formation and to further the objectives and pro­
grams of the United Nations.58
The main strategies are:
— tell the truth;
— explain United States' motives;
— bolster morale and extend hope;
— give a true and convincing picture of American 
life, methods and ideals;
— combat misrepresentations and distortion, and 
— aggressively interpret and support U.S. foreign 
policy.59
U.S. Communication Techniques
However, none of these goals and strategies are real­
ized without specific techniques of achievement. One of 
the most important techniques is the selection of media.
All media are valuable in the United States' international 
outreach efforts. All media can be used in each country 
in which the USICA seeks to achieve its major objectives, 
and these efforts must be coordinated. However, it should 
be remembered that coordination is no easy task. Each medium
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can be used to supplement or complement the others.
Radio complements motion pictures. The centers 
serve as a repository of more detailed information 
to supplement the operations of other media . . .
Leaflets given out at film showings or exhibits 
can address themselves to specific points that 
complement the presentations of the broader issues.
They will be passed along to provide a permanent 
reminder of the themes.60
Media selection must, of course, be geared to the individual
audience. If most of the audience is illiterate, films and
radio broadcasts are the best media, and publications should
be used only sparingly. Films are most effective in areas
where radio broadcasts cannot penetrate. Local radio, films
and leaflets are most effective in contacting hostile or
neutral targets— particularly because they can be used to
reach an audience which has gathered for another purpose.
There is one important restriction to keep in mind.®^
A specific target audience cannot always be reached 
through a specific medium. It is impossible to 
break down specific targets by the media used to 
reach them. A combination must be used to reach 
specific key groups, varying from country to coun­
try. For a broad target, it is better to reach 
many different people with one medium than to 
reach a few many times through different m e d i a . 62
The USICA is faced with the formidable problem of ap­
pealing to a variety of audiences in a variety of cultures. 
Information must be adapted to and presented in such a way 
so that it will appeal to the audience receiving it. This 
includes both the content of the message as well as the media 
used to deliver it. But no matter whom the audience, the 
USICA person providing and disseminating the information
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must identify himself as well as the information with the
. interests, outlooks, and even the familiar media for-
63mat and language. . of those he is seeking to persuade.
The most effective tone for an information statement 
is a matter-of-fact presentation of facts. People are more 
likely to believe an information source that is calm and 
factual rather than one that is constantly haranguing them 
with emotional outbursts. However, it should be remembered 
that facts and emotions can be combined effectively. For 
example:
— News stories should be written and combined so that 
they produce a cumulative emotional effect;
— Some emotional buzzwords can be used, so long as 
the information officer is certain the audience will not 
consider them too propagandistic;
— It is perfectly acceptable to use existing hostil­
ities and play upon those; and
— In broadcasts, voice and inflection should be both
64expressive and when the need arises, strongly emotional.
The tone of the message is only one of the techniques 
which can be used in effective international outreach. Bogart 
suggests a number of ways to ensure the credibility of USICA 
statements :
— stressing a simple, well-known fact that is easily 
recalled;
— avoiding an explicit conclusion;
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— generalizing to imply that no one in the world would 
sincerely challenge a particular statement or theme;
— delivering a message in a calm, sober tone of voice; 
— including self-criticism that produces the impres­
sion of honesty;
— admitting self interest;
— pursuing the same line on a subject in different
ways ;
and
— distinguishing clearly between news and commentary,
— organizing facts so logically the audience draws 
the desired conclusion.®^
The USICA is probably the most effective weapon the 
United States can wield against communist propaganda. However, 
stating the truth is not enough. There are several techniques 
which can be used to counteract Soviet propaganda.
— The Communist accusations are never referred to 
directly. For example, if the Russians decide to exploit 
something they know other people will see as an evil in Ameri­
can life, there is no point in attacking Soviet evils. In­
stead, it is better to simply contrast the democratic and 
socialist systems. In other words, the assault should be 
round-about and not frontal.
— Or the communist charge can be mentioned only as 
a starting point. In other words, the charge should be stated 
accurately, but not so that it might indeed appear truthful
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and any mention should be kept to a minimum. Constant repe­
tition of communist charges against America serves only to 
help the Soviets and hurt the United States. In short, there 
is no point in doing their work for them.
— It is possible to tell BOTH sides, which is often
the most effective technique of all. A balanced account
is most effective, especially if the audience is hostile
to begin with or it is important to remember NOT to distort
the original charbe. That would result in decreased credi-
66bility if the original charge were ever discovered.
Another technique for adapting a message to a target 
audience is the use of unofficial American media or individ­
uals who can sometimes be more credible than government of­
ficials. Sometimes non-Americans, not necessarily nationals 
of the target country, can also be effective. Occasionally 
it is a good idea NOT to attribute certain ideas to U.S. 
government agencies because if that were to be done, the 
target audience might very likely regard those statements 
as biased. That is the time when nonofficial American sources 
that closely resemble the target audience carry more impact 
than an official spokesman's.
This theory is based on several assumptions:
People can be appealed to through a common bond 
rather than nationality. Therefore, information 
from a non-official American source that resembles 
the target is more acceptable than output coming 
directly from USIA.
A statement by a well known American, such 
as a newspaper editor, and not a government
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official, carries more impact than an official 
spokesman's .
USIA should try to get prestigious American 
organizations abroad to adapt statements support­
ing its themes and objectives so that, whenever 
possible, expressions of opinion are attributed 
to some other non-official source. Anti-communist 
material emanating from American labor organiza­
tions is especially effective.
An important aspect of utilizing private in­
dividuals to spread the governmental word is that 
once they are started, many of them continue in­
dependently. Being unofficial, they can spread 
information about American capitalism more ef­
fectively than the U.S. government. To induce 
private American firms and industries operating 
abroad to supplement USIA activities, the agency 
should convince them that "it is their patriotic 
duty." USIA's 'big mistake' is not sufficiently 
exploiting these potential resources.6?
Still another effective technique is that of interper­
sonal contact. Word of mouth is one of the most effective 
ways to influence other people's attitudes. It has the advan­
tage of providing an enormous return on a very small invest­
ment .
A person is apt to believe another person. There 
is a certain warmth of relationship, a certain 
credibility that you get, more than from a printed 
piece of material. . . It isn't what you said . . . 
it's the confidence you've gained. When you get 
home, you can do a hell of a lot more because 
you have the prestige, the backing.°
Contact provides still another advantage. If the information 
provider has contact with people in his target audience, 
he will be able to communicate more effectively through the 
mass media. But it is important to remember that interper­
sonal contacts require special planning and special techni­
ques, including such things as card files identifying those
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to be contacted according to their professions, business 
purposes, or interests. The most important aspect of inter­
personal contact is, of course, kindness and friendship by 
the right USIA personnel. It is ". . . worth many times
the equivalent effort expended on formal and official media
gqfor selling ideas."
The crossover area between films, motion pictures 
and television is another excellent technique. USICA produc­
tions range from how-to-do-it educational films to documen­
taries promoting the beauty and virtues of the American way 
of life. It is a fairly well established fact that all types 
of films and video tapes reach an enormous audience abroad, 
particularly in places where the number of radio receivers 
capable of bringing Voice of America broadcasts or American 
publications are limited. Films seem to be the most effec­
tive medium of communication in poorer areas where the liter­
acy rate is low. The use of television has increased rapidly 
over the recent years. Television audiences were, at first, 
made up of those persons who were economically well off 
enough to be able to purchase a set. But now the price of 
television is coming within reach of all but those at the 
lowest economic levels. The result is that the United States 
has an advantage over the Communists in this respect because
English has become the most widely used language in the 
70world. Because films are expensive to produce and becaus 
many underdeveloped countries have either no film industry
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or only a small one at best, there is a huge market for U.S. 
films and tapes, despite the fact that many countries re­
strict the number of television or motion pictures which 
can be imported within a given period of time. These films 
are distributed through American overseas theatrical distribu­
tors, and arrangements between public affairs officers and 
local theater distribution outlets. The USICA also sponsors 
on its own, the showing of films or loans them to groups 
or organizations interested in sponsoring showings. Most 
information offices as well as U.S. embassies have screening 
rooms and public showings of these films and television pro­
grams are regularly scheduled. There are even mobile vans 
equipped to show these programs which can be used to reach 
people in remote locations. Most of the USICA programs are 
documentaries, designed to help achieve long-range goals 
and seeking to balance and offset some of the distortions 
of American life portrayed in Hollywood motion pictures.
The United States does not hesitate to use other de­
vices and strategies including off-the-record interviews, 
information exchange programs, cultural outreach, providing 
or refusing to provide economic or technical assistance and 
traditional public relations techniques. The exchange of 
persons between countries has always been one of the USICA's 
major functions. The agency is responsible for handling 
the arrangements for and promoting international tours for 
creative and performing artists as well as athletes. In
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addition, the agency arranges for U.S. participation in inter-
71national trade and art fairs and exhibitions.
One of the most popular forms of information exchange
has been through the use of specially produced magazines.
For example, in 1955 the United States proposed, via a note
from its embassy in Moscow, the circulation of a Russian
language magazine, "cultural and non-Oolitical in character,
devoted to an objective presentation of various aspects of 
72American life." The Soviet government accepted the propo­
sal, but in return they insisted they should have the right 
to circulate a magazine of the same type in the United States. 
By October 1957 the first issue of what was later called
Soviet Life appeared on American newstands while America
73Illustrated began a circulation in the Soviet Union.
Another little known technique for achieving basic 
goals is the USICA's research function. Its goal is to con­
duct "special studies overseas to determine communications 
patterns, foreign attitudes toward the United States and
its policies, target audiences, and the effectiveness of
74USICA programs." In addition, this section analyzed field 
reports publications from all over the world to determine 
specific information and projects for specific areas.
Cultural activities also play an important role. Most 
of the material distributed under this division includes 
books, music, educational materials and materials relating 
to other aspects of American culture. "Its primary purpose
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is to plant the seeds of understanding, respect and friend­
ship for future harvest, rather than to influence attitudes
75on current issues." This division supports libraries and
reading rooms, exhibits and provides USICA field officers
with advice and information on the best way to use these
materials. In addition, research assists foreign publishers
with translations and arranges for publications of English
editions of the books to be sold at very low prices. There
are even some English teaching programs designed to promote
mutual understanding.
Other forms of American international outreach include
people-to-people programs " . . .  such publicly supported
projects as hospital ship HOPE, involving the conversion
of a U.S. Navy hospital ship into a privately financed and
operated mercy-training demonstration mission to Asia, Latin
76America, and Africa." Providing or refusing to provide
technical or economic assistance is still another method,
" . . .  and the selection of projects to assist can be power-
77ful political instruments abroad."
But perhaps one of the most important functions of 
the USICA, which encompasses many of those mentioned earlier, 
is to serve as a public relations agency for the U.S. govern­
ment .
From the point of view of the agency, the public 
relations function may be considered the most 
important of all the five main assignments. . .
Unless public relations considerations can be 
taken into account in policymaking, and unless
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communications technicians have time in which 
to prepare for major developments, all other ef­
forts of the Agency are likely to be nullified.
Yet, to be fully effective, this function must 
be thoroughly understood throughout government, 
and its usefulness must be completely accepted.7°
If the USICA does not report government officials' speeches 
or government agencies' actions, the commercial news services 
and foreign correspondents will. And if these government 
actions are ill considered, badly timed, or phrased in offen­
sive terms, sending news of them abroad only magnifies their
ill effects. The agency can attempt to put them into context,
79but it cannot ignore them. However, this aspect of the
agency's role is often not understood or appreciated at home.
In contrast, the agency's public relations work abroad is
highly valued.
The chief of a USIS post is the advisor to the 
American ambassador. His responsibility includes 
advice and supervision of dissemination of infor­
mation. He has the rank of minister at the larg­
est posts and of counselor at other principal 
missions. By executive order of December 11,
1965, the Agency is specifically designated to 
perform all public information functions abroad 
with respect to foreign assistance and develop­
ment programs of the United States. Also at most 
international conferences abroad, the USIS officer 
is detailed as official spokesman for the delega­
tion in its dealings with press, radio, and tele­
vision. USIA also provides a public affairs staff 
for the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, 
and often the public affairs advisors within the 
Department of State are USIA officers on temporarydetail.80
But despite all these efforts, the question of how 
effective they are remains. No one, not even USICA personnel 
themselves, is really quite sure of the effectiveness of the
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organization's international outreach efforts.
There is no single answer or common agreement on cri­
teria of what effectiveness is. Without such a defi­
nition, no efforts can be evaluated. The marvelous 
naivete of this last statement makes it worth noting 
that it was uttered by one of the top officials of 
the agency.81
Agency personnel explained the problem to Bogart :
My basic criticism comes from seeing those guys de­
velop plans for proceding in their countries and then 
reading what they have done and getting an impression 
of great undirected activity ultimately justified by 
occasional bread-and-butter letters from high govern­
ment officials saying "You are doing a good job." An 
assessment of what they do can be made only if they 
first determine what they intend to d o . 8 2
Another problem is that a general definition of effective­
ness could not possibly be applied to all projects. There 
should be specific measures of effectiveness for each spe­
cific task. As one agency staff member told Bogart:
We have not got any clear-cut impression throughout 
the world about what we are, who we are, what we are 
like, and what we stand for. It sometimes seems in­
credible that there are tens of millions of people 
in this world who don't know that we are the war 
party. There it is. It seems to me that unless you 
start out with a master blueprint and then cut that 
up into sections and have considerably more criteria, 
you will go on hoping that the coincidence of a thou­
sand ideas will inspire c o n f i d e n c e . 83
Bogart also points out that agency personnel have a tendency 
to confuse activity with effectiveness. He quotes another 
staff member, saying people in an organization knock them­
selves out in the belief that if they don't, the world will 
fall apart and if they do, the world will be saved. It's 
bad because it tends to distort the actual situation. A
86
man comes into a country with a population of 10 million, 
and h e ’s there with a couple of people. He works frantic­
ally. He tends to confuse his activities without output 
and output with impact and impact with results. He feels
that because he is very busy then things must be happening,
84but that attitude gets everything out of focus. Of 
course, this problem of associating cause and effect is 
characteristic of all social change efforts.
Effectiveness of U.S. Communication Techniques
Despite these criticisms, it does not mean that USICA 
activities cannot be evaluated. It has specific influence 
upon specific actions such as the surrender of troops after 
leaflets have been dropped or in the election of a dandi- 
date favorably disposed to the United States. In areas 
where both superpowers have international outreach efforts, 
Russian failures can be considered American successes.
"In Norway, the campaign to show American cooperation with 
the Norwegians worked so well that some Communist publica­
tions had to stop printing. Others had to get subsidies 
from Russia.
It is important to remember that the numbers of 
people reached are not always an indication of success.
Any information campaign, such as the establishment of a 
library, might reach a large number of people without
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reaching the priority target group, and just because a pro­
gram reaches people, it does not follow that they are 
affected either adversely or positively by that program. 
However, a population's liking for a project's output can 
be considered a measure of effectiveness or popular reaction 
to the cessation of a specific USICA activity. Informed 
local reactions are another indication of a project's effec­
tiveness. "The value of a film used in the Philippines is
shown by the fact that a local priest said it was worth a
86thousand sermons." Bogart also suggests that complimen­
tary letters from high government officials in which a pro­
ject is launched can also be considered a measure of success.
Communist reactions to programs are another way of
determining effectiveness.
If the Communists object to something USICA is doing, 
this is prima facie evidence that its ends are being 
accomplished. Communist press and radio attacks upon 
Voice of America prove the effectiveness of Voice of 
America broadcasts. If anyone found with USICA ma­
terials is ordered killed by the Communists, this is 
also proof. Under the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, 
the success of USICA posters was demonstrated by the 
fact that newsboys were arrested for passing them 
out.87
Modification of a Communist attitude and mail received by 
the Voice of America are also good indications. This is 
particularly important because knowing what the audience is 
thinking serves to provide data which may be useful in coun­
tries where other data is not available. It is possible to 
infer psychological bent, and the range of interests of
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those who listen regularly.
However, Bogart says there are two theories regarding 
USICA success. One is that the agency's success can be 
determined by the cumulative effect of its routine accom­
plishments. As one agency staff member told Bogart of this 
problem:
It's almost impossible to go down to technical evalu­
ations of the effectiveness of a film. The best evi­
dence we have of effectiveness is that over a period 
of time something else has happened. The contrasting 
view is that USICA effectiveness will be proved by 
having a few striking successes.
Basically the conception has been that if things 
flow properly, if they're planned to flow properly, 
you have a minimum of disruption, therefore, you are 
doing a good job. 'ïhat's not the basis of good pro­
paganda. It doesn't matter that it's chaotic and 
that it doesn't flow right if somewhere in it occa­
sionally there are people with a spark and the spark
itself emerges.88
Thus, the United States can safely assume its international 
outreach efforts are most successful in those countries 
which continue to regard Western treatment of themselves 
and Western actions toward other countries as acceptable.
One of the major problems faced by the USICA is the 
need to r etain a flexible strategy and tactics to implement 
it in the face of surrounding domestic and foreign politi­
cal pressures. In many ways, the agency's freedom to act 
is curtailed by the many governmental decisions which are 
beyond its control. For example, some policy decisions 
are so broad that no one agency could possibly influence 
them. All the USICA can do is deal with these decisions
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and effects as best it can. The Vietnam conflict provides 
an excellent exanq)le. The conflict was so unpopular in 
many foreign countries, and USICA efforts to get a friendly 
audience to listen to the United States’ point of view were 
greatly hindered. Personnel were compelled to defend Ameri­
can actions without creating additional hostility, ". . . a
difficult assignment in such a country as Yugoslavia, for 
89example."
Another example is the 1957 launching of a Russian 
manmade satellite " . . .  the impact on other countries was 
sensational. Revolutionary changes in education, science, 
research, and technology resulted in the United States. A 
frantic race to catch up in the space race and recoup lost 
prestige b e g a n . T h e  Russian space victory was a propa­
ganda defeat of the utmost magnitude for the United States.
According to the theory of the directive approach, 
the direction in which information is aimed or the type of 
information disseminated should not be a decision which is 
left to the persons working in the field offices— as it 
sometimes is today. All planning, that is, the strategies 
to be used and the techniques to achieve goals, should be 
done in the headquarters office. Field office personnel 
should simply carry out those instructions. Chapter Five 
will elaborate on this recommendation.
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U.S.S.R. INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH EFFORTS
This section will explain Russia's need for an inter­
national communication system, the system's goals and strate­
gies, the media channels used to disseminate information 
and the credibility of that information. It will also in­
clude a case study of actual propagandistic materials aimed 
at persons living in the United States. Finally, it will 
seek to determine the effectiveness of the Soviet effort.
Russia's international outreach efforts are more com­
plex than those used by any other country. The reason for 
this is fairly simple. Although the Soviets are quite 
willing to use physical conflict to spread their ideology, 
they are well aware that acceptance of Communist doctrine 
must come from the general public— the man on the street. 
Soviet leaders are also well aware of the fact that inter­
national outreach efforts are most effective when aimed at 
the man on the street; thus the dissemination of interna­
tional information about the Soviet Union and Communist 
doctrine became a natural weapon. The Soviet diplomatic 
corps carries out its share of international outreach. 
Sometimes the ambassador will direct these activities; 
sometimes it is the press attache and a group of communica­
tion specialists as well as communist sympathizers among 
the local residents.
There is also international radio propaganda, and
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for a time, the Soviets led the United States in the number 
of hours of foreign language broadcasts. For example in 
1953 " . . .  the Soviet Union broadcast 78 hours a week to 
the United States while Voice of America broadcasts to 
Russia in ten different languages totaled 52 and one-half 
h o u r s . O f  course, there are other methods of interna­
tional outreach as well, which will be discussed more fully 
later. For now, it is sufficient to note that political 
works and general books of fiction and nonfiction are also 
distributed. Weekly, biweekly and monthly publications, 
featuring expensive four-color photography are circulated. 
Tass, the official news agency, provides information about 
Russia to non-communist countries and communist satellites. 
Films are often distributed, and in some countries, such as 
India, the Soviet Union will rent a theater for a year, 
specifically for the purpose of showing these films and 
movies. There are also Soviet exchange programs— and this 
program is often called the best method of propaganda. The» 
difference between Soviet and American exchange programs 
is that Soviet nationals abroad remain under close govern­
mental supervision while Americans do not. Finally, the
Russians frequently use the western press for their own
92propaganda purposes— through news releases from TASS.
Before studying Russian international outreach 
efforts, it will be useful to understand something of the 
history behind them. As is well known, the Union of
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Soviet Socialist Republics is comprised of a group of dif­
ferent states; however, most of the population is concen­
trated in Soviet Russia itself along with the capital,
Moscow. And it is in Moscow that national strategies for 
both national and international communications are developed. 
It is also well known that all communications media in 
Russia are state-owned and subject to strict government 
regulations.
In his book What Is To Be Done?, Lenin insisted that 
all communists should react to all forms of social injus­
tice and they should seek to merge all individual propaganda
93efforts into one formidable stream of power.
Despite the fact that the Soviet Union has a highly 
organized international propaganda operation it is still 
based largely on Leninist principles. Lenin explained the 
importance of having " . . .  the ability to make all neces­
sary compromises, to tack, to make agreements, zigzags,
94retreats and so on . . . ." Only a small portion of the 
population, about 10 percent, is an active minority with 
the remaining 90 percent, a passive majority. The active 
minority is receptive to a sophisticated informational 
approach; the others will understand only a direct one.^^ 
These principles can be applied both to international and 
domestic outreach efforts. With regard to capitalistic 
democracy, Lenin advocated that those guiding international 
outreach efforts to focus the audiences' attention on
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injustices,
engendered by the contradictions inherent in capit­
alism and will endeavor to rouse mass discontent and 
indignation against the crying injustice, leaving to 
the propagandist the responsibility of giving a com­
plete explanation for the contradictions. This is 
why the propagandist works principally through the 
written word and the agitator through the spoken 
word.96
However, after Lenin's death, no other leader with
the same imaginative use of propaganda has emerged.
Since Lenin's death, contributions to Communist press 
theory have been negligible, and recent statements 
echo his principles. Stalin was inferior to both 
Lenin and Kruschev as a propagandist and made no 
original contribution to press theories.97
However, the belief in propaganda continued, and by 1966
Nikita Kruschev was obviously committed to the importance
of propaganda:
We believe in our social system, and we prove and 
will prove our belief not by means of war, but by 
peaceful competition, by developing cultural and 
economic contacts with others. We will fight for 
our ideas not by means of war, but by struggling 
for man';s mind. And man's mind can be conquered 
only if man himself understands which idea isbetter.98
U.S.S.R. Communication Techniques
The main goal behind any Russian international out­
reach effort is to encourage belief in communist theories 
of government. Thus, Communist leaders use their inter­
national efforts to convince peoples of other countries 
that their main goal is to achieve peace throughout the
94
world. Their goals are based on the philosophy that the 
more people in other nations who understand Marxist goals 
and philosophy, the more sophisticated will be their politi­
cal understanding of that philosophy, and thus, the more 
likely those people will be to embrace Russian political 
ideas. This approach is based on the assumption that Com­
munist party doctrine is the most effective bridge between 
party leaders and the general public. This effectively 
eliminates those who would seek unauthorized leadership—  
simply because the people have been schooled to look to 
party leadership for the correct interpretation of party 
doctrine. Thus Lenin hoped that communist sympathizers in 
democratic nations would arrange for scandals in government,
industry, and other areas, so that the people would become
99aware of the selfish intentions of democratic leaders.
In fact Lenin believed the average worker would not 
be able to picture himself in the office of any communist 
party leader. However a worker could envision himself in a 
real-life situation in his own country or in those situa­
tions which Communist propaganda could make him believe 
existed in his own country. This is the basic example of 
Marxist theory— educating the public to become aware of 
its social mistreatment. Any problems in a particular 
society should be focused on by the media writer and he 
should not concentrate on information concerning what is 
happening in the rest of the world.
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For example, communist propaganda would tell persons 
in a given country that the reason barbershops are empty is 
because the common man does not even have enough money to 
eat or for the other necessities of life— let alone the money 
for a haircut. This makes the point by saying that working 
people's salaries should be raised so they can afford hair­
cuts. This may ignore the possibility that they don't have 
enough money simply because the government is taking their 
money in taxes to establish its own military supremacy.
Most westerners believe that Soviet propaganda is designed 
to misinform them: in reality, the Soviet intent is just
the opposite. The goal of Soviet propaganda is to show how 
Communist government and theories will make their lives 
better than what they now have under democratic rule.
It is not enough to merely tell persons in democratic 
countries what should be. The effort must go further to 
include communicating with the people of a nation and con­
vincing them of the correctness of the communist approach 
so they will organize in an effort to force the government 
to give them those things they believe should be theirs. 
However, it must be remembered that propaganda cannot be 
effective without a "news peg," that is, it must be based 
on current events within the country itself. Communist 
communication specialists are quick to take advantage of 
political or social unrest based on information from
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different sources— usually the people most closely involved 
such as farmers, factory workers, etc. Thus Stalin believed 
that the working classes in democratic countries were naive 
enough to accept the words of those in power; however, that 
acceptance could be increased if propaganda could be used 
to appeal to their very real needs— achieving a comfortable 
life. For this reason, a situation of this type gives 
Russian communications experts the opportunity to take ad­
vantage of any unrest in democratic nations and continue to 
use it until the people force democratic leaders to listen 
to them. Additionally, Russian propagandists are not content 
merely to point out the problems; they will not use the in­
formation unless they can show the people how the government 
has made mistakes in dealing with the problem. Thus, Com­
munist propaganda must combine with a country's own politi­
cal and economic difficulties if it is to influence the 
thinking of the common man. In short, there can be no 
revolution if there are no social pressures dictating the 
need for revolutionary activities.
With this philosophy in mind, Soviet propaganda 
goals become a logical method of extending the governmental 
theory.
On the international level, communist propaganda's 
main tasks were defined in a resolution of the Party's 
Central Committee.
97
The chief task of party propaganda is to explain 
the ideas of Marjcism-Leninism profoundly and compre­
hensively, to show the successful implementation of 
these ideas in the course of the party's struggle 
for the victory of socialism and communism . . .  to 
teach people to use in their practical activity and 
to creatively develop the theoretical wealth amassed 
by the party, to rouse the working people to struggle 
for implementation of the party's policy and to rear 
active and staunch fighters for communism.100
Nikolai G. Plaganov, director of Tass, explained it a little
differently to Moscow University journalism students.
News must be organized . . . else it is news of mere 
events and happenstance . . . news must not merely 
throw light on this or that fact or event— it must 
pursue a definite purpose . . . News is agitation 
via facts. In selecting the news topic, the writer 
of the news story must proceed above all from the 
realization that not all facts and not just any 
event should be reported in the press.lui
Bogart identified the Soviet propaganda goals and 
practices more specifically:
— The communist propaganda effort describes the 
United States as an imperialist power eager to make war on 
the rest of the world.
— United States' political leaders are described as 
persons who do not understand Europe, its people, its prob­
lems or its needs and must go to war to save the declining 
U.S. economy.
— The Communists never miss a chance to show that
the United States does not practice the democracy it appears
to sell to the rest of the world. "All violations of civil
102liberties and minority rights" are magnified.
— All capitalist countries are headed for economic
98
disaster.
— The United States has no real culture— all it has 
to offer is money, and U.S. films and books are perfect 
examples of its lack of culture.
— Americans will do anything to achieve their own 
goals; hence, American soldiers are always accused of com­
mitting atrocities.
Remembering that the Soviet Union's international 
communications strategy is a direct result of Lenin's phi­
losophy which equates the power of a Soviet worldwide in­
formation system with the military power of the strongest 
army in the world, it is not surprising that the Soviet
Union continues to spend large sums of money in its war of
104commuai cat ion against the Western world.
For example, during the 1960's, one of the Russians' 
most effective methods of attracting international attention 
was to insist upon wide publicity of any international con­
ference. The technique worked. Thus, Soviet propagandists 
could emphasize their country's desire for world peace if 
only the other governments involved would understand and 
support the Russian proposals. One of the reasons for the 
success of this technique is that the Soviet government can 
make the foreign policy decisions in advance and in complete 
secrecy while other foreign policy makers in democratic 
nations must contend with the almost certainty that some 
snooping member of the mass media is sure to ferret out
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U.S. strategy before the meeting begins and blast the so-
called secret information all over the world. Thus it is
obvious the Soviets can demand and receive as much publicity
105as they wish for any meeting of heads of state.
In many other ways, Soviet propagandists and their 
artistic, scholarly, and scientific collaborators 
have in recent years attracted the attention of 
various world audiences. Among the devices are 
exhibitions, participation in international trade 
fairs, foreign performances by Soviet athletes, 
dancers, and singers, and the export of books, 
periodicals, musical scores, and films.106
Another effective Soviet tactic is to try to reach 
any world audience which information communication special­
ists deem appropriate while at the same time, denying to 
foreign communicators all but the most limited access to 
Soviet communication media. And all foreigners, even those 
from communist countries, are forbidden from having an un­
chaperoned face-to-face interview with the average Soviet
citizen. This includes such individuals as Soviet authors,
107philosophers and other intellectuals.
Another strategy seems to indicate that the Russians 
are seeking innocence by association, especially in terms of 
the familiar Russian device of quoting out of context ex­
cerpts from the popular press of free countries and making 
them appear to support Soviet policies. They also seek to 
"associate respectable, non-communist political, business,
or cultural leaders with Soviet or communist causes and
^ ,,108 movements."
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Soviet policy is linked both to the complaints as 
well as the hopes and aspirations of all types of social, 
national, and ethnic erroups. There are a number of methods 
by which it succeeds, according to Martin and other American 
scholars. Instead of using specific examples, only vague 
references to an event or philosophy are used, even while 
citing creditable sources. A small number of ideas are 
repeated over and over again. Perhaps one of the best known 
techniques is distortion. Certain aspects of Communist 
realities in the Soviet Union are deliberately withheld 
from foreign audiences. The Soviets also rely upon character 
assassination as well as other techniques which will arouse 
the hatred of class enemies. They feel no qualms about in­
dulging in the blatant political forgeries. Their main 
goal is to discredit the United States and its allies to 
nations in the non-western world, to make U.S. allies sus­
picious of the Democratic Giant and finally to discourage 
acceptance of U.S. ideas among other countries. Nor are 
the Russians insensitive to the thoughts and philosophies 
of the group of neople they are trying to reach. Very 
often, Soviet information aimed at a specific country shows 
a great deal of tact and understanding toward the attitudes, 
hopes and beliefs of the target audience. Thus, they are 
often able to attract Third World countries into their 
orbit by playing upon the people's desires for the better 
things in life while seeking to maintain their own customs,
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and traditions. In short, Soviet communicators are taught 
thoroughly about the languages and cultures of the foreign 
countries at whom their messages are aimed.
Thus far, I have discussed Soviet techniques in a 
general way; perhaps it would be helpful to look at them 
more closely. As mentioned earlier, the Soviets limit the 
flow of information into and out of their country. Tass, 
the Soviet news agency, serves as a gatekeeper. Tass cor­
respondents are located in most foreign capitals, but only 
a small portion of the information these reporters collect 
is used in Moscow's mass media:
(Tass is) practically the sole supporter of Soviet 
information for foreign consumption, though this 
monopoly situation is changing. Its broadcasts are 
made in a number of different languages and dialects. 
Tass's overseas radio bulletin contains the daily 
Pravda leader and selected articles from the Soviet 
press representing a guide on world affairs for for­
eign Communist organizations. It also carries cul­
tural and economic information of propagandistic 
value selected from the Tass internal service.109
The Russians frequently employ the technique of 
double talk, which uses both Communist party jargon and 
words with double meanings. There is a double bonus to this 
technique; it is meaningless to the casual reader and avoids 
ordering people about the way they should feel or think 
about a subject, and this does not create a sense of alarm 
or invite official notice.
Nor do they have a problem distributing the materials 
they prepare— they have organizations and party members in
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every country. Another favorite technique is the "slide in" 
effort, in which they begin by taking a factual news item or 
event and then slide into a factual sounding statement which 
actually distorts the truth but it is so subtle that the 
average reader is not aware of what has been done. Other 
strategies include bribing foreign newspaper editors, handl­
ing propaganda so that it does not violate foreign censor­
ship codes and using blackmail and threats to force loyalty 
from people.
However, the main Soviet propaganda techniques are 
deception, guilt by association, repetition and deliberate 
misuse of sentiment. Some of these are conventional tech­
niques for persuading other people to accept a point of 
view, and some have been developed exclusively by the 
Russians. The most common method is the use of news items 
without quoting any source of information. The only sources 
mentioned are usually unnamed western sources. Of course, 
these deceptions are not always outright lies— instead the 
effort is more effective if it is based on a partial truth. 
When using the guilt by association technique, Moscow some­
times indirectly accuses a country of masterminding a ter­
rorist attach against itself. Often this blame is only 
implied— the propagandists prefer the reader or audience 
to draw its own conclusion. Repetition is one of the most 
effective and oldest propaganda devives. It is based on 
the belief that if something is repeated often enough, the
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person hearing the message will eventually begin to accept 
it as truth. Thus the Russians repeat the same slogans over 
and over. Repetition is also used to promulgate the Soviet 
notion of one simple solution to a problem. This leads 
those hearing the information to believe that no other solu­
tion exists and allows the Soviets to provide well known 
words with a new, pro-communist connotation.
The Soviets do not hesitate, especially when provid­
ing misinformation to Middle Eastern countries, to rely on 
the technique of deliberate misuse of sentiment. But per­
haps the Russians' most effective strategy is to talk to 
their audiences in terms of immediate problems to be solved 
or goals to be achieved.
A lot of our criticism of Communist regimes, though 
meaningful to us, is meaningless to the people we 
are addressing. They can accept a lot in the way of 
horror and self-deprivation, government interferences 
in their daily lives, without being shocked by it.
If you come up to them with two separate ideologies, 
they're more inclined to accept the one that offers 
them something concrete in the next couple of years 
rather than in the next generation or two. You go 
to the villages of Indonesia and an official comes 
along in a Buick. We come along and say, "In a 
generation or two, your children will drive around 
in Buicks like that." The Communist says, "Let's 
knock off the bastard and take his Buick." He's 
going to appeal to them.
It is impossible to understand the international 
propaganda of any nation, let alone the Soviet Union's, 
without understanding the facilities most nations use to 
carry out those informational or propagandistic efforts. 
Obviously consular and diplomatic embassy personnel carry
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out a certain propagandistic function for any nation, usually 
in the form of newsletters about their own country. These 
are usually prepared by an information officer within the 
embassy or consulate. Books, maps, posters, pamphlets or 
brochures about the nation are also available for distribu­
tion by diplomatic personnel. These items are usually 
written for the specific purpose of international outreach. 
These are distributed at no charge as are documentary films, 
photographs, magazines and newspapers. And finally, the 
embassy may arrange for speaking engagements for their own 
countrymen visiting the nation, and libraries and reference 
rooms for the general public's use are sometimes provided. 
Sometimes a nation will use a government department designed 
to be in sole charge of international outreach activities. 
Most frequently, it is the ministry of education, or propa­
ganda, or information, or culture. These departments invite 
students from other nations to come and study in their 
country. In addition, if a foreign policy or public opin­
ion maker visits, the ministry will arrange guided tours, 
often with all expenses paid, or they might send special 
ambassadors abroad to create goodwill for their nation.
Other activities include sponsoring international conven­
tions, encouraging communication between people living in 
their own country and those of the same nationality living 
abroad or with persons of other nationalities. Another 
effective information distributor is the news agency—
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whether it be owned by the government or private individuals. 
Also, colleges and universities, clubs and other organiza­
tions, and businessmen are also effective means of distribut­
ing international information. However, there is one channel 
of communication that is probably the most effective of all. 
"Radio is probably the most universal medium of international 
propaganda. The radio stations that engage in international 
propaganda are largely government-owned and operated, though
some are semiofficial, and others are privately owned or 
1 99operated."
Soviet information is no exception. International 
information is disseminated through a worldwide system of 
interlocking organizations and channels which can be di­
vided into several main categories. The main portion of 
the propaganda distribution system is Icated in Moscow under 
the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, Agitrop, which 
directs both domestic and international communications 
systems. One of the most frequently used média is radio, 
and thus, a brief discussion of its development within the 
Soviet Union is essential.
The first radio station was built in Moscow in 1914. 
Although it had the strength of only one hundred kilowatts, 
it was used extensively as part of the revolutionary com­
munications strategy. Eventually it came to be known as
113the October Revolution Radio Center. By 1918 the
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government established a laboratory to contiue developing 
radio as a communications medium, and the project received 
Lenin’s full support. The success of the experimental sta­
tion was such that by August of 1922, the first regularly
broadcasting radio station was launched, and by September 1,
114the first radio concert was aired. The Russian people 
quickly accepted the new form of entertainment and musical 
programs continued to increase in popularity. However, gov­
ernment officials were not unaware of the importance of 
radio's political usefulness both at home and abroad.
During the second World War, radio stations were used only 
for military purposes, but by the time the war had ended, 
there were approximately six million radio sets in Russia. 
After the war ended, research and development continued.
More broadcasting facilities were built throughout the 
country.
Soviet efforts to develop their broadcasting system
did not stop within their own country. The Russians were
more than willing to provide technical assistance and
facilites to neighboring communist countries. Russian
broadcasts were used in Rumania, Poland, Hungary, and North 
117Korea. Emery quotes the deputy chairman of Soviet Radio, 
Andreyev, explaining the extent of post-war broadcast 
efforts in 1956.
The organizational structure of the Soviet radio 
tends toward satisfying the demands of listeners
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living in different parts of the country and speak­
ing different languages.
At present the average daily air time is 125 
hours. Three parallel programmes are broadcast for 
the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. Apart from 
that, special programmes are devised for listeners 
living in the Far East, Siberia, Ural and in Central 
Asia. . .
Broadcasting is carried on in more than 85 lan­
guages spoken in the USSR and abroad. Not only in 
the union and autonomous republics but also in small 
national districts and areas, programmes are broad­
cast in languages spoken in the respective areas 
. . . Even such numerically small nationalities as 
the Evenks, Sakha and others who until the October 
revolution had no written language of their own now 
hear programmes in their mother tongue.
The activities of the Soviet Radio are extensive 
and varied in character. It informs listeners about 
the most significant events of home and internatio­
nal life, disseminates the great ideas of Marxism- 
Leninism, the most important decisions of the CP 
of the USSR, reports on experiences of outstanding 
workers and farmers and on achievements in culture, 
science and art . . .
The Soviet Union has not hesitated to take advantage 
of the freedom of information extended to Western nations 
or even those countries with authoritarian forms of govern­
ment which do not attempt to control what their people 
listen to over the air waves. In 1973 some 14,000 hours 
of broadcasting were directed toward Western European 
countries
In 1976, the Soviet Union's broadcasts to foreign 
audiences totalled nearly 2,000 hours per week in 
84 languages, almost equal to the combined hours 
of Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free 
Europe. About 11 percent of Soviet external broad­
casts, or about 221 hours, are directed to the 
Western hemisphere. The Middle East received 
approximately 186 hours per w e e k . 120
Soviet interest in communication has increased as
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its prestige as a world power increased.
Thus, Leonid F. Ilichev, deputy minister of foreign 
affairs, stated at a Moscow conference in 1960 that 
the party had now made "ideological work and the 
Communist education of the working peoples the cen- ' 
tral task, and the success of communism as a move­
ment depended largely upon the abilities of the 
Communists as communicators. Soviet leaders also 
saw opportunities in new regions, among new nations 
and in new conflicts and uncertainties of interest.121
Despite its heavy reliance upon radio, the Soviet 
Union also makes excellent use of other channels of communi­
cation.
Here again, this information is a combination of tech­
niques listed and defined by Martin, Johns and other American 
scholars. Other types of international outreach efforts in­
clude cultural agreements, friendship societies, front orga­
nizations, films, exhibitions, literature, sports, the per­
forming arts, and tourism. Cultural agreements with various 
nations throughout the world are related to science, educa­
tion, literature, the graphic arts, music, sports, and 
disaster relief. These activities are controlled from 
Moscow, as are all Soviet information efforts. By the end 
of 1973, the Russians had negotiated cultural agreements 
with 120 countries. This does not include Russian partici­
pation in cultural organizations. Some 17,000 cultural 
workers visit foreign countries annually. Although these 
agreements are made with other communist countries, western 
countries, and'Third World nations, agreements with the 
West are usually very specific about what kinds of cultural
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exchanges will take place, when and for what length of time. 
Agreements with Third World countries are somewhat more in­
teresting in that they go beyond what can accurately be 
termed a cultural agreement and includes such things as the 
guarantee of Soviet freedom to conduct any propaganda ef­
forts it believes to be necessary. In turn, Third World 
countries usually send students or journalists to Moscow—  
which also aids Russian propaganda efforts.
Another channel of communication is the friendship 
societies. These groups scattered throughout the world are 
designed to develop and strengthen the friendship, mutual 
understanding, confidence and cultural cooperation of the 
Soviet with that of people in foreign countries. These 
friendship societies are governed by the All Union Confer­
ence, which meets once every four years. This Union in 
turn cooperates with cultural organizations, and delegates 
from all over the world attend. Within their home coun­
tries, these groups serve to provide and promote Soviet 
interests, including friendship with the Soviet Unionj 
assisting in negotiation of cultural agreements, promoting 
the Soviet Union's interests in international politics, 
promoting the study of Russian abroad, and recruiting and 
organizing those persons who ’are in sympathy with Soviet 
policy and theory.
Front organizations are groups which are internatio=. 
nal in nal in scope and sponsored by the Soviets, although
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they do not appear to have any direct connection with the 
main Soviet international outreach effort. They are designed 
to organize common groups and to hide the fact that they are 
sponsored by the Russians as well as the fact that their 
real purpose is to provide more information about the Soviet 
Union. All of these groups are sponsored by international 
celebrities and include prominent Communist party members. 
Obviously, these groups have a very close resemblance to 
the friendship societies.
As usual it was Lenin who understood the potential 
of film as an effective means of international outreach.
After the revolution, one of the first things the new Commu­
nist regime did was to nationalize and therefore gain control 
of the film industry. The making of propaganda films began 
at once, and the Russians immediately began to seek foreign 
markets. To ensure dissemination of these films, internat­
ional film weeks are frequently organized.
Exhibitions provide the perfect opportunity to pub­
licly demonstrate Soviet achievements in art, science, and 
industry. The theme of the exhibitions usually determines 
which party, governmental, or public organization will 
assist in assembling the exhibit and presenting it to other 
countries. Of course, additional informational activities 
such as lectures or discussion groups are also included as 
part of the exhibition.
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Another channel of communication is literature which 
hea always been considered one of the prime methods of learn­
ing about the lives of people in another country. Soviet 
foreign language publications usually include lists of new 
Soviet books for sale in that particular country's bookstores 
Books are usually advertised as the perfect gift. Another 
drawing card is the price. Soviet books are among the 
cheapest in the world.
Sports is one of the most important activities to the 
Russians, but the reason for this emphasis is purely politi­
cal. These athletes can often reach audiences which are 
unaffected by other types of information dissemination. To 
this end, the Russians try to organize as many international 
sports events as possible.
Although the physical activities are different, from 
a propaganda standpoint, there is no difference between 
sporting events and performing arts tours. Once again, 
these performances attract audiences which remain unaffected 
by other types of Soviet propaganda. Performers are con­
sidered ambassadors of a superior social system— a fact 
which makes the defection to the United States of premier 
danseur Mikhail Baryshnikov doubly embarrassing to the 
Russians.
Magazines are also an important aspect of Soviet 
international outreach. Soviet Life has a format similar 
to the old Life magazine published in the United States.
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There are 50,000 copies of Soviet Life published each month.
^ Half are mailed to subscribers and the other 25,000 are sold
on newsstands. Some 2,000 free copies are distributed to
government officials and politicians as well as to libraries
122in the United States. The editors of Soviet Life believe
its reader to be ". . . intellectuals, students, and school
123children, and the material is directed at those groups."
The magazine's Moscow office branch in the Russian Embassy 
is responsible for details of printing and circulation.
The staff is small, and most of the articles are written by 
freelance writers, usually persons who specialize in writing 
about the arts. Additional articles are provided by the
Novosti Press Agency, and both photos and stories are pur-
124chased on an as-needed basis. The Soviet Union pays for
publication, and during its early days, the Kremlin spent
125$27,000 to $40,000 per issue. The publication's goal is 
for its readers to develop positive attitudes toward the 
Soviet Union in both political and nonpolitical areas. 
Another international outreach magazine is Soviet Union, a 
monthly propaganda magazine published in 11 different lan­
guages, including Chinese, English, French, German, Spanish, 
Korean, Japanese, Finnish, Hindi, Urdu, and Arabic.
All of these international outreach messages sent 
along the previously discussed channels of communication 
are designed to combine all aspects of life— economic, mili­
tary, political and psychological. The idea is to use
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simplified images, combined with information slanted to fit 
communist party needs. The result is to produce diametric­
ally opposed values, for example, communist virtues versus 
Western vices, and most of the hostility or bad guy image—  
is blamed on the United States. However, today's Soviet 
international outreach appeals are becoming more democratic 
and liberal, thus generating even more acceptance from 
groups which do not necessarily have any direct relationship 
to the Communist philosophy. The messages are indirectly 
targeted to increase already existing frustrations. The 
technique is one of psychological coercion rather than
, . T . 126logical persuasion.
Given the total amount of information about the 
Soviet Union produced by the Soviet Union, it would be im­
possible to analyze each article or publication on a case- 
by-case basis. The easiest method, the most efficient for 
the purpose of this study is to explain briefly and analyze 
Soviet international outreach efforts directed toward 
English speaking peoples. The best way to do this is through 
a brief glimpse of articles published in the Soviet News and 
studying a series of publications explaining different as­
pects of life in the Soviet Union. This series published 
by Novosti Publishers, written in the Soviet Union, and 
printed in the United States, will illustrate some of the 
techniques used to achieve the Kremlin's primary information
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goal— that of altering peoplesattitudes toward the Soviet
Union.127
I made an unscientific sampling of articles published 
in the Soviet News from March 6, 1979 to December 11, 1979. 
The types of articles published include:
— an accusation that the United States has not with­
drawn from.Asia despite its repeated promises to do so;
— facts and figures on United States' military bases
abroad;
— crucial problems listed on the agenda of the 
United Nations;
— a world disarmament conference;
— a commentary on the relationship between the United
States and Iran— shortly after the Americans serving at the
U.S. embassy in Tehran were taken hostage;
— an analysis of the difference between Soviet and
western aid to developing countries;
— an accusation that a NATO decision has destroyed
any basis for nuclear disarmament talks, and
— a commentary about why Western propaganda seeks to
128deceive other people in other countries.
Although most of the seven previously mentioned articles 
are relatively short in length, it is not necessary to 
enter into a detailed explanation of each article's content. 
Instead, general conclusions common to all articles, are 
sufficient to illustrate the techniques used in this
115
particular international outreach effort. For example, 
nearly all of the articles are based on a grain of truth, 
then amplified to suit Soviet propaganda aims. The article 
dealing with the United States' failure to withdraw from 
Asia suggests that while U.S. leaders agreed to withdraw the 
American presence from Asia, they have not lived up to their 
promise to do so. The implication of the article is that 
Americans had agreed to withdraw ALL types of influence—  
not just the fighting troops, which was the only portion of 
American influence which U.S. policymakers said would be 
withdrawn. The United States never had any intention of 
withdrawing such personnel in advisory positions or its 
foreign aid, yet that is the implication of the article.
That insinuation coupled with the information that American 
presence continues is designed to discount credibility in 
governmental leaders' statements. The same slanting tech­
niques are used in other articles with the goal of dis­
crediting the United States; however, it is important to 
note that at the same time there is little mention of the 
Soviet Union's superiority. Another article concerning 
the relations between the United States and Iran, published 
after the U.S. hostages were taken, suggests that it is the 
United States and not the Iranians who are increasing the 
tension in the area. And finally, in a counteractive mea­
sure, the article regarding Western propaganda's attempt
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to deceive people suggests that Western democratic news­
papers are trying to lull their readers into a false sense 
of security by suggesting that most Soviet international 
outreach efforts are merely bluff.
The other most evident Soviet international outreach 
effort in the Western world is a series of booklets— not 
inexpensive pamphlets, but small books— printed on expensive 
paper stock and using four color photographs and psycho­
logically appealing cover pictures. These books deal with 
such subjects as industry, farming, science, power industry, 
welfare, housing, and economics. I have analyzed a number 
of these booklets.
For example the book dealing with Russia's Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan features a composite photo of a mother and 
child, a Soviet welder, a Russian wedding, and some type of 
scientific installation. Other covers feature pictures of 
children, for the education book; some type of complicated 
device which one assumes to be used for scientific purposes 
in the book for science ; a child picking flowers in the 
book about the Ukraine; men in hardhats working in some 
type of industrial complex with an inset of personnel wearing 
the special type of protection characteristic of nuclear 
facilities; a beautiful portrait of high rise condominiums 
overlooking a blue, pollution-free river in the book on 
housing; a field of golden, waving wheat (similar to those
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of the Oklahoma panhandle), in the book on farming; a beau­
tifully sculpted stone statue of a horse and rider on the 
book about Armenia; and the pastoral scene of pink clouds 
over green and blue mountains overlooking a blue lake bor­
dered by flowers in the book about Kazakhstan. This is ob­
viously the soft-sell technique at its most sophisticated. 
There is nothing threatening about any of the cover photos, 
and each piques the reader's curiosity to open the covers 
for a further glimpse of what's inside.
Unfortunately, this is where the Soviet effort fails. 
The contents are often stylistically inferior and the 
material content contradictory.
The language is often stiff. For example, in the 
beginning of the book about the state of Kazakh, the date 
of the country's origin is described as its date of birth 
instead of the date of its establishment. The writers 
attempt to talk to the readers in a folksy manner, and in 
this particular publication, point out in the first para­
graph that they are both village lads themselves with illi­
terate parents. The implication is clear. If poor Russian 
peasant lads can become authors— what potential there must 
be for others living in Russia, willing to work hard and 
make something of themselves! However, this concept is
never directly stated— it is only the clever use of words
129to leave the implication.
118
The book on farming, while emphasizing the most up- 
to-date agricultural machinery, attempts to explain the food 
shortage by elaboration on the difference between soil pro­
ductivity and seeks to lend credence to its statement by
130purporting to quote Russian farmers from each of the areas.
In the introduction on the book on housing, the
author quickly explains that
Where housing is a commodity that can be bought or 
sold, the right of citizens to housing is just so 
many words . . . But the fact is that in the Soviet 
Union, the state provides flats for its citizens 
free of charge. They go not to those who have the 
most money, but to those who need better living 
conditions.131
The impression is that all Soviet citizens are well housed, 
and yet the section beginning on page 15 discusses rent and 
the family budget.
The book on power industry— which can be translated 
as energy— discusses development of the oil and gas indus­
tries as well as the practical application of nuclear, 
thermal, and solar energies. The Russians do not hesitate 
to make much of the fact that they are the number one oil 
producers in the world. What the book does not mention is 
that several Middle Eastern countries, including the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, could have that number one ranking, if the
countries' leaders had not decided to carefully husband
133their production of this non-renewable resource.
The book on education stresses the excellence of
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Soviet educational systems and the available opportunities 
for everyone— yet goes on to explain the requirements for 
receiving a high school education.
And finally, the book on economics begins with the
explanation that at one time, the Soviet Union lagged far
behind other nations such as the United States, then goes
on to stress economic growth and how that growth benefits
135Soviet citizens. All of the publications contain beau­
tiful black and white as well as four-color photographs, 
and none of them contain statements that could be construed 
as the least bit threatening to Western democracies, How­
ever, the educated person who has seen both the United States 
and the Soviet Union for himself will not be easily fooled 
by the rhetoric.
Effectiveness of U.S.S.R. Communication 
Techniques
These goals, strategies and techniques and channels 
of communication are some of the most important and fre­
quently used methods developed by the Russians to dissemi­
nate information and shape world political opinion. How­
ever, measuring the degree of that belief, or in other 
words, the effectiveness of the Soviet international out­
reach effort is an almost impossible task. It is difficult 
to evaluate the effectiveness of either of the superpowers'
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international outreach efforts for the simple reason that 
effectiveness varies not only from place to place and from 
time to time, but also from strategy to strategy. In 
limited ways, Soviet propaganda can be said to help create 
political parties, topple governments and restructure the 
social order of a developing country. It has a distinct 
nuisance value because it can influence or convert those 
intellectuals who have become disillusioned with democratic 
processes. And it is definitely an important supplement to 
Soviet foreign policy, reinforcing Soviet military, economic 
and diplomatic policies. Soviet international outreach 
efforts cannot, of course, be given major credit for commu­
nist seizures of power, but it is certainly a vital part of 
Soviet power. It has helped convert people to communism or 
at least taught them enough about communism to ensure they 
will remain neutral in any disagreement between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. And others, who might ordi­
narily accept communist ideology, have innocently beliebed 
Russian promises or mistakenly thought they could use the 
communists instead of being used by them. The most impor­
tant aspect of Soviet international information is that it 
has fostered the attitudes of fear of war, anti-colonialism 
and anti-western nationalism. Soviet propaganda in the 
areas of education, scientific progress, economic develop­
ment and its proposed solutions to what Russians have
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termed the nationality problem has proposed to people in 
Third World countries that Soviet methods are the most ef­
fective way to bring their nation the good life. In many 
Third World countries, Soviet propaganda has reinforced the 
attempts of local governments to take advantage of the lower 
class's problems of poverty and hunger. In addition, there 
have been a number of world crises— most notably in the 
Middle East in the confrontations between Arab nations and
occupied Palestine— and Moscow has done its best to fan the
136flames in these instances.
In the early 1960's the effectiveness of Soviet pro­
paganda was limited to a certain extent because, although 
the Soviets talked a lot, they did little to provide the aid 
necessary to effect a change to a communist form of govern­
ment. Now, of course, that strategy has changed, and Moscow 
supplies aid, even when the population of a country might 
not want it. Also, Soviet embassy personnel were reluctant 
to associate with persons in their post country. However, 
they began to relax and participate in informal social 
activities and quickly learned the value of face-to-face 
contact . . . that it is even more effective than the broad­
cast or printed word. However, the communist totalitarian 
philosophy places some limitations on the effectiveness of 
this personal contact. In the old days, the Soviets recited 
the party line almost like a phonograph record— until they
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found that most people viewed these recitations as more irri­
tating than persuasive. And the old Russian fear of intimacy
with foreigners often blocked the transmission of a message
137from the sender to the receiver. As a result, the Soviets
determined their most effective propaganda efforts resulted
from propaganda spectacles— such as youth festivals— simply
because of the failure of the United States and other free
world countries to stage similar shows to illustrate the
value of democracy. Moscow's more dramatic spectacles are
also good for propaganda mileage, and the Russians do not
138hesitate to use that as well.
Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies on the 
effectiveness of Russian information to produce the neces­
sary descriptive, historical or analytical explanation of 
the impact of Soviet international outreach efforts on dif­
ferent areas of the world and different classes of people.
It is almost impossible to determine the accurate relation­
ship between a particular political occurrence and a given 
Russian information stimulus. No one can determine whether 
any of the four main propaganda measures of effectiveness—  
responsive action, participant reports, observer commentar­
ies and indirect indicators— can be applied to an analysis
139of Soviet international information dissemination.
Throughout the world, mass communications experts recognize 
the importance of a nation's superiority in the field of
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mass commxxnications, and it is also interesting to note that 
several experts also believe that the Russian international 
communication system surpasses that of the United States.
Often the main goal of a Soviet propaganda project is 
to increase tensions, considering the effort a success if 
world attention is focused on a particular issue. It would 
also be reasonable to assume the Soviet international out­
reach efforts will be most successful in those countries 
where the Russians have had the opportunity to lay their own 
foundations— that is, in nations which have not received 
large amounts of other nations' propaganda, particularly 
from the United States, before the Soviet effort was begun. 
Stated differently, if the Soviets get there first, their 
propaganda has the most effect. Other countries which seem 
to be the most receptive to Soviet international outreach 
efforts are those in which nationalism and the desire for 
self-determination seem to outweigh the Western tenets of 
democracy and freedom. Even if the United States launches 
its most sophisticated counterpropaganda campaign in these
countries, it is the Soviet information which is more
140likely to be believed.
Bogart states the Soviet propaganda strengths dif­
ferently.
Communist strength is ideological. Communism 
is a religion to millions of people, which means 
that it carries an emotional force. At the basis 
of any totalitarian system is a set of concepts 
which must be propagated and believed . . .
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Communist strength is organizational. Communists 
in democratic countries are organized into a politi­
cal machine which operates on the ward level of pat­
ronage and benevolence. Their voters are much more 
disciplined than any others, This highly organized 
political character of the Communist movement has 
very little to do with ideology.141
Even ÜSICA personnel have a high regard for the effectiveness
of the communist efforts. The basic strategy of Communist
propagandists is to launch a worldwide program with specific
objectives and centralized direction. They are experts,
knowing immediately the correct tack to use for a given
event and can even control certain events to further their
own international outreach goals. Nor do they forget the
weaknesses of the United States' international outreach
efforts and they do not hesitate to exploit those weaknesses
at every opportunity. They can push a given campaign on any
nunber of different levels using different media— all aimed
at achieving one major goal— such as the exploitation of
symbols as the Picasso dove of peace, and they continue to
142hammer at such simple themes as peace over and over again.
Another effective stratagem is based on the commu­
nists' use of flexibility in their campaigns. They have no 
qualms about deviating from the truth if the truth will not 
serve to reach a specific goal.
Convenient falsification, concealed omission, manu­
factured evidence, and spurious inconsistency have 
been powerful weapons . . . The Soviets freely dis­
tort history and the developing news. They can make 
black white (show that the South Koreans started the 
Korean War, for example), distort or edit the meaning
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official U.S. statements or take sentences out of 
context and use them to ridicule the United S t a t e s . 143
However, it is important to remember that Soviet propaganda 
efforts did not always enjoy the success they do now. De­
spite all their positive effects, there are some drawbacks 
to Soviet propaganda techniques which serve to decrease its 
effectiveness. Because of its sheer volume and the emotional 
content of many of its messages, there is reason to believe 
the Soviets feel threatened by the United States propaganda 
efforts as well as the popularity of democracy. Also, it 
is a generally accepted fact that official Communist media 
are seldom believed in the communist satellite countries. 
Also, nations with a disposition to be friendly toward the 
United States, frequently disbelieve the distortions much of 
the communist propaganda contains. These drawbacks are only 
minor considerations and pale in comparison to the volume 
of Soviet international outreach efforts.
Now that we have seen the goals, strategies, and tech­
niques to achieve them and the relative effectiveness, in­
sofar as it can be assessed, it will be helpful to compare 
and contrast the two superpowers' international information 
systems before determining which goals, strategies and 
techniques are suitable for adaptation for use in Saudi 
Arabia. Understanding the many similarities as well as the 
many differences between the United States' and the Soviet 
Unions' international communication systems in general as
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well as serving to pinpoint successful strategies and unsuc­
cessful failures.
The two superpowers have several points in common in 
their international outreach efforts. Both superpowers uti­
lize the most sophisticated communication techniques to 
transmit believable information or disinformation about the 
other countries' policies and about their own. American 
messages encourage Eastern European nations to view the 
Russians as a danger to freedom and Soviet supremacy as a 
means of stifling their independence, while the Soviet Union 
tries to convince Western European countries that the United 
States' only aim is economic exploitation. They both use the 
same media to transmit these messages, including television, 
books, radio, newspapers, magazines, films, and exhibitions. 
Both the Americans and the Russians have basically the same 
general goal— to alter people's attitudes to become more 
favorable toward themselves, and finally, both nations' 
propaganda campaigns are closely aligned to their own for­
eign policy, and both spend large amounts of money to con­
tinue international outreach efforts.
However, this is where the similarity ends. For 
example, even though both nations spend large amounts of 
moeny, the amount each spends is sharply different. During 
the 1960's, no one was exactly sure how much money the 
Russians were spending on their international outreach 
efforts. But all indications were that the amounts spent
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were very large and ". . . i n  quantities not matched by the 
144West." One estimate from the West German Ministry of
Defense in 1962 put the figures at $2 billion annually,
meaning the Russians were able to spend about $2 for each
person in the world. At the same time, the United States
was spending about 1.-1/4 cents for each person in the world
145for its international outreach efforts. However, it is 
important to remember that the United States and its European 
allies did not sit idly by while the Russian efforts were 
occurring. U.S. budgets were also increased. For example, 
the Voice of America has an annual budget of $500 million
and some 7,500 employees working to counteract Soviet pro-
o 146 paganda.
In addition, the United States wons and operates
several radio stations in Europe, including Radio Free
Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio in the American Sector in West
Berlin, and the American Forces Network in Europe. These
stations broadcast a variety of program^, depicting the good
life in the United States. They also broadcast any American
official’s comment on and explanation of events in communist
controlled countries. These broadcasts are sent both to
the United States Western European allies and Soviet satel- 
147lite nations.
Government control of Soviet international outreach 
efforts results in a well planned propaganda campaign, and
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an agency which is capable of conducting several campaigns 
at once. Although ÜSICA can and does conduct several cam­
paigns at once, government control makes for more disorgani­
zation and hampers more than helps international outreach 
efforts. The United States has an additional advantage in 
that hwile the USICA is controlled to a certain extent by the 
U.S. Congress, it is allowed considerable latitude in its 
actions.
Another difference is that with any Russian government 
operation, the goals and strategies to achieve propaganda 
aims are kept secret. In contrast, the USICA is required to 
make most of its goals and aims public since it is financed 
through taxpayers' money. The Americans take an in-the-long- 
run approach, while the Soviets take a more immediate one. 
Recall the example of the Indonesian government official and 
his Buick discussed earlier in this chapter.
The Soviets have friendship societies and front orga­
nizations while the United States does not. This is not to 
say that the United States does not have delegates on sev­
eral international organizations; however, their public 
relations duties are secondary.
There is one final and most important difference.
Soviet propagandists can and do lie outrageously 
when doing so suits their interests. Most of these 
falsehoods have to do so in one way or the other 
with the United States and its policies. This, of 
course, affects the worldwide credibility of Soviet 
propaganda, but because no one within the Soviet 
Union will openly challenge a false statement by
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the government, it is impossible for press and radio 
to send abroad a viewpoint that the government would 
consider distorted.
In the United States, the open nature of society 
precludes the United States International Information 
Service [ now USICA] to spend much cf -its time clarify­
ing an image distorted by commercial news and other 
media. The commercial media of the United States are 
usually readily available for use by Communist states. 
Communist media, however, are, for the most part un­
available to the United States, except for distribu­
tion of American self-criticism, which is plentiful.148
With this comparison and contrast of the two super­
powers' international outreach efforts, the lengthy task is 
completed. Communication approaches have been illustrated 
in Western and Soviet efforts, the United States Internatio­
nal Communication Agency's goals, techniques, and strategies 
to avhieve them and the effectiveness of the American effort 
have been discussed. The same procedure has been attempted 
for the Soviet Union. However, background information pro­
viding the necessary perspective for devising a Saudi Arabian 
international communication system remains incomplete. The 
material in Chapter Four will describe both domestic and 
international communication efforts in the Kingdom.
Thus, as background data for suggesting a Saudi 
Arabian information effort, we will have information on the 
two largest such efforts in the world and an analysis of 
current Saudi Arabian capabilities (largely internally tar­
geted to date) to draw upon.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SAUDI ARABIAN DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
Before an international communication system for the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can be proposed, it is first necessary 
to understand why the development of the mass media is impor­
tant to any emerging nation and a little bit of how the media 
developed within Saudi Arabia. Although our primary purpose 
is the proposal of an international communication strategy, 
it cannot be voiced realistically in isolation from communica­
tion efforts and techniques within the Kingdom. As we have 
indicated, little scholarly study now exists of Saudi Arabia's 
current capability. Any international development will be 
built on capabilities and technologies already used domestically 
with appropriate expansion. We will also note that some 
media such as radio began with a domestic audience in mind, 
they soon evolved into the beginning of an international 
outreach effort. We will also review the structure of the 
Ministry of Information, survey the domestic communications 
system, that is, the mass media— press, radio, and television
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as well as information centers and, finally, survey the inter­
national communications department and review the activities 
of the Higher Council of Information.
We can best discuss Saudi Arabian domestic communica­
tions initially in the light of a few basic principles regard­
ing the development of any thpe of mass communications in 
Thrid World countries. New states, seeking to bridge economic 
and technological gaps, often seek to shorten what can be 
called development time by seeking help from more highly 
developed nations. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is no excep­
tion; the nation has relied heavily upon the United States, 
and more recently, European nations to bridge the communica­
tions technological gap. However, unlike other underdeveloped 
nations, Saudi Arabia, thanks to its vast oil deposits, has 
not had to seek the financial aid which usually accompanies 
technology. And yet, despite the fact that the Kingdom does 
not require financial aid, the two superpowers, that is, 
the United States and the Soviet Union, have, and will con­
tinue, to compete for communications influence in the Middle 
East. Both the United States and the Soviet Union sought 
to provide a dominating influence in strategically important 
Saudi Arabia to protect their own self-interest. Their compe­
tition also reflects the " . . .  revival, on a considerable 
scale, of a world conscience."^
Everywhere there has been a remarkable flood of mass 
media coverage of the new countries. There has been 
a great increase in travel from the highly developed
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countries, and . . . the stationing of troops overseas, 
often in out of the way places, has made it possible 
for otherwise untraveled young men to see how other 
people live. Educational systems in many advanced 
countries have shifted their emphasis from the past 
toward the present, and as a result, are doing a 
better job of covering today's world.%
As a result, two new perspectives have developed. The first 
is the willingness to share scientific advancements. Scientists 
themselves have been most instrumental in furthering this 
particular perspective. Because technical scientific knowledge 
is different from land, gold, or even oil, both superpowers 
are willing to share that information in exchange for influence. 
Still another perspective has also contributed to the advance­
ment of underdeveloped nations:
[since] a few trouble spots may upset a far wider 
balance . . .  it is now clear that potential prob­
lems must be handled where they are. The United 
Nations has given the underdeveloped countries a 
new voice and importance in world affairs, and an 
opportunity to state their problems and to build 
up friendships and alliances.3
Social change is no longer a mysterious or suspect 
activity. If problems in less developed societies are gigantic, 
the tools, skills and knowledge which can be applied to solv­
ing those problems are also substantial. Reported first­
hand observations have made general knowledge of the fact 
that modern communications exert a monumental influence on 
isolated communities in developing countries. Something 
as relatively unsophisticated as a simple radio receiver 
placed in a remote Middle Eastern village has proved con­
clusively that knowledge is power. The radio owner had
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immediate status— simply because he was the first to know 
any information and could control who else knew it. Thus, 
there is little doubt that modern communication can be in-
4fluential in a developing culture.
There are four functions of communication which are
information, persuasion, entertainment, and transmission
of the culture because mass communications are the pipeline
of a social heredity from history to prosperity.^ Schramm's
reasoning for a worldwide development of the mass media is
equally applicable to Saudi Arabia.
. . . people know more about the problems. Vastly 
extended communication has made the situation clear. 
Roads have come to villages. Automobiles have taken 
people over the roads. Jet airplanes have connected 
nations and cities. Mass media have reached down 
from the cities to the villages. In many ways, there­
fore, the men and women in the villages have been 
able to compare their ways of living with those of 
the city people, and the underdeveloped states to 
compare their standard with that of the economically 
developed states.®
Less privileged people in underdeveloped nations now have
the opportunity to do something about their status. Saudi
Arabia does not have economic problems— rather technological
problems.
Part of Saudi Arabia's problem when the government
sought to establish a mass communications system was that
many of its people were illiterate and isolated. Yet their
modernization process was inevitable;
It may be that they would have been happier not par­
ticipating in the struggle for national development 
or marching to the parade of modern life, but this
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is unrealistic . . .  if they try to hide from it, 
they will have nothing to say about what form it 
takes, and it will seek them out in the form some­
one else has given it.'
Those nations, such as Saudi Arabia, which sought almost
immediate development, had to have the cooperation of the
people. The government realized that modernization required
an adequate flow of information and proper education. "And
the only way the [Saudi Arabian government] can do it . . .
g
is to make full use of modern communications."
Saudi Arabia had a relatively small population scatter­
ed across an enormous area, and given the state of the art 
at that time, radio was not capable of reaching all of them. 
This same factor, coupled with the low literacy rate, meant 
that newspapers were also an ineffective medium. The Kingdom 
was fairly isolated from the rest of the world by geographi­
cal barriers and lack of communications systems until the 
Fifties. Since very few Saudi Arabians had ever left the 
Kingdom, and thus had no basis for comparison of their own 
nation's use of mass communications to other nation's, there 
was no internal cultural pressure to improve the media.
Few ever ventured very far from their own communities, and 
news was spread via the spoken word. However, Saudi Arabians 
living in Jiddah, Mecca, and Medina had been less isolated 
due to the yearly contact with religious pilgrims during 
the Hajj, so it seems logical that early development of 
the mass media would occur there. The government, aware
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of its responsibility as protector of the Holy Cities, wanted 
radio broadcasts to emanate from the same provinces in which 
those cities are located. The stimulating environment of 
the central cities fostered encouragement for the venture 
of establishing newspapers for the exchange of religious 
and literary ideas, and later for dissemination of news 
and information.®
In Saudi Arabia the mass media played a paradoxical 
role. On the one hand, they can be viewed as a conservative 
factor and at the same time served as promoters of social 
change. The media's role in preserving the status quo can 
be described in several ways:
(A) All media are either owned and operated by the 
government or are under government supervision and conse­
quently supportive of government policies;
(B) The media were used to unify the Kingdom psy­
chologically since it was not until the 1960s that a feeling 
of Saudi Arabia patriotism began to replace traditional 
community loyalties;
(C) The general public's awareness of belonging
to a national community began to flourish with the improve­
ments in road and air transportation which allowed movement 
about the country and with the expanding centralized govern­
ment which touched their lives more frequently by providing 
more and better services to meet their needs, and
(D) Development of the mass media taught them more
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about their own country than they ever had had the opportunity 
to learn before.
These functions are typical of the role of media;
Information media usually perform five basic functions 
for any society, providing the following to a mass 
audience— information, opinions, reinforcement of 
social norms, entertainment, and advertising.H
During the eleven years from 1964 to 1975, there were numer­
ous changes in media which had a tremendous impact on society. 
However, existing social constraints also played a vital 
role in shaping the media. Commentaries do appear in Saudi 
Arabian media but only in a highly restricted form. Editorials 
are run in daily newspapers, but almost no opinions are 
aired on radio and television. Support for government policies 
is automatic; however, the media does provide the public 
with intellectual stimulation through a presentation of 
news events, people and places. All of the media reinforced 
cultural traditions. Pictures of Saudi Arabian women are 
not run in newspapers, nor do they appear as actors or broad­
casters for radio and television. Saudi Arabian intellectual 
expression is fostered by the use of domestically produced 
radio and television plays, poetry recitations, musical 
concerts, talks, and religious sermons. Imported programs 
are carefully screened and censored to conform to traditional 
social values. References to any other religions, consump­
tion of alcoholic beverages, displays of affection between 
men and women are edited out. Both words and pictures chosen
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for use in the media provided an accurate reflection of
the majority of the general public's attitudes. The amount
of information made available by the mass media to the general
public increased dramatically during the Sixties, particularly
12in providing news about the government. This tradition 
carried over into the Seventies with the creation of the 
Saudi Arabian news agency in 1971. The electronic media 
provided most of the entertainment for the general public. 
Night-time television programs were entertainment-oriented, 
while most radio broadcasts were devoted to music and enter­
tainment. Unfortunately, the Kingdom's lack of an entertain­
ment industry meant that in the early stages of development, 
both radio and television had to rely on foreign programs. 
There was almost no advertising function for the media, 
mainly because no economic basis for advertising existed. 
Newspapers carried paid advertisements from government min­
istries and only a few commercial ads.
Ministry of Information
The mass media are controlled by the Ministry of 
Information. Some background as to the ministry's growth 
and mission will be useful. The Ministry of Information 
is organized according to directorates for press, radio, 
television, and technical affairs with each division headed 
by a director general. There are three deputy ministers to
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assist the Minister of Information in financial and admini­
strative, informational, and engineering matters. Although 
the central office of the Ministry is located in Riyadh, 
there are branch offices scattered throughout the Kingdom. 
The Ministry of Information controls and finances domestic 
and international information dissemination, radio and tele­
vision broadcasts, and supervises the printed media, includ­
ing publication of books and documentary films portraying 
the culture of Saudi Arabia.
During the process of centralizing the government,
the Directorate General of Broadcasting, Press, and Publica-
13tions was established by royal decree. This marked the
beginning of a policy of censorship and information control
and not dissemination of information in the present sense
of the phrase. By 1963 the directorate had become a full
ministry, and a program of expanding broadcast facilities
began, with the goal of providing clear radio signals to
14all parts of the Kingdom;
(A) spreading the tenets of the Islamic religion 
both to Arabic speaking countries and to other nations as 
well;
(B) using the dissemination of information as a 
tool to abolish illiteracy and to increase the educational 
levels of Saudi Arabian people;
(C) providing Saudi Arabians with media information 
about national and international events;
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(D) providing information about the Kingdom's mod­
erate and logical approach to problems between Islamic nations 
and thus working to promote Islamic unity, and
(E) using Saudi Arabian influence to play a major 
role in promoting peace throughout the w o r l d . T h e  first 
Minister of Information was Mr. Jamil Hojallan, the second 
was Mr. Ibraheem Al-Angary, who assumed office in 1970, 
and he in turn was succeeded by Dr. Muhammed Abdu Yemani, 
the present Minister of Information.
Survey of Existing Domestic Communications
Government use of the printed media began slowly, 
but eventually newspapers, magazines, and other printed 
materials became an important channel for communicating 
government policy. During the early years of their develop­
ment, newspapers had little influence on the general public's 
attitude. The first newspapers were established in Al-Hijaz 
in 1908, but all of them were run by people of other nation­
alities. It was not until 1924 that the Jiddah Barid Al-Hijaz, 
written by Saudi Arabians, was founded, and it folded after 
less than a year. Between 1924 and 1932 the only newspaper 
in the country was the government-established Umm al-Qara in
M e c c a . I t  featured mostly religious and literary articles. 
During the early days of its existence, it was edited by 
Syrians, although later operation of the paper was handed
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over to Saudi Arabians. It was a four-page, handprinted 
weekly. Several other newspapers, most of which continued 
the tradition of printing religious and literary articles, 
were founded during the Thirties. Among them were Sawt 
Al-Ha.jaz, 1932; A1 Nida Al-Islam, Mecca, 1937; and A1 Manhal 
and Al-Madina al-Munawara, both in Medina in 1937. The 
latter publication was the only one which made any attempt 
to cover the news. And none of them lasted very long. Pub­
lication was suspended by the government during World War 
II because of the paper shortage, but after the end of the 
war, newspaper expansion continued. In 1946 one newspaper, 
the former Sawt Al-Hijaz, resumed publication under the 
new name of Al-Bilad Al-Saudiya, beginning first as a literary 
magazine and then later changed to a newspaper. Al-Madina- 
Al-Munawara resumed publication in 1947. Both became daily 
newspapers during the Fifties. Headquarters for both publica­
tions were in Jiddah, and coverage focused on local news
17events, including political and social development.
As the Kingdom's economy expanded, due to increased
oil revenues in the Fifties, both newspapers then publishing
in the Kingdom resorted to the more formal and expanded
structure of government by hiring new, young writers and
increasing concentration on covering hard news and public
affairs. Those young writer's were to become the Kingdom's
18" . . .  first generation of real journalists." A third 
newspaper, Al-Nadwa was established in 1958, but it did not
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join the ranks of the dailies until 1960. In 1953, Sheikh 
Earned Al-Jusir established the first publication in Riyadh, 
Al-Yamama, a literary magazine, and 1956, the only new monthly 
publication,. Al-Izaa wa Tilvizyawn, a broadcast magazine 
published by the government, was founded in Jiddah.
The information media began a rapid expansion in 
the early Sixties, and newspapers were no exception. . As 
previously mentioned, Al-Nadwa became a daily newspaper.
Al-Nadwa, Al-Biald, and Al-Madina had a combined circulation 
of less than 25,000.^^ The situation did not remain static 
for long. Three more dailies were established. Okaz began 
publication in Jiddah in 1960 and by 1964 began publishing 
daily issues. Al-Riyadh was established as a daily in 
1965. Another newspaper, Al-Jazeerah, was founded in Riyadh 
in 1964, but it did not begin daily publication until 1971.
In Dammam Al-Yawm was founded in 1965 and became a daily 
in 1969. The number of weekly and monthly publications 
also increased. Two new weeklies commenced publishing during 
that decade: The Saudi Weekly Newsletter, a government
published news sheet for foreigners, was established in 
1961 in Jiddah, and in 1964 Al-Dawa, a conservative, religious 
newspaper, was founded in Riyadh. Four new monthly publications 
also came into existence:
(A) 1960, A1 Ti.jara, the Jiddah Chamber of Commerce's
magazine, published in Jiddah;
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(B) 1963, Habitat Al-Alam Al-Islam, a Muslim World
League publication aimed at persons living outside Saudi 
Arabia, published in Jiddah;
(C) 1965, Ti.iaret Al-Riyadh. Riyadh Chamber of
Commerce Magazine, published in Riyadh, and
(d) 1967, Sawt Al-Haq * a literary magazine, published
in Jiddah. In fact the number of printed publications in-
20creased faster than the literacy rate.
In 1965 King Faisal explained why the government
began to exert more control over the printed media.
Two years ago our press started discussing socailism 
and other subjects. Some writers were in favor 
and others against. When the discussion developed 
into what we feared might compromise certain govern­
ments of leaders, we advised our friends of the 
press to avoid discussing this subject. We did 
this out of anxiety to maintain the friendly and 
brotherly relations with friends, [the Egyptians] 
but they ascribed this to our stong opposition to 
socialism. We believe only in Islam, but we do 
not interfere in the affairs of others. . . 21
One problem with the press was the large number of foreigners 
working for the daily newspapers who tended to sympathize 
with the Egyptian president Gammal Abd Al-Nasser. The govern­
ment probably did not want to control the privately owned 
print media, but it soon became obvious that government 
supervision was the only way to ensure that the press and 
the government remained on good terms and loyal to Saudi 
ideals. At that time, the government wanted a politically 
inactive press; one which would avoid controversial issues 
and not stir up society unnecessarily. However, there were
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times when the government wanted and needed the newspapers 
to issue strong statements— the conflict with Egypt for 
example.
The government also took several steps to help develop 
the print media including (1) training Saudi Arabian journa­
lists so as to eliminate dependence on foreigners for news­
paper production; (2) establishing a Ministry of Information 
in 1962, as has been mentioned earlier, and (3) developing 
the 1964 Press Code which gave the government more authority 
to intervene. However, the code was also intended to strengthen 
the newspapers by broadening ownership and setting minimum 
standards. The code's provisions included the establishment 
of a board of directors, comprised of 15 Saudi Arabian citizens 
and requiring each daily paper to have at least five editors, 
two foreign language translators, a photographer, and three 
correspondents in three major capitals. Newspaper publishers 
did not like the code, but the general public did because 
it held the potential for improving the quality of newspapers. 
The three daily newspapers promptly conformed to the code's 
requirements so publication could continue. The dailies 
also hired and trained Saudi Arabians for staff work, funded 
by the government's purchase of some 2,000 subscriptions 
for Civil Service employees and embassy personnel abroad. 
Newspapers did improve some, but not all of the code require­
ments had been fulfilled by the end of the Sixties because
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most publications continued to suffer financial difficulties.
Finally, in 1969 when financial burdens threatened to force
one of the dailies to suspend publication, the government
22began a subsidizing program which continues today.
Although the first newspaper was issued in 1908, 
it was not until 1932, the year of the Kingdom's establish­
ment, that development of the electronic media began. Al­
though use of radio began rather late, the Kingdom was able 
to catch up quickly because the government was willing to 
support such a major effort. This section describes the 
history, development and governmental use of radio as a 
medium of domestic communications. In 1932 Abdul Aziz had 
established a private radio network so that government of­
ficials in major cities and towns could keep him abreast 
of local affairs. However, broadcasts for the general public
did not began until 1949 with the establishment of a government-
23operated shortwave radio station in Jiddah. Abdul Aziz 
encountered some opposition from conservative religious 
groups to the establishment of this first radio station, 
but he had a ready answer. Abdul Aziz told his critics 
that since radio was not specifically mentioned in the Koran, 
it was safe to assume the Islamic religion did not prohibit 
its use, and he was quick to remind the religious leaders
24that the medium could be used to transmit the word of God. 
Accordingly, the first broadcast was aired in October 1949 
on the first day of the Hajj when pilgrims were worshipping
156
at Mecca, approximately 25 kilometers to the east. His 
Royal Highness, who was then Crown Prince, Saud ibn Abdul 
Aziz spoke to the people during the opening ceremonies of 
the first broadcast, welcoming those who had made the pil­
grimage to Saudi Arabia. However, the agreement authorizing 
the first broadcast was not signed by His Majesty King Abdul 
Aziz and officials of International Telephone and Telegraph 
until May of that year. Terms of the agreement included 
transmission and technical administration of the radio station 
with the goal of serving Saudi Arabians and other Arab and 
Islamic nations. Other terms included establishing another 
station in Jiddah as well as facilities in Mecca and other 
locations. His Royal Highness King Faisal, then Prince 
of the Hijjaz oversaw station operations and a Royal Decree
describing government policy regarding broadcasting and
25aims and uses of the medium was issued. Although the 
government invited experts from abroad to assist in establish­
ment of the system, it also arranged for training courses 
both in Saudi Arabia and abroad so that Saudi Arabian nationals 
could get instructions in all fields of broadcasting.
Early programming included religious and social talks, 
discussions of Arab culture, poetry, and literature. The 
only music allowed was military marches provided by the 
Saudi Arabian Army Band, and it was not until 1950 that 
a woman was allowed to sing, act, or.announce on radio.
But after 1956 a steady change in program development began.
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Radio broadcasts were scheduled three times daily from 7:30
a.m. to 9:30 a.m.; 2:30 p.m. to 5 p.m.; and 8:30 p.m. to 
2610 p.m. Most Friday broadcasts originated in Mecca. Pro­
gramming included readings from the Holy Koran— 12 percent; 
news, including local social activities and news commentary—  
25 percent; lectures from authors and historians— 13 percent;
entertainment— 30 percent; and cultural programs, including
27educational, women's and children's programs,— 20 percent.
However, the real golden age of radio broadcasting
did not begin until 1961 when Kin Faisal assumed power.
As mentioned earlier, cultural and economic development
began in earnest during his reign. Information in general
and broadcasting in particular were given special emphasis.
When the decade began, there was only one radio station,
les than 200,000 receivers and only approximately half a
million listeners. By 1975 there were broadcast stations
scattered throughout the Kingdom, the number of receivers
had increased to 1 million, and the number of listeners
28was estimated at 2.5 million. Programming was increased 
from seven to 17 hours per day, and variety broadcasts, 
including programs for workers, women and children, and 
even military and security forces were added to the air 
schedule. Saudi Arabians assumed roles as announcers; female 
singers from neighboring Arab states provided recordings; 
and tunes were allowed broadcast time during each quarter 
of the year. Currently songs comprise at least 32 percent
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of daily broadcasting. Technical advances also continued.
By 1967 a second broadcasting station was built in Riyadh,
and eventually a network of transmitters provided broadcasts
to western, central, and eastern regions of the Kingdom.
Transmission time was increased to 20 hours per day, and
still more and more powerful transmitters were built in
Jiddah, Riyadh, and other important areas to provide both
29short and medium wavelength broadcasts.
The use of foreign language broadcasts also began 
early. Programs in Urdu for the people of India and Pakistan 
began in 1949. Foreign language transmissions were increased 
from 15 minutes to one hour per day, and the languages included 
Swahili, Persian, Turkish, English, and French. Due to 
the confrontation with Egypt and inflamtory broadcasts by 
Cairo's Voice of the Arabs radio, the Saudi Arabian government 
became aware of the potential use of the mass media, particularly 
radio, to provide counteractive information both inside 
the Kingdom and abroad. The Voice of Islam was established 
with broadcasts from Riyadh and Jiddah. Program schedules 
included excerpts from the Holy Koran, programs targeted 
for specific audiences and European Service programs. Cur­
rently programs, including those with religious themes, 
news, songs, drama, and other types, are alternately broad­
cast from Riyadh and Jiddah. Voice of Islam broadcasts 
originate from Mecca just prior to the Magrib prayer call 
at 6 p.m. and continue until the end of the Isha prayer call
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at approximately 8:15 p.m. Broadcasts include specific 
news about the Islamic World and general news about the 
Arab world. Programming has been increased to approximately 
20 hours daily and future plans include broadcasts in Bulgarian, 
Yugoslavian, Hebrew, Chinese, Russian, and Japanese with 
about the same diversity of programming as national broad­
casting. There are also programs relating to the Holy Koran 
broadcast from Riyadh and Mecca. Broadcasts from Riyadh 
begin at 6 a.m. and continue until noon. Programs resume 
at 4 p.m. and continue until midnight. These broadcasts 
reach as far south as northern and southern Asia and northern 
and central Africa. This type of broadcasting began in 
1972.30
These international broadcasts are used to reach
a variety of different audiences. The main goal was to
31". . . combat subversive ideas and mind invasion." The 
programming is aimed at Muslims all over the world and in- 
clud+s:
(A) Persian Section: Broadcasts from 6 a.m. to
8 a.m. with religious, information, cultural, and songs 
and musical programs;
(B) Turkish Section: Broadcasts from 7 a.m. to
9 a.m. with the same type of programs as the Persian section;
(C) Indonesian Section: Broadcasts from 2 p.m. 
to 4 p.m. also with the same type of programming;
(D) Bengali Section: Broadcasts from 4 p.m. to
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5 p.m. with most of the programs related to religion;
(E) Urdu Section; Broadcasts from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. 
and again, most programming has a religious theme;
(F) Swahili Section: Broadcasts from 7 p.m. to
8 p.m. again with emphasis on religious programming, and
(G) Somali Section: Broadcasts from 8 p.m. to 9
p.m. with emphasis on religious programming.
In addition there are European transmissions broadcast in 
two languages— French and English. "The English Service 
transmits 37 hourss weekly each from the Riyadh and Jiddah 
stations, while the French Service broadcasts 28 hours weekly. 
However, it is important to note that all of these efforts 
are under the supervision of the Ministry of Information's 
Assistant Deputy Minister of Radio and Television— a domestic 
information service. Thus, as we indicated earlier in this 
chapter, it is not easy to deal with international communica­
tion without noting its domestic origins.
If the early 1960s marked the beginning of the golden 
age of radio, then the mid-Sixties can be considered the 
beginning of the golden age of television. After he became 
Prime Minister in 1962, Faisal authorized " . . .  an ambi­
tious plan to create a national television system for the 
33Kingdom." Television had existed in Saudi Arabia since 
1957 with ARAMCO's provision of television service to its 
employees in Dhahran. Unfortunately, this programming was 
seen only in the Eastern Province, and then only by a’ few
,32
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Saudi Arabians. But in January 1964 Faisal signed an agree­
ment with " . . .  National Broadcasting Company (NBC) Inter­
national, New York, to build a national network with the 
first test transmissions beginning July 17, 1965 in Jiddah 
and R i y a d h . A n d  by 1975 there were transmitters in Jiddah, 
Taif, Medina, Riyadh, Burayda, and Dammam, approximately
35600,000 television sets and an estimated 1.5 million viewers.
This section outlines that development.
All radio and television stations are government- 
owned and operated, thus the rapid expansion of electronic 
broadcasting facilities were the direct result of the government's 
program to improve existing internal communications. The 
reason for the program was to increase the sense of domestic 
unity and national awareness among a widely scattered general 
population with very little knowledge about one another.
There was also a need to modernize the communications indus­
try to keep pace with political, social, and economic develop­
ment .
There were, of course, some problems. Those Saudi 
Arabians who had studied and traveled abroad, wanted the 
Kingdom to have interesting and entertaining radio and tele­
vision programs, but there was also a very conservative 
segment of the population which set the standards for public
behavior, and these people were doubtful of television pro-
36grams " . . .  value and propriety. . ." However, once 
again the government was able to demonstrate how the new
162
medium could be used for religious instruction and education.
Another reason for rapid expansion might also have been
the tense diplomatic situation between Saudi Arabia and
Egypt. The Egyptian radio, Voice of the Arabs, broadcast
from Cairo, enjoyed a wide listening audience, and many
of the programs attacked the Saudi Arabian government as
37". . . a despotic and reactionary . . . regime." The
goal of these broadcasts was to unite all Arabs, including
Saudi Arabians, to resist their governments.
The Saudi Arabian government provided for ". . . a
very deliberate and controlled liberalization, undertaken
slowly, and designed in such a way as to avoid antagonizing
38the conservative groups.” Despite conservative opposition, 
the government did not hesitate to develop the medium. However, 
the content of the programs broadcast took the conservative 
concerns into consideration. For example, Saudi Arabian 
women do not appear at all, and a large portion of broad­
cast time is devoted to instructional and religious program­
ming. The media's rapid development meant that much of 
the programming was foreign. This spread new concepts, 
ideas, and sources of information among the general popu-
39lation. Television provided " . . .  a window on the world" 
for Saudi Arabians. They received information about other 
countries which had never been provided before. Saudi
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Arabians began to learn about social and cultural behavior 
which was different from their own, thus creating new atti­
tudes. Another change wrought by television affected time. 
Traditional time, which was always changing because it was 
determined by sunset, was abandoned and international broad­
cast time standards were adopted so more foreign audiences 
could be reached. However, most of the changes cannot be 
measured empirically. The general population was abruptly 
inundated with information about other people and their 
accepted values and beliefs. These affected the Saudi 
Arabians' previously held perceptions.
The beginning of these changing perceptions can be 
marked by the first Saudi Arabian television signal which 
was broadcast simultaneously from Riyadh and Jiddah on July 
17, 1965. Neither station was very powerful— having only 
two kilowatts of power and reaching an area of approximately 
100 square kilometers. But during the next decade, broadcast 
areas and the number of television studios were increased. 
Saud Arabians were trained to work as engineers, technicians, 
and producers. Broadcast time was also increased, and more 
and more locally produced television programs have been 
added to the broadcast schedule. Additionally, the number 
of programs designed to provide information about Saudi 
Arabian culture to be broadcast both domestically and inter­
nationally have also increased. For example, between 1965 
and 1975, five new broadcasting stations were constructed.
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one each in Riyadh and Jiddah, and two more in Medina and 
Qassim. The largest station of all was built in Dammam, 
having the largest coverage area and the best and most modern 
television equipment. To supplement these facilities, relay 
stations were built to boost reception throughout the Kingdom.
At the same time both the quality and the quantity
of television broadcasts were improving, and broadcast hours
increased from 10 hours to almost 50 hours per week. And
by 1982, programming had been increased to approximately
72 hours per week. These figures do not include special
broadcasts of Kingdom occasions, religious occurrences such
as the pilgrimages or sporting events. As a result, the
number of persons employed in the television industry grew
from 64 persons in 1965 to 428 in 1975 and the number of
40employees continues to increase. When technology for 
worldwide satellite transmission of television signals became 
available, the Kingdom seized the opportunity to use the 
medium to bring still more information about the rest of 
the world to Saudi Arabians. Between 1975 and 1977, color 
television was introduced, and the transition from black 
and white programming began. Still more facilities and 
equipment were provided by the government to utilize this 
new development. Pooling facilities were established in 
Riyadh and Jiddah, and other stations' production capa­
bilities were upgraded. A sixth station was built in Abba, 
and a series of relay stations constructed to serve the
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southern section of the country. And eventually a backbone 
cable connecting all broadcasting facilities, was completed. 
The first color broadcast was aired on September 24, 1976—  
the National Day of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and after 
a six-month test period, regular color transmissions using 
the French SECAM 3B system began. The French system was 
chosen because it could be used for both color and black 
and white transmissions. However, the station in Dammam 
was equipped with both the SECAM system and the German PAL 
system so that viewers in other Arabian Gulf states could 
also pick up the transmissions.
Perhaps the Abba station can be used as the best 
example of the establishment of a television system in Saudi 
Arabia. It was built, fully equipped, and on the air in 
less than a year and began its first color broadcasts on 
August 15, 1977.^^ The Abba station has the most sophisti­
cated equipment and all engineering equipment is twinned 
to avoid problems with technical difficulties. The station 
also boasts a spare transmitter and a complete television 
film production unit, including montage units, voice studios, 
and other necessary facilities.
In addition, the scale of television broadcasting 
was increased between 1965 and 1975. The project, designed 
to provide better coverage of most of the western area of 
the Kingdom was necessary since this is the area in which 
hundreds of thousands of Islamic pilgrims visit yearly
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during the Hajj. In addition, the government's summer head­
quarters and the resort area of Taif are also located in 
this area. Four more relay stations are being built in 
the eastern province in Abgaig, Rastanura, Ruhaima, Jubail, 
and mobile transmitters are used to provide broadcast signals 
to the northern area of the Kingdom.
The most recent project still under construction 
is the Central Television Complex, with a cost of approximately 
SRI,600 million or $450 million. The facility, located 
in Riyadh, will occupy a 40,000 square-meter area and house 
several studio and auditorium facilities:
(A) Transmission studio buildings include 13 studio 
units with telecinema, video and control rooms. Programs 
will be broadcast on two channels and there is a possibility 
a third channel will be added later if it is needed. The 
ten-story building will also house three news studios and 
offices for video, film, and general administration.
(B) The three-story production studio building in­
cludes five production studios with dressing rooms, work­
shops and stage set storage rooms.
(C) The film building will feature three stories 
of production studios, technical rooms, film processing 
laboratories, and a production and exhibition hall.
(D) A TV outside broadcasting building will house
a garage for mobile units and direct transportation, special 
workshops and a maintenance laboratory.
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(E) The theater, designed to seat 700 persons, will 
include reception halls, and dressing rooms, and
(F) The 170-meter high transmission tower will feature
a diamond-shaped, glass-walled restaurant. Smaller versions
of the complex are under construction in Jiddah, Dammam,
42and Qassim.
Due to improved technical facilities, local programming 
has improved. These broadcasts are designed to continue 
providing information about Saudi Arabian culture, enlighten­
ment and entertainment. Percentage of programming types 
shows :
(A) religious and cultural programs— 25 percent;
(B) variety and musical programs— 22 percent;
(C) film and non-Arabic serials— 8 percent;
(D) local and Arabic dramas— 15 percent;
(E) target audience programs (directed toward child­
ren women, etc.)— 15 percent, and
43(F) news and information programs— 15 percent.
These numbers reflect the same number of transmission hours, 
however, airtimes are flexible to allow the stations to 
sign on and off the air at different times. Total broadcast 
hours remain the same largely because of the lifestyle of 
the Saudi Arabian people. Both work and school hours begin 
early in the morning and continue until mid-afternoon, inter­
rupted only by the noon prayer. Thus, most broadcasting 
begins at approximately 4 p.m., and continues until midnight.
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except on weekends— Wednesday night and Thursday— -when no 
work or school days are scheduled. Broadcast time is in­
creased from one to two hours on weekends. And during the 
summer vacation, three additional hours of air time are 
broadcast. These programs are usually directed toward women 
and children. Thus during the summer months, broadcast 
hours are increased to 78 per week and during the month 
of Ramadan, broadcast time is increased to as much as 100 
hours weekly because of the month's religious importance. 
During the Hajj, the month of the pilgrimage, transmission 
time is incrased to 12 hours daily when the most important 
pilgrimage rituals are broadcast live from the Holy Cities. 
Ramadan prayers were broadcast for the first time in 1977 
and carried by satellite to most parts of the world. Hun­
dreds of millions of viewers of different religions and 
nationalities were able to see two prayers transmitted live 
from the Holy Mosque in Mecca from 100 different television 
stations. Todya live broadcasts of these holy religious 
occasions have become a yearly event in ordinary programming.
Construction of television stations was also considered 
complementary to foreign policy. Due to the confrontation 
with Egypt and inflammatory broadcasts by Cairo's Voice 
of the Arabs radio, the Saudi Arabian government became 
aware of the potential use of the mass media, particularly 
radio, to provide counter active information both inside 
the Kingdom and abroad. The early ". . . focus in foreign
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broadcasting" was on the entire Islamic world, especially
as Faisal, protector of the Holy Cities, began to develop
44his Islamic solidarity policy." Local broadcasts could 
be used to counteract foreign propaganda by providing dif­
ferent sources of news as well as entertainment. In some 
border areas of the Kingdom, the general public could pick 
up some foreign boradcasts but not Saudi Arabian programming. 
Persons living near the Eastern border received programs 
from Kuwait, Iran Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar. The largest 
television tower in the Middle East was installed at Dammam 
in 1969 as a counteractive measure. Saudi Arabians enjoyed
better television reception, and the new tower provided
44the power to reach other Gulf States.
Survey of Existing International Communication
Thus far, I have discussed the press, radio and tele­
vision, the traditional forms of mass media. But these are 
not the only communication media employed by the Saudi Arabian 
government. Like the two superpowers, the Kingdom's govern­
ment recognizes the importance of information centers. In­
formation materials is a vague all encompassing term which 
can include anything from books and periodicals to television 
broadcasting equipment. In this section, informational mater­
ials will be defined as books, periodicals, films, pamphlets, 
posters, models, maps, charts, teaching equipment, audio
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visual presentations, or any material which can convey poli­
tical, economic, religious, social, or cultural information 
about the people of one country to the people of another. 
Original domestic and international outreach efforts actually 
began within the Kingdom's own border. Information about 
the Kingdom, printed in Arabic and foreign languages, has 
been available for several years from the Ministry of In­
formation's Press and Publications Department. However, 
as the Kingdom developed, more and more foreign guests 
entered, and the Ministry of Information saw the need to 
provide still more information about Saudi Arabia both to 
Saudi Arabians and to foreigners. As a result, information 
centers were established in Riyadh, Jiddah, and Mecca, provid­
ing posters, maps, booklets and other types of information 
to Saudi Arabian citizens and to foreign guests adjusting 
to life in the Kingdom. The Ministry of Information also 
plans to establish still more information centers in other 
cities.
These information centers are supervised by the Assi­
stant Deputy Minister for Internal Information. Three major 
goals were defined:
(A) to present information about government activities 
concerning further development of the country and about the 
work the government ministeries are doing to aid in that 
development ;
(B) to unite the past with the present by providing
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cultural and social information designed to increase Saudi 
Arabians' sense of patriotism, and
(C) to educate, enlighten and encourage the general
47public to work toward the Kingdom's further development.
The main thrust of these information centers is providing 
an information service both to Saudi Arabian citizens and 
foreign guests living in the Kingdom— either through their 
visits to the centers or by contacting them through their 
schools, clubs, or places of business. The information centers 
feature publications, film and audio visual libraries provid­
ing information about Saudi Arabian life and the Islamic 
religion. These materials are available either for use 
at the center or loaned out for presentations. The centers 
also maintain a speaker's bureau in which ministers and 
other high government officials discuss government policies.
All of these resources are available to clubs, schools, and 
other educational institutions, including those providing 
military training. Department personnel include translators, 
legal and public relations consultants from other ministries, 
authors, and philosophers from the Kingdom's major univers 
sities. There are several divisions, including:
(A) archives to provide more specific information 
about people or subjects relating to Saudi Arabian life or 
the Islamic religion;
(B) research and study which reviews publications 
and approves them for use in international outreach efforts;
172
(C) a clipping service to keep track of articles pub­
lished about Saudi Arabia;
(D) a press division to provide subscriptions to Saudi 
Arabian publications to those requesting them and maintains
a file of newspapers and magazines received in the Kingdom.
A subscription division to obtain subscriptions of 
foreign publications to be sent to government officials and 
to accept and approve requests for circulation of foreign 
publications inside the Kingdom. Other activities include 
making contact with other information centers in foreign coun­
tries and arranging for the circulation and distribution of 
Saudi Arabian materials; honoring requests from foreigners 
to provide information about Saudi Arabia; covering the con­
ferences of information of other Arab nations; and cooperating 
with the Ministry of Commerce to produce international exhibi­
tion. The public relations division arranges for transporta­
tion and accommodations for foreign correspondents visiting 
Saudi Arabia. The yearly operating budget is SR 8,000 or
48about $2.35 million in 1981.
One of the most important aspects of international 
outreach are the activities undertaken during the Hajj— the 
month of pilgrimages to the holy shrines in Mecca and Median. 
International outreach efforts include publishing guidebooks 
and information about the pilgrimage itself in nine different 
languages, inviting foreign correspondents and information 
experts from about 40 different countries to cover the
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religious activities, providing cassettes in Urdu with more
religious information as well as slide films to foreigners
interested in the event. Perhaps one of the most interesting
aspects of the international outreach efforts during the Hajj
is that all government ministeries cooperate in the effort
as well as students from the Communications Department of
49Riyadh University. But despite all these activities, up 
to the present time, there has been no concentrated, coordi­
nated, serious international outreach effort beyond these 
religious awareness efforts.
The Higher Council of Information
To solve some of these problems of domestic and inter­
national information dissemination, recognized boty by govern­
ment officials and Saudi Arabian citizens, the Minister of 
Information requested the creation of the Higher Council of 
Information with himself as President and 10 additional members. 
Other members included the Deputy Minister of Information, 
the Deputy Minister of the Interior, the Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Higher Education, 
three faculty members from any of the Kingdom's institutions 
of higher learning and three famous Saudi Arabian authors 
or philosophers. Dr. Yemani's request was approved in a letter 
from Crown Prince Fahd.^^ The council's first meeting was 
July 7, 1977 (1397), and Dr. Yemani defined the main goals.
174
The council was to make both domestic and international in­
formation policies for the Kingdom. These policies would 
not become official until they were approved by the King or 
the Crown Prince. The council met only once a month, and 
no new creative policy recommendations were made.^^ However, 
in 1981 His Majesty King Khalid issued a royal decree re­
organization of the higher council and assigning Prince Naif 
ibn Abdul Aziz, the Minister of the Interior to serve as 
President. During the first meeting. Prince Naif defined 
the council's new goals of formulating a new communications 
policy and ordering council members to determine new agenda
52items to be studied during the council's subsequent meetings. 
With this perspective of Saudi Arabian mass communications 
and its existing domestic and international communication 
efforts, the necessity for improving domestic and international 
outreach efforts exists. Specific suggestions for improvement 
will be discussed in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter sill explain why Saudi Arabia would bene­
fit from having its own international communications system 
and propose a plan for the development of the system. To 
illustrate the need for such a system we will review the weak­
nesses of the Kingdom's current efforts in the field of inter­
national communication and propose a workable plan for estab­
lishing a Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency.
The plan will include proposed policies and goals for the 
Saudi Arabian effort, drawing on the adaptations of strategies 
and techniques from the United States' and the Soviet Union's 
international communications system. We will suggest an or­
ganization and structure for the new agency and the type of 
personnel required to staff it, and finally, offer some ex­
amples of international outreach efforts.
Although it is sometimes interrupted by cataclysmic 
events, the flow of information between nations throughout 
the world is reasonably predictable because it is governed 
by a few basic facts. There are only five major worldwide
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news agencies, and these are owned either by the government 
or private citizens of only four countries. Telecommunica­
tions facilities, while not quite so severely restricted, 
remain limited. Fewer than one-third of the world's nations 
produce and control an estimated two-thirds of both technology 
and technical information necessary for what we call a modern 
society. A concentration of wealth in certain countries makes 
it easier for their people to travel, to support the communi­
cations industry and its endeavors and to produce advanced 
equipment.^
Information has exerted an enormous impact and played 
an important role in the overall changes in global balance.
The importance of communications is highlighted in a state­
ment from the president of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty;
The Soviet Union is leading a concerted international 
campaign with the enthusiastic support of a large 
number of Third World countries to put the dead 
hand of the bureaucrat at the throttle of the world­
wide communications transmission system. The cam­
paign has already mobilized such support that we 
are now approaching a crisis in international com­
munications, perhaps more serious than anything 
we have seen since the Second World Was. . . .  By 
using such catch phrases as "development of support 
communications," and "communications imperialism,”
. . . [they appeal] to the defense of indigenous 
interest and culture against the historic "dominance 
of the West."2
W.G. Harley cites still another example from U.N. documents.
At the 19th General Conference of UNESCO. . . November 
[1976] at Nairobi, there were two and a half days of 
heated debate on the international role of the media. 
Sopkesmen for the Third World deplored the West's 
overwhelming dominance of the world's news and assailed 
its global news agencies for assorted sins of omission 
and commission.3
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The Need for a Saudi Arabian International 
Communication System
Saudi Arabia is now in the second year of its third 
five-year economic plan. During the first two plans, there 
were no coordinated, effective domestic and international 
communications systems. Because of the increased importance 
of worldwide communications systems, because there was no 
coordinated international outreach efforts during the first 
two five-year plans, and because the third plan is designed 
to increase Saudi Arabia's role in world leadership, it seems 
essential that an effective international communication system 
complement the third plan and its objectives as well as all 
future plans for progress. To fill this gap, I believe we 
must reorganize the entire flow of information both domestical­
ly and internationally. We have seen in Chapter Four that 
during the last decade, the Ministry of Information, despite 
its efforts, has done little in the area of international 
outreach. The problem has not been lack of money: the prob­
lem is a lack of qualified personnel with an understanding 
of the practical application of mass communications techniques. 
And since there are adequate funds, it is possible to hire 
qualified personnel from outside the Kingdom until enough 
Saudi Arabians can be trained to assume these positions. This 
policy of hiring foreigners until Saudi Arabian citizens can 
be trained is a policy which has been followed by almost all 
of the government ministeries.
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A brief study of domestic and international communica­
tions systems in the Middle East shows them to be practically 
nonexistent for a variety of reasons. Most Middle Eastern 
countries face social, political, and economic problems which 
require immediate government attention, and there is little 
time left for thought about the needs of establishing an ef­
fective communications system. However, Saudi Arabia does 
not fit into that category as many of its Middle Eastern neigh­
bors do. This is not to say the Kingdom has not had its share 
of problems in adjusting from an underdeveloped nation into 
a developed one, but the problems have been less pressing, 
thanks to the Kingdom's political stability and sound economic 
foundation.
It is part of human nature throughout the entire world 
to attack those who have special advantages. Saudi Arabia 
is not exempt from this type of attack. The Kingdom controls 
vast oil deposits as well as the Holy Cities of Mecca and 
Medina and becomes a fair target for slings and arrows both 
from its Arab neighbors and from other nations. So, although 
the Kingdom has the opportunity to develop an effective domestic 
communications system, it has not been able to create an inter­
national outreach system with specific goals and policies 
to achieve them. Thus, there has been no policy either to 
counteract unfavorable information by providing other infor­
mation which would create a favorable attitude toward the 
Kingdom or to counteract adverse publicity and impressions
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by providing more favorable and accurate information. An
information system will utilize every possible avenue of
communication.
Any situation in which information is presented, 
assessed, and decisions rendered should not be over­
looked as an important medium susceptible to manipu­
lation. . . . The results, findings, and recommenda­
tions of these "media" may find their way into news­
rooms and then be disseminated via the mass media.
But what the mass media ^  with these reports depends 
upon their . . . needs and not on direct manipulation 
by government and other organizations . . . that 
provide official reports to fulfill their interests 
may rely on reporters who know little about the 
substance of the report to present the sanctioned 
image to the public.4
In Saudi Arabia's case, these reporters are mostly foreign 
and are " . . .  constrained [to fulfill] the requirements 
of news work. Both parties involved in the propaganda process, 
and the medium each uses must be understood."^
Propaganda is simply a contrived and artful way of 
presenting some facts and interpretations as though they 
were truthful.® Saudi Arabia could present the most truthful 
and useful facts without any contrivance. Successful govern­
ment information specialists are well aware that the people 
cannot be consistently lied to or they will begin to realize 
the lie, the effort will boomerang, and damage credibility.
A perfect example exists in Saudi Arabia. Very frequently, 
the Ministry of Information bans certain publications or 
movies, and the reaction of the general public is to decide 
they want to read the book or see the movie for themselves 
before making a decision. In a word, the general public's
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reaction is distrust.
There is a body of analytical literature on the 
development of Saudi Arabia which consists of some­
thing like twenty-five scholarly articles and per­
haps an equal number of books. This reveals a 
scholarly aridity comparable to the Rub Al-Khali, 
that vast empty quarter of Arabian desert rarely 
traversed by man. Yet this state of affairs has 
not constrained writers and journalists from mak­
ing generalizations about the Kingdom which at best 
are lacking the modesty which should be the scholar's 
cloak and at worst casts Saudi Arabia in an unfavor­
able light.?
Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense, explained the
problems generaged by the lack of an effective international
communications system when the United States Congress was
voting on the sale of AWACS planes to the Kingdom.
The disheartening truth is that the world press 
lacks an understanding of Saudi Arabians. People 
are unaware of events in Saudi Arabia and regard 
the entire Kingdom as one person who has made a 
mistake and from that make fictionalized general­
izations. In Saudi Arabia . . . [there are] some 
of the most sophisticated military schools. . . .
By the end of this year [1981], F-15 planes will 
arrive, and they will be piloted by 20 recently 
trained Saudi Arabians. However, the AWACS are 
only an airplane which any pilot of Saudi Arabian 
Airlines could fly. What remains for them to learn 
is the operation of the sophisticated radar equip­
ment. And by the time the AWACS are delivered, 
we will have Saudi Arabians capable of using that 
equipment as well . . .
At this time, Saudi Arabia has no method of organizing 
available information and data as background for all subjects 
which might be of potential interest to the government. The 
establishment of an international communication system with 
a division designed to serve this purpose would be an invalu­
able reference library.
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An international communication system would never 
presume to make Saudi Arabian foreign policy. It should 
serve as a complement to foreign policy by influencing public 
attitudes on a worldwide basis and by informing the govern­
ment of the implications of foreign opinion toward Saudi 
Arabian foreign policies, programs, and official government 
statements, such as the informations services of the two 
superpowers do. International outreach efforts can create 
public support abroad if the goal is one of creating a peace­
ful world community of free and independent states, free 
to choose their own future and their own system, so long 
as it does not interfere with or threaten the freedom of 
others. The rest of the world does not view the Kingdom 
as a strong dynamic nation, qualified for leadership in world 
affairs. An effective international communication system 
could correct that misimpression.
One of the reasons for these misimpressions is that 
Saudi Arabia does not employ sophisticated techniques and 
strategies of communication. Another reason for the problem 
is the overlapping authority of government ministeries. Both 
the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Foreign Af­
fairs regard dissemination of information relating to Saudi 
Arabian foreign policy as their own purview, and, as a result, 
no real information is released. The Saudi Arabian effort 
does little to bolster morale or extend hope. It does not 
succeed in giving a true and convincing picture of Saudi
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Arabian life or culture to combat misrepresentations and 
distortions or to aggressively interpret and explain Saudi 
Arabian foreign policy or its social, political, economic 
and cultural affairs.
The medium of publishing books is also not used ef­
fectively. The Ministry of Information produces a large, 
expensive book about the Kingdom. And yet, using the same 
money— and finances are not even a serious consideration—  
smaller booklets which would appeal to more people could 
be produced.
Finally, and the most serious problem of all, particu­
larly in the Ministry of Information, is that personnel with 
specialized training in one field are frequently assigned 
to areas in which they have no education background, or practi­
cal experience. Political patronage has been and continued 
to be a problem. Government jobs are porvided to personnel 
who lack the expertise to work in a specific area. High 
government positions are given to personnel who, whole they 
may be well educated, lack the expertise to work in that 
specific field.
In addition to the weaknesses listed above, there 
are several other problems created because the Ministry of 
Information controls the international communication system.
To those who may argue that an international communication 
service falls within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Information, the following facts should be considered. First,
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the Ministry of Information through its owner-operation of 
the radio and television and supervision of the press system, 
focuses only on a small segment of international service; 
although the Ministry of Information established an inter­
national information department in 1979, as Chapter Four 
demonstrated, there have been no serious efforts to provide 
any type of international outreach; although the Ministry 
of Information is the government entity charged with provid­
ing information to the Kingdom, it does not handle public 
relations information from other ministeries or official 
establishments. Stated differently, the role of the Ministry 
of Information is a generalized one; however, this plan to 
establish an international communication agency has specific 
goals and strategies to achieve them. The content and na­
ture of this plan is much more appropriate for providing 
effective international outreach than the Ministry of Infor­
mation's present procedure.
System Goals and Policies
Although the proposed international communication 
agency will rely on modern communications techniques to 
achieve the major goal of creating a favorable impression 
of the Kingdom throughout the world, a delineation of specific 
goals and the policies to be used is needed.
However, there is one important caveat which must
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be kept in mind, before those policies and goals can be stated. 
The headquarters office of any international communication 
agency would not, nor should it be, allowed to form or change 
foreign policies created by the nation's leaders. This axiom 
also applies to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The main job 
of the proposed Saudi Arabian International Communication 
Agency will be to translate the foreign policy decisions 
made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the rest of the 
world. The main function of the headquarters office will 
be to decide whether a particular event or decision should 
be given international emphasis, the type of emphasis it 
should be given, and the media which will most effectively 
achieve that emphasis. As will be seen in a later section 
of this chapter, the proposed international communication 
agency will have geographical information centers scattered 
throughout the world. Personnel in these centers will not 
be allowed to determine the type of information to be dis­
seminated. All planning that is determining the strategies 
to be used to disseminate information will be done in the 
headquarters office, and the job of the media representatives 
in the geographical centers will be to implement those strat­
egies.
The Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency 
should have two main goals. The first is to defend the Islamic 
religion by counteracting any false propaganda spread about 
it. As shown in Chapter Two, the goals of both the Islamic
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religion and the Saudi Arabian government have been through­
out the Kingdom's history, and remain today, closely inter­
twined. Therefore communications strategies useful for pro­
moting Islamic interests are equally useful both to the Saudi 
Arabian government and its people and the reverse is also 
true. The proposed agency's second goal is to provide in­
formation to other governments, international institutions, 
and general populations of other countries so they will have 
a clearer understanding of Saudi Arabia and its role in solv­
ing domestic problems for its own people and international 
problems for the world community. For example, few people 
throughout the world are aware of Saudi Arabia's moderating 
influence among OPEC nations to stabilize oil prices. Nor 
is the world in general aware of Saudi Arabia's cooperation 
with the superpowers to create stability in the Middle East 
through such things as Crown Prince Fahd's plan for a peace­
ful solution to the Palestinian problem. Finally, most people 
are unaware of Saudi Arabia's cooperation with the World 
Bank to help finance loans to underdeveloped countries.
Some of the problems the Kingdom has had to face be­
cause of the lack of an effective international communication 
system will illustrate the need for a plan such as that pro­
posed in this chapter. After each of the problems is explained, 
specific policies to provide solutions will be discussed.
In the past, Saudi Arabia has had a bad image, especially 
among Western nations, mainly due to the success of Zionist
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and Communist propaganda. This misinformation depicts nega­
tive aspects of Saudi Arabian life and the Saudi Arabian 
people. Thus, one of the international communication agency's 
key policies will be to take counteractive measures against 
this propaganda by using a positive international outreach 
effort which will result in polishing the Kingdom's tarnished 
image, and emphasize the positive aspects of Saudi Arabian 
culture. As a result, many Saudi Arabians and people of 
other Arab nations believe that Westerners are biased against 
them. International outreach policies will include strategies 
to break down these prejudices and create a more favorable 
attitude toward the Middle East in general.
Saudi Arabia has many powerful friends serving as 
policymakers in their own countries who understand and appre­
ciate the Kingdom's role in world arfairs; yet these friends 
have never been utilized in any international outreach effort. 
One of the major policies will be to foster still further 
cooperation with these people, within the limits of protect­
ing their own nation's self-interest, by providing them with 
accurate information about the Kingdom they have not hereto­
fore received. The government's reaction to any adverse 
publicity is to expel any reporters and forbid circulation 
of the newspaper or magazine or broadcasts of the radio or 
television program. An effective international communica­
tion agency policy will include contacting the source of 
adverse publicity and pointing out any inaccuracies and
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requesting the correct information be disseminated. If the 
reporter or his medium refuses to do so, the agency could 
then arrange for distribution of the correct information 
on its own.
The Saudi Arabian government's policy has been to 
remain silent in the face of world criticisms. An example 
is the 1980 occupation of the mosque in Mecca. In an inter­
view with the late editor-in-chief S. El-Lozi of Al-Hawadess a 
famous Lebanese news magazine, His Royal Highness Crown Prince 
Fahd explained the dangers of allowing adverse publicity 
to remain unanswered. He said that when a worldwide audience 
is permitted to make its own assumptions because the true 
facts about the incident were not provided, people use their 
imaginations to create the news and describe the event as 
worse than it was. His recommendation was that the Kingdom 
should provide accurate information, even if it might appear 
at first that releasing the information would do more harm 
than good.®
An effective international communication agency would 
have a policy to increase cooperation with worldwide news 
agency correspondents so they can easily enter the Kingdom 
and receive firsthand information they need to file their 
stories. An additional effective policy will be to allow 
the international communication agency to serve as the sole 
official voice of the government. This would also solve 
the problem of conflicting reports coming from several
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government spokesmen.
However, it is not enough to assert these policies 
ought to exist. Additional strategies and goals must be 
outlined to carry out these ideas. There are several strate­
gies for disseminating information being used by the United 
States which are also useful for Saudi Arabia. This plan 
for a Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency will 
be designed to avoid some of the pitfalls suffered by the 
United States International Communication Agency which were 
discussed in Chapter Three. For example, it will be neces­
sary for the system to have specific goals for specific areas, 
and no one working in the Kingdom's international outreach 
effort must ever be allowed to confuse activity with effec­
tiveness. Administrative personnel in the Saudi Arabian 
International Communication Agency will remember that more 
is not always better. This will entail considerable train­
ing of personnel and a clear articulation of their duties.
Adaptations from the United States 
and the Soviet Union
The United States' techniques of selecting media and 
the tone of the message to be transmitted, as explained in 
Chapter Three, can be adapted wholesale for use in Saudi 
Arabia. In addition to adapting the U.S. strategies of bol­
stering morale and interpreting and explaining Saudi Arabian 
foreign policies, there are a number of techniques and
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strategies used by the United States which can also be used 
effectively in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom's international 
communication agency could use the technique of explaining 
Saudi Arabian motives using the strategies of information 
exchange and research. The Kingdom can exchange information 
about its development plans to assist underdeveloped coun­
tries. The agency could conduct special studies overseas 
to determine communication patterns, foreign attitudes toward 
Saudi Arabia and its policies, to define target audiences 
and to assess the effectiveness of the agency's programs.
As mentioned earlier, the agency could provide a true and 
convincing picture of Saudi Arabian life, methods, and ideals.
Strategies for this technique would include films 
and interpersonal contacts. Saudi Arabia can produce how- 
to-do-it educational films and documentaries promoting the 
beauty and virtues of the Kingdom's way of life. Films seem 
to be the most effective medium of communications, especially 
in areas where the literacy rate is low. Interpersonal con­
tact is also an effective strategy. Word of mouth is one 
of the most effective ways to influence other people's atti­
tudes. It has the advantage of providing an enormous return 
on a very small investment.
One of the goals to create a more favorable attitude 
toward the Kingdom and an effective strategy to achieve that 
goal is combatting misrepresentations and distortions. The 
U.S. rebuttal techniques provide an effective means of carrying
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out this startegy. Communist or Zionist propaganda need 
not bereferred to directly. Or the accusation or distortion 
can be mentioned only as a starting point. Or it is possible 
to tell both sides, which is often the most effective techni­
que of all. The most important strategy any international 
outreach effort can pursue is that of telling the truth.
There is one additional important note to be considered 
here. Not all of the United States' credibility techniques 
are applicable for use in Saudi Arabia by virtue of the King­
dom's culture. Although basic, true facts are used in the 
message, the appeal is as emotional as it is intellectual.
U.S. strategies which can be used in Saudi Arabia are:
(A) stressing a simple, well-known fact that is easily 
recalled;
(B) generalizing to imply that no one in the world 
would sincerely challenge a particular statement or theme;
(C) delivering the message without undue bombast 
or emotionalism, whether it be spoken or written;
(D) not always pursuing the same line on a subject;
(E) clearly distinguishing between news and commen­
tary, and,
(?) organizing facts logically so that the audience 
draws the desireed conclusion.
However, the United States is not the only super­
power with effective communication techniques. Because the 
Communist method of government does not stress freedom—
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particularly freedom of information— it is tempting to dis­
miss Soviet techniques as not being useful. But this would 
be a serious mistake. As shown in Chapter Three the Russians 
are masters at the propaganda game, and there are several 
strategies and techniques as well as media channels which 
can be used to improve Saudi Arabia's international outreach 
efforts. It would be effective to adapt the Soviet Union's 
philosophy and equate the power of a worldwide information 
system with the strength of being the center of the Islamic 
religion, the Kingdom's political stability and its solid 
economic foundation. The Soviet technique of innocence by 
association could be modified to quote excerpts from articles 
in the popular press which are in support of Saudi Arabian 
policies. The technique of repeating a small number of ideas 
over and over again can be utilized. Saudi Arabian communi­
cators must be sensitive to the thoughts and philosophies 
of the group of people they are tyring to reach. The Saudi 
Arabian International Communication Agency can serve as the 
gatekeeper— as the official voice of the government and avoid 
the problem of conflicting stories from government officials. 
The Soviet technique of bribing newspaper editors can be 
greatly modified into an interpersonal contact strategy. 
Office managers at the geographical centers will be required 
to get acquainted with editors and reporters of all news­
papers and magazines in their areas— possibly by providing 
luncheon or dinner invitations or developing friendships
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with their families. Like the Soviets, the Saudi Arabian 
International Communication Agency will be permitted to op­
erate in secrecy, unhampered by the requirement of reporting 
all of its activities to the general public.
And finally, one of the most important strategies 
to be borrowed from the Soviet Union is to approach those 
living in other lands on an immediate basis. Recalling the 
quoted incident in Chapter Three in which the Americans tell 
the people of Indonesia that in a generation or two their 
children will be able to enjoy the same standards of living 
as a government official, and the communists suggest they 
knock off the government official so they could have a car 
immediately, it will be a vital part of Saudi Arabian strategy 
to show recipients of international outreach efforts the 
immediate benefits and rewards of a close friendship with 
the kingdom. The Saudi Arabian International Communication 
Agency will address its audiences in terms of their immediate 
problems to be solved and explain what the Kingdom is doing 
or can do to help provide a solution.
There are also several adaptations from the Soviet 
Union's use of media channels which can be used to benefit 
Saudi Arabia. They are:
(A) cultural agreements with nations throughout the 
world related to Islamic religion, science, education, lit­
erature, the graphic arts, music, sports, and disaster re­
lief ;
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(B) exhibitions to publicly demonstrate Saudi Arabian 
achievements in art, science, and industry;
(C) literature written in the target audience's na­
tive language to provide one of the best ways of learning 
about the lives of people in other countries, and
(D) participation in athletic events to create good­
will. However, carrying out these goals, strategies, and 
techniques will require a carefully designed agency. Of 
course the United States uses some of these tactics, but
it does not place as high a priority on some of them.
Organization and Procedure
The organizational structure of the Saudi Arabian 
International Communication Agency will be adapted from a 
combination of the organizational structures of the United 
States International Communication system and the Soviet 
Union's international communication service to accomodate 
the Kingdom's governmental organization and its culture.
First of all, the agency will require an upper-echelon admini­
strative structure. The top-ranking officials in the Saudi 
Arabian agency will be the president, vice president, and 
the president's administrative advisors. The president will 
hold the rank of a full minister, thus his authority to over­
see the agency's activities will come directly from the King 
or the Crown Prince. The agency's president will be a member
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of the Council of Ministers, the Council of Higher Informa­
tion and serve as a special advisor to the King in all commu­
nication matters, including the implications of foreign opin­
ion regarding Saudi Arabian policies, programs, and official 
statements. He will also attend meetings with the Minister 
of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Interior as well as meetings 
of Saudi Arabian intelligence agencies. The president will 
actively participate in helping other departments of the 
executive branch of government in providing international 
information about their particular Ministry's activities.
The president will have two advisors, one for domestic 
communications and one for international communication. They 
will be answerable directly to him. Their primary responsi­
bilities will be to supervise the activities of the directors 
general of domestic and international communication to ensure 
strict adherence to agency policy. The second-ranking of­
ficial will be the agency's vice president. He will be 
directly responsible to the president, and his major function 
will be to serve as a gatekeeper between the directors general, 
whose functions will be discussed more thoroughly in a later 
section, and the president. The president and other execu­
tive officers will have an executive secretariat. These 
personnel will serve as administrative assistants to the 
president, vice president, the two advisors for domestic 
and international communication and the directors general 
of the six major divisions. (The functions of these divisions
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are explained in the following paragraph). In addition, 
there will be an office administration section responsible 
for supervising the day-to-day operations of the department. 
It will also be responsible directly to the president.
The third-ranking officials will be the directors 
general of the six major divisions— assessment and research, 
security, worldwide exhibitions, data and information, domes­
tic, and international communication. All directors general 
will be responsible directly to the vice president and will 
be permitted to unofficially consult with both presidential 
advisors. Their primary responsibility will be to oversee 
the day-to-day operations of the departments and implement 
the communication strategies developed by the president.
The Division of Research and Assessment will have 
several responsibilities. It will study and evaluate all 
of the agency's communication efforts to determine whether 
the agency is achieving its major communication goals. It 
will conduct sample surveys as well as using other methods 
of research to provide data on foreign opinions regarding 
Saudi Arabian foreign policy and suggest the channels of 
communication most likely to reach target audiences of other 
countries. It will also conduct further surveys to determine 
what foreign audiences perceive to be their most immediate 
problems. The division will determine how well the nationals 
of a specific area understand international events and what 
their perceptions of those events mean to the Kingdom. For
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example, if they seem to understand a particular event fairly 
well, it might not be necessary for the agency to provide 
any additional information; however, if there appears to 
be little or no understanding, agency personnel will be alerted 
to the need for an intensive campaign.
In addition, division personnel will keep track of 
articles printed in foreign publications regarding Saudi 
Arabian actions and policies and report on the activities 
of foreign news services within the Kingdom. This will pro­
vide high-ranking agency officials with an understanding 
and evaluation of other international news agencies' efforts 
in the Kingdom. The division will also be responsible for 
selecting the most important subjects relating to current 
events and compile all related published material. It will 
prepare a half-hour cassette summarizing the news of the 
day for the specific use of all high ranking government of­
ficials. The mention of all relevant news items on the cas­
sette should be brief, but additional complete background 
information should be instantly available to any government 
official requesting it.
The security division of the Saudi Arabian International 
Communication Agency will be of utmost importance. Its func­
tions will be patterned after those of the United States 
International Communication Agency's security department, 
and it is important to explain how the United States uses 
this department. Until 1971 Radio Free Europe and Radio
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Liberty received most of their funding from the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency. When the source of this funding was 
confirmed, legislation was passed to force an end to CIA 
funding and provided for the continuation of radio broad­
casts through separate appropriations.^^ However, the coopera­
tion between the Voice of Liberty and Radio Free Europe and 
the CIA continued.
Although the CIA did not use radio personnel as 
agents to collect secret intelligence, we some­
times were able to provide the radios with singi- 
ficant information that they would not otherwise 
have had access to. It was part of our job to 
cull the intelligence flowing in from defectors 
for factually accurate items that could be used 
by the radios in their daily reporting on internal 
developments. In­
stated differently, the United States' major intelligence 
agency cooperated with the nation's main form of international 
information— radio broadcasts.
The same type of cooperation in Saudi Arabia is es­
sential to the effectiveness of any international outreach 
effort. The Saudi Arabian Intelligence Agency should be 
required to supply any information which might be necessary 
to develop information policies and programs. . The security 
division should also seek the cooperation of other inter­
national intelligence agencies, asking them to provide in­
formation both to the communication agency and the Propaganda 
Intelligence Agency, regarding any event or the activities 
of any person which may be of interest or assistanct to the 
Kingdom. The president of the Saudi Arabian International
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Communication Agency must have access to confidential infor­
mation which should not be made public or circulated beyond 
the confines of His Majesty’s office, so that the most ef­
fective information program possible can be initiated. The 
security division will also have other responsibilities.
It will be responsible for the physical safety of personnel, 
materials, and equipment of international information centers 
both at home and abroad. It can also serve as an investiga­
tive arm by providing background information about all em­
ployes wishing to work for the Saudi Arabian agency. The 
security division can be used to conduct other investigations 
unrelated to the employment studies. It can be used to gather 
information about visitors to the Kingdom through coopera­
tion with other international intelligence agencies as well 
as with Sauid Arabia's own intelligence network.
The director general of the Worldwide Exhibition divi­
sion will be responsible for recognizing potential situations 
in which an exhibition within a given coüntrÿ' could be staged. 
He will be responsible for obtaining clearance, both from 
his own agency and government, to sponsor the exhibition, 
determining the type of exhibition to be held, and the type 
of materials necessary for it as well as supervising pro­
duction of those materials by the subdivision directly re­
sponsible for producing for a given medium.
The division of Organization of Data and Information 
will be responsible for computer storage and correlation
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for easy retrieval of all information required by the agency, 
ranging from payroll information to background histories 
of foreign press personnel to results of studies conducted 
by the Assessment and Research division. Computer programs 
to store the types of information programs aimed at specific 
target audiences at specific times and any survey results 
regarding the reactions to and effectiveness of those pro­
grams will be designed. In addition, the computers will 
store past articles written about Saudi Arabia as produced 
by the Division of Assessment and Research. Terminals for 
providing detailed information, except in those areas which 
the President has been told are too sensitive for general 
dissemination, should be located in all highranking government 
officials' offices so».fhey #ill have instant access to all 
necessary information. Terminals will, of course, be in­
stalled in the offices of the agency's president, vice presi­
dent, presidential advisors, directors general, geographical 
centers, and Saudi Arabian embassies throughout the world.
The Training Division will have two primary responsi­
bilities; first, it will be recruiting qualified experts 
to work in each of the agency's sections, and secondly, for 
negotiating agreements with major universities, four of the 
major international news agencies— Agence France Presse, 
Reuters, Associated Press, and the United Press International—  
as well as major public relations agencies throughout the 
world to provide specialized training programs for Saudi
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Arabians. In addition, the Training Division will set the 
qualifications for empl03nnent for each job in each section 
and cooperate with the security division in conducting pre- 
emplo3nnent investigations. It will be responsible for locat­
ing foreign authors who might be commissioned to write favor­
able materials about Saudi Arabia for distribution by the 
agency's international and domestic communication division. 
Training officers will be responsible for the promotion and 
career development of section employees. Employees will 
be given the opportunity to receive additional or advanced 
training, either devised by this section, on ir cooperation 
with Saudi Arabian universities or through the previously 
mentioned international training agreements.
The Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency 
will have three subdivisions— radio, television and film, 
and a foreign press section. The three subdivisions will 
be responsible for the actual production of materials to 
be distributed locally and by the geographic centers. Each 
will specialize in its own channel of communications and 
will use the specific techniques for communicating a specific 
bit of information to a specific audience as outlined by 
the agency president and his advisors.
These three subdivisions will perform much of the 
agency's technical work. All sections must include technical 
personnel for actual physical production of the materials 
and professionals to do the writing, editing, creating the
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scripts, and planning the films and television and radio 
programming. These subdivisions will establish foreign press 
centers within the Kingdom to assist foreign correspondents 
in reporting accurately about Saudi Arabia. These centers 
will provide reference services, assist in arranging inter­
views with government officials, and provide photos and back­
ground information.
The two most important divisions are domestic and 
international communication. These two divisions must cooper- 
ate-closely with each of the others. They will be responsible 
for all information dissemination both inside the Kingdom 
and abroad. For example, the general director of Domestic 
Communications will need to have access to strategies used 
to reach target audience abroad whose nationals will be ex­
pected to visit the Kingdom during the Hajj or foreign guests 
holding jobs in Saudi Arabia. But most importantly, the 
two will be responsible for implementing strategies and 
techniques for communication developed by the president and 
his advisors. They will supervise the production of this 
material and submit it to the president for his approval 
before distribution. This includes foreign radio broad­
casts and newspapers aimed at audiences living outside the 
Kingdom and foreign guests living inside Saudi Arabia. These 
two departments will be responsible for all communication 
targeted for any foreign audience. All of these divisions 
will be located within the Kingdom, but the Saudi Arabian
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International Communication Agency will also have locations 
abroad.
The geographic centers of the agency will be very
similar to those maintained by the United States. Each center
will have libraries of books, magazines, and audio visual
programs providing information about the Kingdom as well
as free maps and posters and guidebooks to provide still
more information. Centers will be scattered throughout the- *
world in major cities such as London, Paris, Madrid, Rome, 
Tokyo, Mexico City, Toronto, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, 
Houston, New York City, Tunis, Beirut and Cairo.
Personnel
After reading the preceding section on organization, 
it may appear at first glance that the proposed Saudi Arabian 
International Communication Agency will add large numbers 
of employees to the government's payroll. This is not the 
case for two reasons; first, the system will be a highly 
sophisticated one, relying on computers to do much of the 
work, and secondly, since few Saudi Arabians are trained 
to staff an international communication center, much opera­
tional work will be contracted with other nations to provide 
both initial staffing for the agency and to train Saudi 
Arabians to eventually assume those positions. Finally, 
the wise use of both civil and foreign personnel will decrease 
the number of employees, at least initially.
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The quality of employees sought to staff the agency 
will be important. Civil Service personnel will include 
all the agency's high ranking officials, extending to the 
managers of the several geographical centers. In the head­
quarters office, qualified Saudi Arabians will be given • 
preference in the lower echelon jobs. Although the geographi­
cal centers will be managed by Saudi Arabians, it will be 
the manager's job to recruit nationals from each country 
or geographical section in his area to help write some of 
the desired information, thus achieving the goal of sensi­
tivity to and an understanding of a given target audience's 
responses to messages. Most importantly, the manager will 
locate qualified public relations agencies to conduct the 
creation of and dissemination of information about Saudi 
Arabia, using the most sophisticated media campaigns for 
that particular area.
All agency personnel hired to work directly for the 
Saudi Arabian government must have several things in common. 
Obviously, they must be experts in their fields. No inter­
national outreach effort can succeed without competent 
writers who understand the basics of communication theories. 
Those writings must be supported by technical personnel cap­
able of producing the best material possible in each of the 
media. The training section can devise programs to educate 
many agency employees, and as mentioned earlier, further 
training can be provided through international agreements
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as well as from foreign corporations hired to implement the 
agency's plans. Personnel serving in the geographical centers 
must, of course, understand the agency's goals and policies 
as well as the strategies and techniques to implement them.
They must be politically sensitive both to Saudi Arabian 
goals and to the political goals of the country or area in 
which they serve. Their political awareness should be equal 
to that of their counterparts serving in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.
Another essential requirement is the ability to commu­
nicate with the people they are trying to persuade in their 
own language. This is particularly important because while 
many of the people the agency is trying to reach do speak 
two or more languages, they think in their native tongue, 
and it is the agency's primary task to influence its audience's 
thinking. To be more specific;
(A) The geographical center director must understand 
both Saudi Arabian objectives, the policies used to achieve 
those objectives, and the reasons why the Kingdom is pur­
suing a particular strategy.
(B) It is not necessary for him to have access to 
the same information as the upper echelons of government; 
he should be permitted access to information on a need-to- 
know basis.
(C) He must also understand the thinking patterns 
of the people he is trying to influence as well as the
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average citizen's aspirations, fears, prejudices, and the 
methods he used in the decision-making process.
(D) He must project Saudi Arabia to the people in
the area or nation in which he is stationed in such a way
that they will gain an understanding of who Saudi Arabians 
are and why they think the way they do.
(E) He must be flexible enough to adapt to a way 
of life in a strange country, and, if he has a wife, she
must also be able to do so.
(F) Finally, he must believe in the Saudi Arabian
goals so he will have the courage to speak out about them,
even if the effort seems fruitless at the time. He must
be able to think in terms of long-run as well as short-run
benefits.
Examples of International Outreach Projects
Up to this point, the discussion of the agency's inter­
national outreach efforts have been relatively technical 
and focused on organization and general goals. However, 
the agency cannot succeed without some specific types of 
international outreach efforts. Although the Saudi Arabian 
International Communication Agency programs will vary from 
country to country, the following activities, some of which 
have been touched on earlier in specific examples, can be 
used as part of the international outreach effort;
1. Personal contact with government officials, editors.
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writers, educators, business executives, and other public 
opinion makers in the country;
2. Preparing press, photo, radio and television cov­
erage of special events in Saudi Arabia;
3. Producing and providing TV program materials to 
be placed on domestic and international television stations;
4. Supplying news and feature materials to the local 
and international press, news agencies, and foreign and local 
groups in support of Saudi Arabian objectives;
5. Producing and distributing magazines, pamphlets, 
leaflets, posters, and official photo displays to local and 
foreign interest groups through mailing lists;
6. Producing documentary films and showing them through 
public outlets, including projection rooms within the geographi­
cal centers or through the use of multi-media vehicles or 
through the loan of audio visual equipment;
7. Operating information centers, reading rooms, 
and extension services in selected cities in Saudi Arabia 
to conduct lectures and discussion programs and Arabic lan­
guage instructions.
8. Providing international exhibits to interpret 
Saudi Arabian foreign policy and the Kingdom's scientific, 
economic, cultural, and social development;
9. Assisting local publishers to produce books about 
Saudi Arabia in translation and encouraging local authors ;to
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prepare books which focus on Saudi Arabia culture and interest ;
10. Selecting appropriate books and periodicals to be 
presented to key institutions and individuals;
11. Providing financial aid and assisting foreign uni­
versities and other institutions in countries in which Arabic 
is not the native language to establish courses in Arabic and 
Islamic studies, and
12. Inviting foreigners to visit the Kingdom. Once
a person has visited Saudi Arabia, at the Kingdom's expense, 
and has invested a portion of his time as a guest professor 
in a university, for example, that person will have a greater 
understanding of what the Kingdom is trying to achieve and 
is more likely to remain friendly toward Saudi Arabia.
There is also another important aspect of international 
outreach which has not so far been discussed. In an article 
for ARAMCO World Magazine, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yemani, the 
Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources, pointed out that 
in 1980 alone, ARAMCO contracted with the Saudi Arabian govern­
ment for SR 8.6 billion or $2.2 billion. These contracts are 
with completely owned Saudi Arabian companies or with corpora­
tions in which Saudi Arabia owns considerable shares. All
companies licensed to conduct business in the Kingdom are
12established under the name of a Saudi Arabian national. If 
just one corporation, such as ARAMCO, can spend this much money, 
the sums paid to other companies including Exxon, Mobil Oil,
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Standard Oil, Phillips Petroleum Co., Philip Holzmann, Lockheed, 
Boeing, McDonnel Douglass, Sony, Mitsubishi, IBM, Thompson,
Three M and Honda— to mention only a few— is stupendous. It 
seems only reasonable that before the Saudi Arabian government 
awards a contract to do business in the Kingdom, the corpora­
tion should agree to a contract clause requiring the company 
to assist in the Kingdom's international outreach efforts in 
its home nation by sponsoring newspaper, radio and television 
advertising designed to provide information about Saudi Arabia.
In fact an excellent example is the full-page newspaper 
advertisements which ran in the Daily Oklahoman and the 
Oklahoma City Times, published October 13, 1980. It is worth 
noting that the ad says the same advertisement had "...been
13published over the past several days in eleven major newspapers."
The ad's headline reads, "A Message Worth Repeating," and describes
14the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as "far more than oil." The
main purpose of the advertisement was to encourage the American
public's support for the sale of the U.S. AWACS planes to Saudi
Arabia, and the ad points out that while,
...there has been a flood of commentary on the 
political and military aspects of the President's 
proposals, but hardly a word on their economic 
implications. We would like to briefly outline 
the profound and rapidly growing economic partner­
ship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. 15
According to the ad;
More than 700 American companies are now doing 
business with Saudi Arabia.... The enterprises
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involved extend to 42 states.... Even without 
regard to ARAMCO and the large U.S. oil companies, 
American business now holds well in excess of 
$35 billion in contracts for work with Saudi 
Arabia.
The body copy of the ad concludes with the statement, "Saudi
Arabia is far more than oil— it means trade for America, jobs
17for Americans and strength for the dollar." The second box 
of body type includes a partial list of the 700 companies doing 
business in the Kingdom.
While there have been no studies to determine the effect­
iveness of this particular series of advertisements, the fact 
remains— the American public opinion gradually came to favor 
the sale of the planes and an agreement between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia was eventually signed. Corporate execu­
tives authorized the expenditures because they honestly believed 
it was in the best economic interest of the United States to 
provide the American public with the necessary information 
about the benefits Saudi Arabia provides to this country. If 
such advertisements, even on a smaller scale, were required 
of all foreign corporations, the international impact would 
be most effective. Of course, the companies could always retain 
the option of refusing to provide such media efforts, and the 
Kingdom could always retain the option of granting contracts 
to corporations willing to cooperate. Or if the corporations 
were not willing to bear the entire cost of a media effort, 
perhaps an agreement could be worked out wherein both Saudi 
Arabia's government and the corporation shared the expense.
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This might also benefit companies recruiting Americans or 
people of other nationalities for their Saudi Arabian enter­
prises.
At this point, it might be helpful to review the prom­
ised parameters of this study as outlined in Chapter One 
and to briefly illustrate how these promises have been kept.
In Chapter One the problem of utilizing only a capital-inten­
sive strategy and the advantage of using a combination of 
both capital-and labor-intensive strategies for development 
in Saudi Arabia were explained. I have shown how the role 
of mass communications is greatly enhanced by combining the 
two planning strategies. Chapter Two explained how the King­
dom's interrelated cultural, educational, economic, religious, 
and political systems both influence any plan to devise an 
international communication system as well as contribute 
to the understanding of why the Kingdom needs such a system. 
Chapter Three was designed to explain and illustrate several 
communication theories or strategies as they are used by 
the United States and the Soviet Union in their international 
outreach efforts. The United States felt the need to begin 
a project of international outreach during World War II and 
eventually this led to the establishment of the United States 
International Communication Agency. In contrast, since Lenin's 
time, the Russians have understood that the spread of communism 
depends on the general public's acceptance of it as a viable 
political doctrine. Soviet leaders have also been well aware
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that international outreach efforts are most effective when 
directed at the general public, and thus, it became a logi­
cal conclusion for international information to become the 
natural weapon for creating favorable attitudes toward Commu­
nist doctrine. Chapter Four explained the development of 
the mass media in Saudi Arabia, the structure of the Ministry 
of Inform^^^[^^«^veyed domestic and international outreach
unctions the Higher Council 
an explanation of 
an international communi­
asses of the Kingdom's 
^national communication 
Itry of Information 
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Conclusions
As a result of the preceding chapters of work, I have 
reached the following conclusions:
(A) The Saudi Arabian International Communication
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that international outreach efforts are most effective when 
directed at the general public, and thus, it became a logi­
cal conclusion for international information to become the 
natural weapon for creating favorable attitudes toward Commu­
nist doctrine. Chapter Four explained the development of 
the mass media in Saudi Arabia, the structure of the Ministry 
of Information, surveyed domestic and international outreach 
efforts, and explained the functions of the Higher Council 
of Information. This chapter provided an explanation of 
how Saudi Arabia, could benefit from an international communi­
cation program. In addition, weaknesses of the Kingdom's 
current efforts to establish an international communication 
system and the weaknesses of the Ministry of Information 
were also explained. Finally, strategies and techniques 
from both the United States and the Soviet Union were adapted 
for use in Saudi Arabia and combined with logical policies 
and goals to meet Saudi Arabian needs. A proposed organiza­
tion chart and description of personnel characteristics were 
combined to create an international communication agency 
staff.
Conclusions
As a result of the preceding chapters of work, I have 
reached the following conclusions:
(A) The Saudi Arabian International Communication
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Agency needs to be established according to the design described 
in this Chapter.
(B) Establishment of such an agency could correct 
many of the weaknesses of the current international outreach 
efforts and solve many of the problems of disseminating world­
wide information about the Kingdom. It must be clearly 
understood that the proposed international communication 
agency would be in charge of all domestic and international 
communication efforts which are aimed toward foreigners as
a target audience. This means a certain amount of the agency's 
activities will, of necessity, occur within the Kingdom's 
borders.
(C) If the Saudi Arabian International Communication 
Agency is established according to this plan, the only re­
maining duties of the Ministry of Information will be the 
operation of radio and television stations broadcasting pro­
grams aimed at a target audience of Saudi Arabians and super­
vision of newspapers also aimed at Saudi Arabian readers.
(D) International exhibitions have always been under 
the direction and control of the Ministry of Commerce, and
I propose that since these are basically international out­
reach efforts, responsibility for these exhibitions be trans­
ferred to the proposed international communication agency.
(E) Finally, and most importantly, while it should 
be remembered that the president of the international commu­
nication agency would be a member of the Higher Council of
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Information and responsible to it, it should also be remember­
ed that the council formulates domestic and international 
communication policies for the Ministry of Information.
(F) Therefore, I propose that control of all mass 
media aimed at a target audience of Saudi Arabians be trans­
ferred directly to the Higher Council of Information and 
the Ministry of Information abolished in that its functions 
would be incorporated and executed by other units in the 
overall plan.
If this plan were to be followed, the Saudi Arabian 
International Communication Agency would be a mirror of the 
Saudi Arabian way of life; it would present a favorable pic­
ture of the Kingdom; and quite possibly, challenge other 
Third World countries to emulate Saudi Arabian accomplishments, 
Application of the plan could turn the use of information 
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